Japanese Emigration to Manchuria: 
Local Activists and the Making of the Village-Division Campaign

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Anke Scherer, M.A.

aus
Völklingen

Referentin: Prof. Dr. Regine Mathias
Koreferent: Prof. Dr. Heiner Roetz

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Note on names

Japanese and Chinese names are given in the order common in those languages with surname first. Macrons have been omitted in the case of Tokyo, Osaka and Kyoto where they appear in the text, in translations of organisations and as places of publication. Chinese place-names are transcribed in Hanyu Pinyin, their Japanese reading given in brackets. The area in northeast China to which Japanese peasants migrated is either called Manchuria (the term that came to be used for the region in Western languages), Manshūkoku (the Japanese pronunciation of the name of the country that existed in Manchuria 1932-1945) or Manzhouguo (the Chinese pronunciation of the country name). Manchukou is an older transcription of this name. The problem of the usage of the country name in China is shortly discussed in the text.

Glossaries give the Japanese characters for special terms, institutions, place names and the personal names used in the analysis. Whereas the reading for politicians, bureaucrats and academics who acted at the central level as well as the prominent actors at the local level could be clarified through biographical sources, the reading of some names of local actors of minor importance could not be verified. In these cases the most probable reading for the first name is used in the text. The year of birth and death in these cases could often not be established either.
Selected participants in the Village-Division Campaign

Traditional hamlets of the village of Ōhinata
Map of Manzhouguo
with railroads and selected settlements (in italics)
1. Introduction

Between 1932 and the end of World War II, approximately 300,000 people emigrated from Japan to settle as farmers in Manzhouguo (Japanese: Manshūkoku). This was the state created in Manchuria, in northeast China, a region which nowadays comprises the provinces of Heilongjiang, Jilin, Liaoning, parts of Inner Mongolia and Hebei.

The state of Manshūkoku was founded on 1 March 1932 and was dissolved on 20 August 1945. It was never a Japanese colony like Taiwan and Korea, although some Japanese authors call Manchuria a shokuminchi (colony). However, the usual appellation in Chinese literature as well as in some Japanese and Western studies for this short-lived entity is “puppet state” or “puppet regime”. The term “puppet” is used to describe the claim of the then Japanese government and, more specifically, parts of the Japanese Army, to control Manshūkoku. This control was exercised through members of the Kantō Army, which was created in 1919 to guard and administer Japanese concession territories in northeast China. The Kantō Army subsequently became the main power in the region. It initiated the founding of the state of Manshūkoku and made sure that every Manchurian government official had a Japanese deputy as “counsel”.

According to a definition by Max Weber, power “is the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests” (Weber 1947: 152). Thus regardless of Manshūkoku’s official status of independence from Japan, power was exercised by Japanese military men and bureaucrats forcing their will on Chinese-Manchurian government officials, who acted as their “puppets”.

In this framework of power distribution, the resettlement of large numbers of Japanese peasants in Manshūkoku would not have been possible without the involvement of the Kantō Army. In fact it supported the immigration of Japanese farmers in northeast China, although the idea for the resettlement did not originate with the Army.

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1 It is impossible to give the exact number of Japanese people from the countryside who were resettled in Manchuria. A statistic in the first comprehensive history of the migration contains a total number of 241,160 settlers (Manshū kaitakushi kankōkai 1966: 433-434); Young combines several sources to compute the figure of 305,867 settlers (Young 1998a: 395), whereas a Chinese history of Manshūkoku gives a number of 318,000 Japanese settlers (Lü 1980: 345). By adding the number of migrants from all Japanese prefectures, Araragi arrives at a total of 320,972 migrants from all over Japan (Araragi 1998: 96); Okabe Makio even gives a total of 321,873 Japanese migrants, of whom approximately 270,000 were still in Manchuria in August 1945 (Okabe 1978: 179).
Even before Manshūkoku was founded, a group of bureaucrats and academics associated with the agrarian nationalist Katō Kanji had envisioned the expansion of the so-called “Yamato race” to the continent, where settlers would live in self-sufficient communities of a rural utopia. Some officers from the Kantō Army, such as Tōmiya Kaneo, caught onto this idea, because they saw Japanese settlements in the Manchurian countryside as a means to guard railway lines, industrial plants, and the northern border with the USSR. On top, the agricultural settlements would provide food for the Japanese Army in Manchuria.

Having different motives but a common goal, the Kantō Army and the Katō group together lobbied for state sponsorship of migration to Manchuria. The cabinet, however, declined their first proposal in March 1932 for financial reasons. Persistent lobbying finally resulted in the drafting of a small-scale resettlement plan in August 1932. Plans for state-sponsored mass migration were approved only in August 1936, after a political shift to the right in the wake of the failed coup d'état of 26 February 1936.

Japanese migration to Manchuria is usually divided into three phases. During the test phase from 1932 to 1936, only a few hundred paramilitary settlers emigrated to the continent. The second phase from 1937 to 1941 was characterized by mass migration. In the last phase from 1942 to 1945, emigration stagnated and bureaucrats tried to compensate for the lack of farm households volunteering for migration by sending teenagers between 14 and 19 years old as members of the Brigade of Patriotic Youths for the Development of Manchuria and Mongolia, or “Youth Brigade” for short (Man-Mō kaitaku seishōnen giyūgun). At the end of the war, most men from the settlements had been drafted into the Japanese Army. After Japan’s surrender many settlements were attacked by Chinese guerrilla forces, and the settlers fled to bigger cities where they had to spend the winter of 1945/46 in refugee camps. Many of these refugees died of hunger, cold or illness, before the remainder were repatriated starting in the summer of 1946.

This study looks into the implementation of the mass migration plans of the late 1930s at the grassroot level. It analyses the short but decisive phase between 1937

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2 The core members of this group were the career bureaucrats Ishiguro Tada'atsu and Kodaira Gon’ichi, both originally from the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, as well as the academics Hashimoto Denzaemon, professor at the Imperial University of Kyoto, and Nasu Hiroshi, professor at the Imperial University of Tōkyō (Manshikai 1965: 182).
and 1939, when the idea to promote emigration to Manchuria turned from a pet project of a network of people connected to Katō Kanji into a government-sponsored nationwide scheme called the Village-Division Campaign (bunson undō). To examine the evolution of this campaign and the roles of actors at the grassroots level, the study focuses on analysing the most famous case of so-called “village-division” (bunson), the village of Ōhinata in Saku County of Nagano Prefecture. The concentration on the village level through a case study of the best-documented example of the campaign, as well as the contextualization of events in Ōhinata into the broader perspective of the emergence of the nationwide campaign, aims to contribute to the discussion about the mechanisms used to mobilize people from the countryside for a national migration programme.

However, before further elucidating the research question and study outline, it is necessary to describe the state of research on emigration to Manchuria in general, and to assess the various sources available for this kind of study.

1.1. State of the Field

Research about Japanese migration to Manchuria has evolved in several phases and from the different perspectives of Japanese, Chinese and Western researchers. This review introduces these phases, perspectives and different approaches as a way of defining the starting point for subsequent analysis.

Hardly any research on the sensitive topic of Japanese domination of Manchuria was done in the post-war period in Japan. The first article to address a related topic was published only in 1962 (Yamada 1962). Then, however, three large works about the history of Japan’s involvement in northeast China appeared within a period of just two years.

In 1965, the Society for (Research into) the History of Manchuria (Manshikai) published its Manshū kaihatsu shijūnen shi (Forty years of development of Manchuria), a three-volume history about all aspects of Japanese involvement in the development of Manshūkoku. This work also contains an appendix of nearly 100 pages about the institutions concerned with implementing the migration plans (Manshikai 1965). The compilation approaches the Japanese influence in Manchuria from an institutional point of view, and is mainly concerned with the political and economic development of the region. On the subject of emigration to Manchuria it provides an overview of
the organizational framework and the general environment in which migration took place.

The second large work about Japan in Manchuria published during this period takes a diametrically opposite approach. It is a collection of personal accounts from former Manchuria settlers, published by the Association for the Publication of Recollections from Manchuria (Manshū kaikoshū kankōkai 1965). It was undertaken from the perspective of those who experienced and survived the mass migration in the 1930s and 1940s, with the main purpose of preserving the memory of these former settlers. Since these kinds of publications are not concerned with analysing the migration process or its background, they can be used as source material about the migration endeavour compiled after the process.

The third work was the first comprehensive history devoted to all aspects of migration to Manchuria. This was published in 1966 by the Association for the Publication of the History of the Development of Manchuria (Manshū kaitakushi kankōkai 1966). The preface to this volume was written by no less than Katō Kanji, the main promoter of agricultural migration to Manchuria. Although it contains a broad range of material about the political background and the administration of the migration movement, and provides researchers with all kinds of information on events in connection to the emigration endeavour, it is nevertheless first and foremost the work of those who wanted to preserve their personal history and present their point of view to the general public.

Several trends in the research of migration to Manchuria originated from these beginnings. Although not all these trends play a role in the conceptualization of this study, it is necessary to outline them to position this study within the general discussion.

The approach to the history of Japanese migration to Manchuria through personal memories (exemplified by the 1965 publication of recollections) is most important for the market of popular books on Manchuria, so to some extent dominates the general public’s view of the topic. This trend can be quantified, for instance, through a 1995 bibliography prepared by Nichigai Associates on books related to the time of the Pacific War (Nichigai Associates 1995: 53-65). This bibliography lists 282 items under the entry Manshū kaitaku, i.e., the development or the conquest of Manchuria. The overwhelming majority of these publications, however, consist of personal accounts of former settlers. Books approaching the topic of migration to Manchuria from a
more scientific perspective are a clear minority. The list contains two early accounts of former settlers from the 1950s, one from 1950 and one from 1954, and 15 more from the 1960s. Then the number of items on the list rises to just over 50 for the 1970s, and in the 1980s we can see the beginning of what Yamamuro in 1989 called the “Manchuria Boom” (Yamamuro 1989: 354). The Nichigai bibliography lists nearly 140 books about settlement in Manchuria published in the 1980s and nearly 80 more just for the first half of the 1990s, most written from the perspective of the settlers’ personal experiences.

An interesting development is the treatment of the tragic fate of former Manchuria settlers in fiction. Even more than the published accounts of settlers’ experiences, these publications shape public perceptions of Japanese emigrants. Tsunoda Fusako, for instance, wrote a story of the wife of a paramilitary settler in Manchuria with motifs from real-life stories she had read (Tsunoda 1970). The novel was published by _le no hikari kyōkai_ (The “Light of the Home” Association), a publishing house which grew out of _le no hikari_, a widely distributed monthly magazine for rural people which had helped promote agricultural settlement in Manchuria during World War II (Itagaki 1992). Several fictional accounts like this followed, most prominently Yamazaki Toyoko’s _Daichi no ko_ (Child of the Earth) about the life of a Japanese boy left behind in China when his parents fled to Japan along with most migrants after the end of the war. The story was first serialized in the magazine _Bungei shunjū_ from 1987 to 1991 and later turned into a successful movie (Yamazaki 1991).

Since the focus here is on the stories of individual people – real or fictional – whose lives were severely affected by historical circumstance, this approach to the history of emigration to Manchuria can be called biographical. Its handling of the history of Manshūkoku ignores questions of responsibility for injustice and war crimes committed in the course of settling the area with Japanese people. In recounting (sometimes their own) life stories, authors can give an emotional account of (sometimes their own) personal connection with their “ideal country” (_risō kokka_). “Pleading ignorance” of the historical and political background of the state of Manshūkoku spares them the pain of being disloyal to the place they once called home (Yamamuro 1989: 360).

The topic of responsibility and the correct assessment of the migration policy, however, plays an important role in the evolution of academic research on the subject. This research started on a broader scale in the 1970s and thus paralleled the proc-
ness of rapprochement between Japan and the People’s Republic of China after the start of diplomatic relations in 1972, which then entered a new stage with the conclusion of the Peace and Friendship Treaty between the two countries in August 1978. In contrast to the early editors of migration history, the researcher of the 1970s were academics who did not have personal experience with emigration and were characterized by a very critical approach to Japan’s role in Asia during World War II. One of them was Yamada Shōji, then professor in the General Education Department of Rikkyō University. Together with two history students from Hōsei University and two students of education from Tōkyō Gakugei University, he prepared a report about the migration to Manchuria from Ōhinata Village (Rekishi kyōikusha 1972). This short booklet became the basis for Yamada’s work on the migration movement from Ōhinata, which culminated in the edition of documents and source material mainly from that village (Yamada 1978). However, although this edition also contains some articles about the migration movement in general and a narrative about the events in Ōhinata, it does not fully exploit the potential of the source material. It was explicitly published in a series of documents for grassroots history, not as an analysis of all aspects of the case of Ōhinata, so serves as an important starting point and valuable source of data for this study.

Whereas the work of Yamada and his students provide a point of entry into grassroots studies of the migration movement, Asada Kyōji, an academic who studied Japanese migration to Manchuria in the 1970s together with his students at Komazawa University, concentrated on the planning process and the central level. In his publications he methodologically tackled all aspects of the central administration of the whole migration process. He started with the first plans for agricultural settlements made by the Kantō Army (Asada 1974), then looked into the acquisition of land by the agricultural settlers (Asada 1976b) and their economic situation (Asada 1977a). In 1977 he also published an article addressing the problems of research into the history of agricultural settlers in Manchuria (Asada 1977b) and contributed a wrap-up of his findings on the political background of agricultural migration to Manchuria in Yamada Shōji’s above-mentioned collection of documents on Manchuria migration (Asada 1978). Asada had formed a group of researchers who called themselves the “Society for the Research into the History of Migration to Manchuria” (Manshū iminshi kenkyūkai). In 1976 they published a volume entitled Nihon teikoku-shugika no Manshū imin (Emigration to Manchuria under Japanese imperialism). It is
a classic in its field of research and contains the first academic overview of the major aspects of the migration movement (Manshū inminshi kenkyūkai 1976). Some contributors to this volume, such as Yunoki Shun’ichi and Kobayashi Kōji, were working in Asada’s department; others were Asada’s doctoral students, such as Kimijima Kazuhiko and Takahashi Yasutaka, or were academics from other institutions, such as Yoda Yoshie and Tanaka Tsunejirō. The members of this group produced important contributions to the discussion about migration to Manchuria, some of which serve as a basis for this study.

However, despite the broad variety of topics of these researchers, their work has one common denominator which is closely connected to the political framework of 1930s and 1940s. As can be seen from the programmatic title of the group’s main work – Emigration to Manchuria under Japanese imperialism – its research is focused on the function of the migration movement in the framework of Japan’s imperialist policy in East Asia. Most group members explicitly followed this lead in their later research, either as the framework for regional studies (e.g., Kimijima 1978) or directly – like Yoda Yoshie, who first published an article about Japanese imperialism in northeast China (Yoda 1978) and later presented a monograph on Japanese imperialism in China in general (Yoda 1988). Even Takahashi Yasutaka, who through a series of articles (which he finally collected and published as a book in 1997) became the specialist for the connection between the Rural Rehabilitation Movement of the early 1930s and the later mass migration to Manchuria, tackled his research from the point of view how Japanese farmers were instrumentalized by those campaigns to further the cause of Japanese fascism (Takahashi 1997).

This approach – even in studies where group members followed the development of one specific community that participated in the Village-Division Campaign, such as Yomikaki (Takahashi 1976), Yamato (Yunoki 1977) or Yasuoka (Kobayashi 1977) – led to an overemphasis of the planning process and the political ideology dictated from the central level. Participants in these government programmes tended to be categorized as victims of what the historian Okabe Makio called the “fascist colonization movement” (Okabe 1974).

Although not a member of the group around Asada, Okabe, too, focused on the role of Japanese imperialism in his research. After doing so in a study connected to the topic of migration from Nagano Prefecture (Okabe 1977), he turned to the political
history of the state of Manshūkoku created under the Japanese aegis (Okabe 1978) and continued working on Japanese colonialism.

Academic research in the 1970s thus provided a framework for the understanding of the Japanese migration policy as a vehicle of Japanese aggression on the continent. The implementation of the migration plans was seen as a top-down process, with Japanese peasants as the potential victims of fascistic structures. For lack of a better term, this focus can be classified as the ideological approach.

Another important aspect that emerged in the 1970s is the approach of studying the migration process in a specific village or region. The above-mentioned works about the villages of Yomikaki, Yasouka and Yamato, taken together with later studies about the villages of Nangō (Yunoki 1982, Abiko 1988), Kurikuma (Nakano 1983), Asahi (Nakamichi 1984 and 1991) and Chichibu (Yamakawa 1995), provide an overview of the Village-Division Campaign by individual analyses of prominent cases. This picture is completed by three articles about the Village of Ōhinata, which became a model village and showcase of the whole movement (Miyai 1981, Kindaishi kenkyūkai 1984, Ikegami 1995). What these studies all have in common, however, is that they treat their respective community as an example that illustrates how the central policy of mass migration was put into practice. They are village histories which record the events of a certain period of time and look into the specific influence the migration schemes had locally. Studies with a broader geographical scope, for instance about northeast Japan (Kusumoto 1995), or an individual prefecture such as Gifu (Gifuken 1977) or Ishikawa (Okino 1990), work the same way. The most extensive of such undertakings to record local history is surely the compilation on the migration movement in Nagano, the prefecture which sent the highest number of peasants to Manchuria (Naganoken kaitaku 1984). This geographical approach, i.e., the examination of Japan’s migration policy through the lens of one geographically defined example, can also be found for migrants from urban areas such as Osaka (Tanaka 1985, Ōsakafu 1989), or in the choice of topic not by the community of origin in Japan, but by the place of settlement in Manchuria, for example the first settlement of Iyasaka established in 1933 (Iyasaka 1986) or the second settlement of Chiburi founded in 1934 (Ōbora 1995).

Contrary to the often exclusively personal biographical approach centred on one or a few individuals, most studies with an ideological or geographical approach speak of
settlers in general, or mention individuals in leading positions as actors within the framework of the implementation of the migration policy.

Apart from either looking at individual life stories or treating settlers as a rather indistinct object of migration policies, the literature offers another approach, which groups together migrants according to their specific characteristics. The important objects of this kind of research are teenagers as members of the Youth Brigade, women as so-called “continental brides” (tairiku no hanayome), children left behind in Manchuria by fleeing settlers, and Korean farmers who were used as settlers in Manchuria especially in the early phase of Japanese expansion. These groups tend to be treated as victims of the general migration policy, mostly due to their vulnerability as women, children or colonial subjects. Most obviously victims of the Japanese migration policies were the resettled Korean farmers. They were technically Japanese subjects and were thus used by the Kantō Army to stake a claim in the Manchurian territory before Manshūkoku was founded (Kindaishi kenkyūkai 1986). This difficult topic, which combines the problems of Japanese colonial rule in Korea and its domination of northeast China by migration politics, was presented to the general public in Japan only in 1987 through a series of articles published in the magazine Sekai (Kim 1987) and then used by Barbara Brooks to discuss the status of colonially ruled Koreans in the Japanese empire in general (Brooks 1998).

This victimization theory cannot be used that easily for the other groups. A case in point is the Youth Brigade, a nationwide organizational structure which recruited tens of thousands of male teenagers for resettlement in specific brigades in Manchuria. Despite titles of recollections of former members of this Youth Brigade like Kōya ni kieta seishun ([A] youth vanished in the plains) (Dairikon dōshikai 1995) and research into the mechanisms in the education sector which lured young men into the brigades (Naganoken rekishi 2000), many teenagers saw brigade membership not as a sacrifice for the empire but rather as an opportunity for an adventurous life as a pioneer in a new country and a chance to become a landowning farmer overseas (Kami 1973, Shiratori 1986, Sakuramoto 1987). The Youth Brigade followed the tradition of the first Japanese who went to settle in Manchuria as busō imin, i.e., paramilitary settlers, the pioneers who between 1932 and 1936 tested the feasibility of settlement in Manchuria in small numbers (Kuwajima 1979). It is no coincidence that one of the first researchers who tackled the topic of the Youth Brigades in Manchuria arrived at this topic after a study about the first paramilitary settlers (Tsunazawa 1976, 1977).
The Youth Brigade was the original project of Katō Kanji to recruit Manchurian settlers and so played an important role in the overall history of the migration process, and it was the first topic directly connected with migration to Manchuria that was further scrutinized in the West (Suleski 1981). Despite this, the mobilization and administration structures for this group of migrants did not affect village politics and the social structure at the grassroots level in the same way as did the Village-Division Campaign. Therefore the role of the Youth Brigade is largely excluded from this study about the influence of local politics on the making of this campaign.

Other groups of Japanese settlers that researchers have singled out for specific studies are female settlers and children left behind in Manchuria after the end of the war. Like the teenage members of the Youth Brigades, they are often portrayed as victims. The precedent for seeing women as victims was set by an article by Yamazaki Tomoko, a housewife-turned-historian specializing in topics connected to women and imperialism, such as the karayuki-san, Japanese prostitutes in East Asia, and the “comfort women” (ianfu) from Korea, the Philippines, etc. who were forced into prostitution by the Japanese Army in the war. Yamazaki describes the “continental brides” – women who were sent to Manchuria to marry Japanese settlers already there – mainly in terms of their exploitation by male planners and settlers (Yamazaki 1972).

When the topic of the continental brides was taken up again two decades later, however, the approach was more balanced (Jinno 1992) and geared towards specific aspects of the training of these women in special bridal schools (Sugiyama 1996) and the mechanisms of their recruitment (Aiba et al. 1996). In the 1990s female settlers, not just those who came to Manchuria as continental brides, became the topic of colonial studies (Kanō 1993), gender studies (Tanaka 1997) and the study of everyday life (Shin 1996 and 2001).

Clear and undisputed victims of the migration movement, however, are the children left behind by their settler parents when they had to flee the settlements at the end of World War II. This topic was opened up to the general public when Saijō Tadashi’s memoirs of growing up as such a left-behind Japanese “orphan” in the People’s Republic of China (zanryū koji) became a bestseller (Saijō 1978). The search for left-behind children had begun in Japan in the 1970s through private initiatives, and made good progress, with the result that the first group of such orphans visited Japan in March 1981. In this way, this specific group affected by the migration policy be-
came a widely discussed topic in Japan (Hayashi 1983, Ide 1985, Igarashi 1996) and later and to a lesser extent in Western languages (e.g., Narangoa 2003).

However, the focus of this research is on the life of those orphans in China, their specific problems and the identity of the people “left behind” (Araragi 1992 and 2000). Like the research on continental brides, it does not contribute to the discussion about the impact of mass migration plans on a community planning their implementation in Japan.

The normalization of Sino-Japanese relations and the broad adoption of Japanese migration to Manchuria as a research topic also brought about new possibilities for Japanese research on Manshūkoku as a whole. After Okabe’s first general monograph Manshūkoku (Okabe 1978), more and more researchers concentrated on political, social and economic aspects of this Japanese-dominated state. An important instrument of Japan’s socio-political dominance was the “policy of harmony among the five races” (i.e., Chinese, Japanese, Korean, Manchu and Mongolian), which served as the ideological background for the import of Japanese farmers to the Manchurian countryside (Ōtani Tadashi 1980 and 1984). However, studies about the agricultural production of the Japanese immigrants and their use of Chinese and Korean labour in the land of harmony of the five races (Sakashita 1995), and the real situation in the co-existence of the different ethnic groups in Manshūkoku (Tsukase 1998), proved this ideal to be a mere creation of the Japanese propaganda.

Studies about the economy in Manshūkoku and the impact of migration of a large number of Japanese, looking beyond the propaganda fuelling the Manchuria hype, dismantled other notions about the profitable interaction of Manchuria and Japan. They concluded that the impact of Chinese labour migrants into northeast China on the development of Manchuria was usually underestimated (Kawano 1996), that the Japanese migration to Manchuria had negative impacts on the labour market in Japan (Kiyokawa 1982) and the controlled war economy in general (Kazama 1989), and that the assumption that Manshūkoku provided natural resources for Japan’s industry was a mere myth (Pauer 1998).

The general tendency of research about Manchuria in Japan is a shift from a politically sensitive topic at the beginning into a “normal” research topic in the 1990s – one

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3 Another possible composition of this group was to regard Koreans as Japanese subjects and to include Russians as one the five races instead (Hirano 1981: 97).
that is now approached from many different points of view. The topic has become part of mainstream history – one that is also popularized through illustrated booklets geared towards the non-academic general reader. The publishing house Kawade shobō shinsha, for instance, has devoted three paperbacks so far to Manchuria-related topics: a history of the South Manchurian Railway Company (Nishizawa 2000), an architectural history of the big Manchurian cities, which has been so popular that it has gone through several reprints (Nishizawa 20004), and last but not least, a history of Manshū teikoku (The empire of Manchuria) (Taiheiyō sensō kenkyūkai 1997). Iwanami Shoten, a publishing house with a reputation of providing Japanese readers with books that contain the standard knowledge of the time, has issued a series on modern Japan and colonialism which contains a wrap-up of Asada Kyōji’s life work (Asada 1993). Thus research about Manshūkoku and the Japanese migration to Manchuria has become part of colonial studies, where it is also used in works using a comparative approach (Hamaguchi 1996).

In the West, Japanese emigration to Manchuria is a topic that has not received much attention and is mostly treated as an appendix to other research subjects. The phenomenon of Japanese-dominated Manchuria came into focus in the 1980s in studies about Japan’s colonial empire (Myers and Peattie 1984), Japan’s Pan-Asiatic mission (Martin 1986), and Japanese imperialism in general (Nish 1986; Beasley 1987). However, Japanese migration to Manchuria is hardly mentioned here. At the beginning of the 1990s, Gavan McCormack presented his findings on the ideological construction of Manshūkoku as a state, which also included a discussion of the role of Japanese agricultural settlements in the new state (McCormack 1991). The first article which entirely focused on the history of Japanese migration to Manchuria in English was published by Sandra Wilson in 1995 and is basically an overview of the development of the migration policy from a central perspective. The focus of Western research, however, is still on Manchuria as part of the Japanese empire, as can be seen in a volume on Japan’s informal empire in Asia (Duus, Myers and Peattie 1996). This contains articles about the administration of occupied Manchuria (Matsusaka 1996) and the economic integration of Japan, Manchuria, and North China (Myers 1996), as well as Louise Young’s first article on the subject of the cultural construction of Manshūkoku and its connection to the idea of a Japanese empire in Asia (Young 1996). Young’s work on this subject for her PhD thesis culminated in the publication of Japan’s total empire: Manchuria and the culture of wartime imperialism, the
most thorough study of Japan’s imperialist aspirations in Manchuria to date, which also discusses the role of Japanese migrants in the making of the empire (Young 1998a).

Most recent Western research about Manshūkoku, however, concentrates on the political dimensions of the Japanese influence in the region, either from the Japanese perspective (Wilson 2002) or from the perspective of Chinese resistance to the Japanese takeover (Mitter 2000). Where Manshūkoku is studied, the focus is on the urban areas and culture (e.g., Lahusen 2000, Tamanoi 2005). Rural people, Chinese and Japanese, seem not to have played a role in the construction of Manshūkoku as a nation-state (Duara 1997 and 2003). They appear only in studies about how their Manchuria experience influenced their self-perception of being Japanese after they returned to Japan (Tamanoi 1998, 2000a, 2000b).

The discussion of the resettlement policies which brought those rural people to Manchuria in the first place is currently conducted in the context of the economic history of the Japanese countryside. A volume about Farmers and Village Life in Twentieth-century Japan contains not only articles about the fight against the Great Depression in the Japan’s rural areas (Smith 2003) and Japanese farmers and Manchuria between 1931 and 1933 (Wilson 2003). It also includes a study about the influence of the mass migration policy on the village economy, which contains an interesting approach to the problem of mobilization at the grassroots level and can therefore serve as a starting point for analysis in this study (Mori 2003). The above-mentioned volume is especially interesting in the evolution of research on rural Japanese and their migration to Manchuria because it was first published in English (Waswo and Nishida 2003) and then in Japanese (Nishida and Waswo 2006), with a nearly equal number of Japanese and Western contributors.

Compared to the size and variety of studies by Japanese researchers on the Japanese role in Manchuria, research by Chinese historians is meagre – though there are some interesting attempts at Chinese–Japanese cooperation, such as the above-mentioned Japanese–Western cooperation in the volume by Nishida and Waswo. However, according to Christine Moll-Murata’s findings, Japanese migration to north-east China does not even feature as a separate point in a 1995 bibliography of Chinese research into Japan (Zhongguo ribenxue 1995). She examined two studies about what historians from the People’s Republic of China always call Wei
Manzhouguo (i.e. Pseudo-Manzhouguo) to mark their non-acknowledgement of the Japanese puppet state (Moll-Murata 1998). The first of these studies was prepared by a group of Chinese researchers (Lü et al. 1980); the second was written by Xie Xueshi, one of the contributors to Lü et al.’s book (Xie 1995). Both studies follow the political agenda of demonstrating the negative influence of Japanese rule in northeast China and of assigning responsibility for destruction and exploitation to the Japanese military. The Japanese settlers, however, are put into the victim category, since they, as well as the Chinese population in Manshūkoku, were subject to the Army’s fascist methods of forced resettlement. Moll-Murata classifies the 1980 study as rather socialist in tendency, since its focus is on the class standpoint, and the 1995 study as rather nationalist in contrast, because it concentrates on the legality of the Chinese claim to the Manchurian territory (Moll-Murata 1998: 190). Both studies contain short remarks about the conspicuous absence of more research into the topic and present as a possible explanation a certain restraint by Chinese historians who in the beginning did not want to glorify or legitimize Japanese rule in Manchuria by documenting its history (cited according to Thøgersen and Clausen 1995: 122). However, as a reason for Chinese historians to tackle the subject nevertheless, the introduction to the 1995 study states that the sometimes apologetic tone of Japanese research on Manchuria generated a countermovement of Chinese research in the 1970s to criticize right-wing Japanese authors, and this led in turn to the publication of the first monograph about Wei Manzhouguo shi (The History of Pseudo-Manzhouguo) in 1980 (Lü et al. 1980). But this study accomplished its historical mission, and the development of historical research justifies new approaches to the topic of the history of Manzhouguo (Xie 1995: 1).

The prime example of such a new approach is documented in a 1997 publication of the Nihon shakai bungakkai (Japanese Association for Social Literature). Founded in 1989, this association first discussed subjects related to the Second World War in Asia, inviting participants from many different Asian countries to these conferences. One of the participants of the 1991 symposium was Lü Yuanming, a professor at the College of Education in Changchun and co-author of the 1980 history of Pseudo-Manzhouguo. He suggested that the next symposium of the association should focus on Manzhouguo, and offered to hold the conference in Changchun, in Jilin province. This symposium was officially hosted by the Committee for the Compilation of the Fourteen Year History of Foreign Rule [in Manchuria] (Lunxian shishi nian shi bian-
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This committee was founded in 1986 by the Institute for the Research about the History of the Chinese Communist Party (Zhongguo gongchandang zhongyang dangshi yanjiushi) to compile the history of the provinces of Liaoning, Jilin and Heilongjiang under Japanese rule. Thøgersen and Clausen cite two publications about its research, one in 1988 and one in 1991 (Wang 1988 and 1991 according to Thøgersen and Clausen 1995: 225). The first symposium in Changchun in summer 1992 was followed by four more, one a year, alternating between Changchun and locations in Japan. The outcome of this series of meetings was finally published in 1997 in Japanese under the title *Kindai Nihon to ‘Gi Manshūkoku’* (Modern Japan and Pseudo-Manshūkoku) (Nishida 1997). It is unique in so far as it contains articles – mainly about issues of culture and literature connected to the history of Manshūkoku – by Japanese as well as by Chinese authors, whose articles have been translated into Japanese. However, no Chinese version of the book seems to have been published in the People’s Republic of China.

Nevertheless, Chinese research on Japanese migration into Manchuria seems to continue. Gao Lecai, professor of history at Changchun’s Northeast Normal University, completed a project on Japan’s aggression against northeast China through emigration and published a book devoted specifically on Japanese emigration to Manchuria in 2000. This refers to some of the above-mentioned studies about Japanese migration to Manchuria by Japanese scholars.

An interesting participant in the discussion about Japanese imperialism in Asia is the Taiwanese author Huang Wenxiong, who calls himself Kō Bunyū in Japan. This Meiji University graduate is a prolific writer on Japanese colonial rule in Taiwan and Korea and has also published a book in Japanese about the difficult heritage of Manshūkoku and the problems caused by the way Japan deals with this part of its history (Huang 2001). He is evidently a member of the infamous association of revisionist historians named the Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform (Atarashii rekishishi kyōkasho o tsurukai, often abbreviated as Tsukurukai). On its website the society features Huang’s 2003 book *Taiwan, Chōsen, Manshū: Nihon no shokuminchi no seishin* (The truth about the Japanese colonies: Taiwan, Korea, Manchuria) published by Fusōsha, a publishing house closely associated with the Tsukurukai (Huang 2003). Whereas research on Manzhouguo in the People’s Republic of China is biased in its attempt to single out the negative effects of Japan in Manchuria, Huang
Huang has equally political motives for concentrating on the positive Japanese contributions in East Asia in his publications.

This review can be summed up in several points that lead to a more precise formulation of this study’s research question. In Japanese, Western and Chinese academic research about Japanese migration to Manchuria, there is a clear emphasis on a top-down perspective in the analysis of the development of the migration policies. Since Chinese studies have a clear political agenda and focus on the impact of the migration in Manchuria, they hardly contribute to the study presented here. In Western languages, relatively few scholarly works are concerned directly with the migration issue and can be used as a starting point for the following discussion. The largest amount of literature on all aspects of Japanese migration to Manchuria has been published in Japan. Nevertheless there are still questions left to be answered. The strong geographical approach on one side, and the ideological approach mainly concerned with meta-issues like the role of fascism and empire-building on the other, lead to a picture of a migration campaign with a well-researched planning process at one end and local histories mostly of villages that narrate events connected to the implementation of centrally made policies at the other.

1.2. Research Question and Theoretical Background

This study argues, however, that an important key to understanding the implementation of the mass migration scheme lies neither at the central level where the political decisions were made and overall plans were drafted, nor in the history of individual participants in the endeavour. Starting with the question of how settlers were mobilized at the grassroots level, i.e., how the idea of sending large numbers of Japanese peasants to Manchuria developed into concrete local implementation measures, the following discussion of theoretical approaches explains the basic framework for this study.

A good example of a study that concentrates on top-level government decisions is Louise Young’s Japan’s Total Empire. She analyses propaganda efforts to incorporate the ideology of Manchuria as a part of the Japanese empire into domestic discourse in Japan. She devotes her last two chapters to the mass migration of Japanese settlers as part of this incorporation effort, and coins the term “migration machine” for the state-sponsored mass emigration to Manchuria of the late 1930s and early 1940s (Young 1998a). However fitting the term “migration machine” is for the
working of the Japanese bureaucracy that engineered the mass migration, the term can also be misleading, since it tends to turn the settlers into an amorphous mass that was moved about for the sake of the empire. People are perceived as objects that migrate because they are told to do so.

From a bottom-up perspective in contrast, the question is not so much how the machinery works, but how and why the individual got sucked into it. When examining the local level there is no longer a direct correlation between the government’s order to people the vast expanses of Manchuria and the number of Japanese who were willing to fulfil the quotas. Thus it is necessary to look at the factors which led to an individual’s decision to become part of the migration movement – or not. Umeda Kinji shows that the vision of filling the rural masses with enthusiasm for emigration to the continent sometimes failed miserably. In the three cases he examined, the villages had to give up village-division in the end because of the lack of peasants willing to resettle (Umeda 1988: 49). This proves the point that despite the state-run character of the whole operation, it was still an individual decision to join the campaign or to abstain.

In his book on ‘Manshū imin’ no rekishi shakaigaku (Historical sociology of ‘Manchuria settlers) Araragi Shinzō examines so-called pull- and push-factors relevant for migration to Manchuria. This classic approach in sociology to the motivation for migration looks into the circumstances that push migrants out of their community, e.g., poverty, unemployment, as well as the circumstances that pull migrants to a certain place, e.g., job opportunities. The only pull-factor Araragi names, however, is the existence of the new state of Manshūkoku under the aegis of the Kantō Army, which offered the migrants a framework for resettlement in Manchuria in exchange for their being utilized as the Army’s fifth column in its quest to control northeastern China (Araragi 1998:52). This explanation takes the above-mentioned top-down perspective: the Kantō Army pulls, and the settlers follow. It does not provide any reason for the individual to be attracted to Manchuria. The same applies to some extent to the push-factors that Araragi names (Araragi 1998: 53). These factors, namely the economic depression of 1929 and the ensuing crisis in Japanese agriculture in 1930, were national or even global phenomena. As such they can be the background for a personal decision to leave Japan, but the actual role of the ever-present rural poverty in mass migration to Manchuria must be further specified. Just like the explanation of mass migration as the result of a large “migration machine”, the division of the his-
historical framework into the “push” of a crisis in the national economy and the “pull” of a sparsely populated region looking for settlers cannot satisfactorily explain how and why the participating individuals became involved in a nationwide campaign that changed their lives forever.

Japanese people had been migrating to places like Hawaii and Brazil since the opening of Japan late in the nineteenth century. These migrants were in fact “pushed” out of their home communities by their individual decision to escape poverty, and “pulled” to places that promised better living conditions. The unprecedented mobilization of tens of thousands of prospective settlers to be sent to Manchuria, however, could only be achieved through large-scale efforts. Therefore in this case, instead of looking for individual push- and pull-factors, one should also study how so many people in such a short time were convinced to participate in such a nationwide migration campaign.

Sheldon Garon’s research into how the Japanese state promoted saving and thrift in the twentieth century offers an interesting approach to this problem. In Japan he detects “a powerful pattern of governance in which the state has historically intervened to shape how ordinary Japanese thought and behaved…” which he terms “‘social management’, for the government devoted considerable resources to managing not only the economy but society itself.” (Garon 1997: xiv). By exercising this “social management”, the government attempted to guide developments in a desired direction, for instance in a campaign for rationalization and planned use of resources for economic revival in the countryside. However, rather than simply ordering the implementation of its policies, the authorities – according to Garon’s concept of social management – used “moral suasion” as their “chief managerial tool” (Garon 1997: xiv). Moral suasion implies that participants in such a government campaign were involved in the campaign and acquainted with its ideas to a point where they felt that they were actually pursuing their own agenda.

This study argues that the promotion of emigration to Manchuria has many characteristics of social management since its implementation of a centrally defined overall goal led to massive interventions in the lives of ordinary Japanese. The propaganda for emigration to Manchuria was a classic example of moral suasion in the way it tried to persuade peasants that migration was in essence their own choice for a better life.
Japanese peasants experienced governmental interference in their everyday life in many aspects in the 1920s and 1930s.

Kerry Smith describes such interference in her study of the implementation and the effects of the Rural Economic Revitalization Campaign (Nōson keizai kōsei undō) in the early 1930s in detail (Smith 2001). She found that agriculture bureaucrats as well as local reformers detected the same problems in the countryside in this period of economic depression. Together they devised measures to solve these problems at the grassroots level. Their interaction often changed the nature of local leadership: movements like the Economic Revitalization Campaign in the villages created new structures for economic and social leadership, and provided opportunities for a new leadership elite to rise to power in their communities. Thus social management was not directly exercised by “the government”, but by local agents involved in village administration and politics. These new leadership figures are called chūshin jinbutsu or chūken jinbutsu, which Smith translates as “village mainstays” (Smith 2001: 270).

In the discussion about the development of rural society in the years prior to World War II, this group generally is credited as an important factor. When Nam Songho, for instance, analyses how villages tackled problems like the economic crisis or debt and poverty the 1930s, he claims that usually too much emphasis is placed on the decision making process at the centre, and passive compliance by the populace is tacitly assumed. According to his findings, however, policies have to be adapted actively to the specific conditions of each community. Village mainstays play an active role in this process of adaptation and implementation (Nam 2002).

These local activists played a pivotal role in the implementation of mass migration to Manchuria, too. In an article about Colonizing Manchuria, Young asserts that “the emigration movement was fuelled by the energy of promoters rather than migrants; it was emigration preached from above by a welfare-minded elite, not pushed from below by land-hungry farmers” (Young 1998b: 97). Thus this study will follow this lead and ask whether this “welfare-minded elite” might have been the decisive factors for the degree of local involvement in the government campaign and not just the transmission belts for the passing on of government orders to the village populace. For Mori Takemaro, mainstay farmers were an important factor in the mobilization of settlers for emigration to Manchuria (Mori 2003: 191-192). If one assumes that the process of social management works through moral suasion, then it is necessary to take a closer look at these enthusiastic local leaders and ask whether they were the ones
who actively tried to promote the government programmes and persuade their communities to participate in them – and if that was the case, how they did it.

The prime example of the involvement of local activists, the “village mainstays”, in the social management of their communities can be found in the bunson undō, the Village-Division Campaign, a special form of emigration from Japan to Manchuria. This campaign was based on the conviction that the main reason for the continuing plight of large parts of the Japanese countryside was overpopulation. According to this theory, which was promoted by agricultural economists as early as 1914, the majority of Japan’s peasants simply did not have enough land under the plough to utilize the family’s labour fully, and because little land was left to reclaim, out-migration of rural households appeared to be the only solution (Vlastos 1998: 83-84). Thus when in the first half of the 1930s poor rural communities trying to improve living conditions said to be caused by overpopulation were met with the demand to participate in the mass migration movement to Manchuria, the natural solution seemed to be to export the “surplus” population. That would kill two birds with one stone: not only could the ailing village economy be revived by removing a percentage of the population that could not be sustained by existing resources, but the “overpopulation” also had a place to go to and a chance to start a better life in Manchuria.

However, the form of social management chosen for the implementation of the migration plans at the grassroots level – namely the division of a village population with the aim of relocating a substantial percentage of households in a new village on the Asian continent – fundamentally altered the nature of the emigration to Manchuria, since it was no longer primarily the decision of an individual or a family to participate in a government programme. Now it was “the village” which made the decision to be a part of the Village-Division Campaign. “The village” then had to draw up a plan for mass migration from the community, and had to recruit settlers among its inhabitants to fulfil the set quota of out-migrants. The village mainstays thus come into focus, since they were in charge of adapting the abstract government plans to their respective communities, and they organized their implementation.

This study argues that local politicians, activists and other influential persons at the grassroots level played a pivotal role in the decision-making process at the village level. It therefore focuses not on the level of central government planning, nor on the level of the migrating individual or household, but concentrates on the meso-level of
prefectural and local politicians, village mainstays and activists to clarify their contribution to the development of the government-sponsored mass migration to Manchuria in the Village-Division Campaign.

Since moral suasion is an important part of social management efforts, the propaganda for village-division has also to be taken into consideration and scrutinized for the image it presented of the campaign and especially the local activists. To integrate this aspect into the analysis, this study concentrates on the most prominent case of mass-migration through village-division, the Village of Ōhinata, which was widely used in propaganda as a model for the whole campaign. However, this is not a classic case study, since its purpose is not to deliver just another village history of Ōhinata. Ōhinata serves as an example for the implementation of the mass migration policy at the grassroots level, but to understand its role in the overall development it is necessary to put the events in Ōhinata in the broader context of the evolution of the Village-Division Campaign as a whole. By doing so, the whole campaign will be reassessed in the light of the role the local activists played in its making.

1.3. Source Material

It is not easy, however, to find the traces of the village mainstays and their influence in the implementation process of village-division plans in contemporary sources. The possibilities for research about migration to Manchuria were greatly enhanced in 1990 when the publishing house Fuji shuppan started to release its 40-volume collection of reprinted original documents concerning Japanese emigration to Manchuria. Volumes 7 and 8 of this collection are specifically concerned with material from the Village-Division Campaign (Okabe 1990-92). Most of the documents, however, are plans handed in by village institutions and standard reports about the progress of the migration activities in the communities. They either contain statistical data about the communities – population figures, amount of farmland, and other economic figures – as well as the timetables and the quotas for emigration to Manchuria, or they consist of surveys related to the implementation process of the migration plans showing the progress of village-division in statistics. The discussion about village-division and the role individual activists played are not mirrored in these types of documents; they therefore mainly serve to illuminate the economic background of the participation communities and the target figures for migration.
There are, however, some records of discussions in which local activists and promoters of Manchuria migration took part. These discussions are preserved in the form of published records of round-table discussions (zadankai), one that took place in July 1937 and the other in January 1939. Participants in these talks were representatives of the institutions in charge of putting the abstract central-level plans into practice. These institutions included the Department for Rural Revitalization in the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (Nōrinshō keizai kōseibu), the Association for Rural Revitalization (Nōson kōsei kyōkai), and the Association for Emigration to Manchuria (Manshū ijū kyōkai), as well as local activists from those villages that featured prominently in the Village-Division Campaign.

The first of these round-table discussions was sponsored by the Ministry of Colonial Affairs (Takumushō). Its records were published in a book with a foreword by the head of the Colonial Bureau in the Ministry of Colonial Affairs (Takumushō takumukyoku). The book also contains explanations of the mass migration policy and personal reports of settlers about their experiences in Manchuria and had the purpose to attract and inform prospective settlers (Hishinuma and Kimura 1938).

The later discussion was hosted by the Association for Rural Revitalization and published in a book by the Asahi Newspaper Company. The book comprises the records of two days of discussions on 14 and 15 January 1939, as well as reports about the stage of the Village-Division Campaign in those villages where the migration movement was most advanced (Asahi shinbunsha 1939).

Although these discussions were published as propaganda for mass migration and have certainly been edited, they nevertheless provide us with material taken from the process of making the Village-Division Campaign and the sometimes also critical or controversial opinions of important local activists. The first discussion was conducted at the very beginning of this campaign; the second at a time when enthusiasm had waned and the mass migration campaign had problems to fulfil its optimistic quotas. The protocols of these discussions show the spokesmen of the mass migration campaign in action, and also reveal some of the problems the activists had with the central bureaucracy or their respective communities. Thus they serve as valuable and rare sources about human interaction resulting directly from the implementation process.
Although this kind of sources might also suffer from restrictions posed by mainstream opinion of the time, they do not reveal the hindsight knowledge inevitably involved in later narratives by witnesses to the events. For activists who did not participate in the round-table discussions, these publications were important sources for their activities. For researchers, these books contain overviews about the state of the campaign at a given time, as well as an insight into the propaganda for migration.

Very interesting in this regard is also a handbook for prospective migrants from 1938 that, although it does not contain any record of the activists in action, provides the promoters of mass migration with all kinds of technical details about the application and training process (Nakata and Nomura 1938).

Other information about the emigration to Manchuria compiled and edited for the general public is contained in the various yearbooks published in Manchuria in Japanese and English. General yearbooks in Japanese and English versions were published from 1929 until 1939 by the South Manchurian Railway Company. They contain some information on rural migration and Japanese settlements in Manchuria. These yearbooks, however, contained no information on the mobilization and recruitment of the settlers in Japan. Such information is contained in a yearbook published only in Japanese by the Manchuria News Agency (Manshūkoku tsūshinsha) in 1940. It is entirely devoted to the issue migration to Manshūkoku and also contains data about the implementation of the migration policy in Japan up to 1940. Statistical information with explanations in English for this stage of the migration project is only contained in The Japan-Manchoukuo Year Book 1941 published by a division of the Asia Statistics Company in Tokyo (Japan-Manchoukuo Year Book Co. 1941: 613-618).

What makes the village of Ōhinata an ideal object for the study of the implementation of the migration policy at the grassroots level is not only its key position in the Village-Division Campaign, but also the variety of sources available about its development. Although most administrative documentation in the village itself did not survive the end of World War II (Ikegami 1995: 19), more than enough records about its village-division still exist. Most have been compiled and published by Yamada Shōji. They include not only reports about the progress of the implementation process but also short recollections about this endeavour by villagers collected by Yamada (Yamada 1978). Two other Japanese researchers besides Yamada had collected information
locally, some of which has also been used as background information for this study (Miyai 1981; Ikegami 1995).

What makes the case of Ōhinata rather unique, however, is the fact that it was the object of a sociological study already in 1940. Over the course of 1939, professor Nasu Hiroshi and his students from the Faculty of Agriculture of Tokyo Imperial University (Tōkyō teikoku daigaku nōgakubu) conducted an in-depth research about three divided villages from Nagano Prefecture, featuring most prominently Ōhinata and giving some further findings about Yomikaki and Fujimi. This document contains valuable information from the process of implementation and although compiled by one of the main supporters of Katō Kanji and his emigration policy, it is first and foremost a sociological study and a scientific document (Tōdai 1940).

The case of Ōhinata also provides other sources that are unique in their extent and importance. Although most of the above-mentioned publications introducing various early participants in the Village-Division Campaign can be regarded not only as information but also as propaganda, no other case was as openly instrumentalized in the official promotion of emigration as the village of Ōhinata. Promotional activities geared towards rural people can best be observed by looking at the contents of the magazine *Ie no hikari*, which reached more rural households than any other publication in the years 1932 to 1945 (Itagaki 1992: ii-viii).

But Ōhinata did not feature only in this magazine. The biggest propaganda effect was attained by a documentary novel commissioned in 1939 about the village-division of Ōhinata. The fact that it was subsequently converted into a play and a movie finally turned the village into the national showcase for the campaign and the role model to follow (Wada 1964). The novel on which the play and movie are based was an important instrument in the promotion of village-division. It contains an ideal image of the campaign and its local activists in Ōhinata desired by the campaigners. A translation of this novel is contained in the Appendix to this study (Chapter 10).

**1.4. Study Outline**

To explain the making of the Village-Division Campaign and the role of local activists in the implementation of mass migration, this study takes the showcase of the campaign, the village of Ōhinata, as the core of the analysis. However, since the Village-Division Campaign was not a locally restricted phenomenon, it is necessary to exam-
ine its evolution in a broader context and also take into consideration the propaganda which shaped the public’s perception of the campaign and to a certain degree even influences the contemporary view on Japanese mass migration to Manchuria.

Chapter 2 gives an overview of the general development of emigration from Japan to Manchuria and especially the central policy and ideology behind it. Since this serves as a mere background, no direct connection to the core analysis of the study is made. Chapter 3 introduces the economic situation that led to the participation of rural communities in migration schemes using the case of Ōhinata as an example for a typical village targeted by migration planners. Chapter 4 analyses the evolution of the campaign that came to be called the Village-Division Campaign from various local roots into a nationwide campaign. It concludes with an assessment of the role of local activist in this campaign and their contribution to its making.

After having examined the evolution of the campaign, the analysis continues in Chapter 5 with an examination of the details of the administration of the Village-Division Campaign at the local level. This gives an understanding of the mobilization and resettlement process which was the important part of the implementation of the campaign in Japan. For an assessment of the actual impact of the campaign in Chapter 6, the study again puts its focus on the development in Ōhinata, since it is well documented by a contemporary sociological study.

After the making of the campaign, its implementation and its effects on the grassroots level has been examined and the specific role of local activists in this process has been analysed, Chapter 7 turns to the network of activists that played a decisive role in shaping it. Since the activists from the village of Ōhinata were turned into national role models for the promotion of the campaign, this chapter also examines the image of the ideal village-division process and the local activists as presented in the propaganda for the Village-Division Campaign.

The conclusion (Chapter 8) is followed by an epilogue (Chapter 9) which describes the fate of Ōhinata’s settlement in Manchuria.

Chapter 10, the Appendix, contains a translation of the novel Ōhinatamura (The village of Ōhinata) Wada Tsutō.
2. Migration to Manchuria

To establish the context for the main analysis of this study, this chapter provides a general overview of Japanese emigration to Manchuria in four phases. Like most historical periodization this distinction is to a certain extent artificial. Since this overview follows the evolution of central-level policies of migration and overall planning as a tool for implementation, it makes sense to use the periodization resulting from the political framework in which it took place. Thus the first phase spans the time when migration was contemplated but barely realized before the founding of the state of Manshūkoku. The second, “trial”, phase comprises the years when lobbyists already succeed in gaining some acceptance of official promotion for emigration, but the numbers of migrants were small. The third (“mass migration”) and fourth (“stagnation and breakdown”) phases follow the framework of the five-year plans for 1937-1941 and 1942-1946, a periodization set by the planners of the overall plan for Japanese emigration to Manchuria. The classification of the second, third and fourth phases as “trial”, “mass migration” and “stagnation and breakdown” follows the terminology of Asada, who established these distinctions early in his research. However, as will become clear in the course of this chapter, the transition from one phase to the other is fluid; and although the terminology used for these phases contains the main characteristics of the time in question, is mostly a heuristic concept.

The focus of this chapter, unlike that of other chapters, is explicitly on the central policy and planning level. It explains the general framework in which the evolution of the Village-Division Campaign took place and contextualizes the analysis of a relatively short phase of the migration policy: the early years of the Village-Division Campaign from 1937 to 1939. Since this campaign is examined in terms of its role for the implementation of migration plans and methods used to mobilize volunteers, this chapter also covers the progress of implementing the migration plans and policies for mobilizing migrants and fulfilling quotas.

2.1. The Start of the Promotion of Japanese Emigration to Manchuria

The resettlement of Japanese farmers to Manchuria was discussed long before the state of Manshūkoku was founded. Gotō Shinpei, a bureaucrat and politician who was the civilian governor of Japan’s first colony, Taiwan, from 1898 until he became the first president of the newly created South Manchurian Railway Company (Minami Manshū tetsudō kabushikigaisha = Mantetsu) in 1906, argued that bringing over
Japanese settlers to Manchuria was vital to consolidate Japan’s role in the region. He stated that Japan “...can resolve the Manchurian issue by moving people there” and proposed “to induce 500,000 Japanese to emigrate to Manchuria” within ten years (Fogel 1988: 9). Although Gotô left the Mantetsu in 1908 for a career in various Japanese ministries (Communication Ministry, Colonization Bureau, Home Ministry, Foreign Ministry), the idea to create Japanese settlements in northeast China remained potent.

The Mantetsu was an important tool for Japanese penetration of northeast China. It was founded on 26 November 1906 with an initial capital of 200 million yen. It was designed to play a role for Japanese interests in the region similar to the one the East India Company had played for the British Empire in India. It was therefore placed under strict government supervision. Its president was appointed by the Japanese government and received his orders from the Prime Minister. Half of its initial capital was the tracks, facilities and rolling stock of the former Russian-owned Chinese Eastern Railway that the Treaty of Portsmouth (which ended the Russo-Japanese War of 1904/05) had assigned to Japan. The remaining capital came from the sale of shares to the public as well as from bank loans (Beasley 1987: 135-136).

By the 1920s, the Mantetsu had developed into an industrial venture with a wide range of subsidiaries in mining, manufacturing and trade, as well as into an important agent in the administration of Japanese concession territory in Manchuria, the so-called Railway Zone comprising of station towns and mining districts along the railroad between Dalian and Changchun that was also granted to Japan by Russia in compensation after the Treaty of Portsmouth (Matsusaka 1996: 98-99). It was an important agent in the promotion and implementation of Japanese immigration in Manchuria.

Before the founding of the state of Manshūkoku, however, most immigrants into the region were Chinese from the neighbouring provinces of Shandong, Hebei, Henan, etc. Some found work as coolie day-labourers for the Mantetsu, on construction sites or in factories; most settled somewhere in the vast countryside as poor subsistence farmers (Mantetsu chōsabu 1930; SMR 1929: 6-12). Japanese settlements in this time were very rare and had an experimental character, like the one in Aichuan village (Japanese: Aikawa). This settlement in the Japanese concession territory of Guandong (Japanese: Kantō) resulted from the private enterprise of a former Japanese policeman who started farming there in 1911, took care of infrastructure such as
roads, buildings and electricity in the area, and attracted volunteers from Yamagata, Niigata and Nagano to help with his endeavour. Although many volunteers left the settlement over time, Aikawa remained something of a pet project of the Kantō Army, which praised it as the pioneer village of Japanese settlers in Manchuria (Kantōshūchō naimubu dobuka 1935).

Discussion about Japanese emigration to Manchuria started in earnest after the US government closed the country for immigrants from Japan in 1924. In the following year Katō Kanji, who had up to then concentrated his efforts on the education of young Japanese in the spirit of nōhonshugi (agrarianism, agro-nationalism), started arguing that emigration to northeast China was the only solution to the economic problems of the Japanese countryside. He kept lobbying for his ideas and gathered supporters and collaborators. After the Manchurian Incident of 18 September 1931 and the ensuing war that secured Japanese dominance in Manchuria, the group around Katō started a full-fledged campaign to convince the Japanese government that the resettlement of farmers to Manchuria should be tackled as soon as possible.

On 26 and 27 January 1932 the headquarters of the Kantō Army invited a commission around the academics Nasu Hiroshi and Hashimoto Denzaemon to compile basic recommendations for what they called the expansion of the Yamato race to the continent. These recommendations contained such points as the aim of group settlements with only landowning peasants in areas that were not currently being farmed. Settlements had to be guarded against bandit attacks, so reservists qualified best as settlers because of their military experience. The settlement should offer non-inheriting sons the possibility to farm their own land, and regulations against the sale of land should make sure that settlers would not fall back into tenancy in Manchuria. For proper training and support of the settlers, specific organizations should be created. The recommendations were turned into the first resettlement plans by the Kantō Army in February 1932 (Asada 1978: 557). In March 1932, Katō Kanji, Ishiguro Tada’atsu and Sō Mitsuhiko formulated concrete resettlement plans that they presented to the Japanese government (Araragi 1998: 64).

However, this first attempt to gain approval for government sponsorship of a migration plan by the Japanese Diet on 20 March 1932 failed due to the firm resistance of Finance Minister Takahashi Korekiyō. Nevertheless, lobbying continued, not the least through publications that tried to exploit the “war fever” in the two years after the
Manchurian Incident. Although it is open to question to what extent the media frenzy about Manchuria in this period really reached ordinary people (Wilson 2002: 69-70), the proponents of Japanese migration to Manchuria used the prevailing atmosphere to further their cause. In April a small Mantetsu booklet evaluated the feasibility of the resettlement of larger numbers of Japanese farmers in Manshūkoku into an environment with generally lower rural living standards than even those in Japan. It concluded that although the resettlement of Japanese farmers was only possible with financial aid and logistical support from the Japanese government, the immigration of 500,000 people over 20 years to work in agriculture and later on in the rapidly developing industrial sector was an overall realistic goal (Mantetsu chihōbu nōmuka 1932: 36-38).

To introduce newly founded Manshūkoku and the possibilities it offered to Japanese settlers, a Lieutenant-General Kawanishi Korekazu, presumably from the Kantō Army, wrote a Manshūkoku ijū shishin (Guide to emigration to Manchuria) with facts about the new state, its institutions, history, climate and all kinds of practical information about application and resettlement procedures for Japanese migrants (Kawanishi 1932). Taken together with all other support of the endeavour by the Kantō Army, this guide shows how sure some promoters of emigration were that it was only a matter of time before migration organizers would be inundated with applications from volunteers.

In May 1932 a special edition of the magazine Shakai Seisaku Jihō, which translated its own title into English as Social Reform, was dedicated to the topic of migration to Manchuria and Mongolia. Besides Katō Kanji, the nearly 30 authors in this issue included members of the House of Peers, businessmen and bureaucrats. Many of the authors, however, were academics, mostly from Tokyo Imperial University. Prominent among them are Yanaihara Tadao and Nasu Hiroshi. Interestingly enough, Yanaihara, professor in the Faculty of Economics of Tokyo Imperial University at the time of the publication, was not a typical proponent of Japanese expansion to the continent. His Manshū mondai (The Manchuria problem) of 1934 is generally regarded as containing “a subtext of opposition” to Japan’s ambitions in Manchuria (Townsend 2000: 180). This opposition, however, was mostly directed at the way the Kantō Army exercised power in the newly created state of Manshūkoku. At the same time Yanaihara acknowledged the “Manchuria as the lifeline for Japan” argument. Thus his contribution to a volume of promoters of Manchuria emigration is not altogether surpris-
ing, but it shows how broad the consensus about the necessity of out-migration to Manchuria among intellectuals in Japan in 1932 really was.

One of the most important institutional promoters of migration to Manchuria on the Japanese side was the Ministry of Colonial Affairs, officially founded on 10 June 1929 and in charge of e.g., the supervision of the Mantetsu, land reclamation outside Japan, and out-migration in general. Internal documents preserved by Kōriyama Satoshi, an official in the Ministry of Colonial Affairs, and reprinted in 1990 show that the ministry was already involved in the very early phase of lobbying for government sponsorship of emigration to Manchuria (Chaen 1990: 8-9). In July 1932 the new Minister for Colonial Affairs, Nagai Ryūtarō – in office from 26 May 1932 to 8 July 1934 and said to have been an avid promoter of Japan’s expansion in Asia – wrote the foreword for the publication of an “Old China hand” examining the feasibility of migration into Manshūkoku. Although most of the book dealt with Chinese migrants coming into Manshūkoku from neighbouring provinces like Shandong, it concluded that good conditions for settlers would also attract Japanese migrants, and that even if the Japanese government did not sponsor Japanese settlers, enthusiasm and financial support from the populace would finally realize Japanese settlements in Manshūkoku (Tashiro 1932: 133).

This conclusion was clearly written before the background of an ongoing discussion about government sponsorship and support of the endeavour by the Kantō Army. Katō Kanji had travelled to Manchuria in July 1932 and talked to members of the Army. Ishiwara Kanji, the Army officer who is generally regarded as the driving force behind the Manchurian Incident, introduced him to Tōmiya Kaneo, and the two of them prepared the first design for Japanese paramilitary settlements. Katō returned to Japan with the Kantō Army’s promise to provide 10,000 cho of farmland for Japanese settlers (Araragi 1998: 64). Two proposals for government sponsorship of Japanese emigration to Manchuria had already been turned down, when a third proposal put forward in mid-August 1932 was at least partially successful, since on 30 August 1932 the cabinet agreed to sponsor 500 test-migrants instead of the requested 1,000 households (Asada 1978: 559).

For the time before Japanese migration to Manchuria was sponsored by the Japanese government, it can be concluded that the idea to send Japanese people to con-

\[1 \text{ cho} = 0.992 \text{ hectares}\]
tinental Asia was on one hand connected to the end of emigration from Japan into the USA, and on the other hand to the notion that Japanese population was needed in Manchuria to secure Japan’s position in the area. Coming from an agronationalist background, Katô Kanji discovered Manchuria as the place where he could realize his ideal of an agriculture-centred living better than in rapidly industrializing Japan with its impoverished countryside. He thus became the main promoter of Japanese emigration to Manchuria, finding supporters and collaborators in the Kantô Army, the Ministry of Colonial Affairs, and in the academic world.

2.2. The Trial Phase, 1932 – 1936

The recruitment of prospective settlers started as early as 1 September 1932 and was conducted by the Reservist Association (Zaigô gunjinjiai) among its members in eleven Tôhoku (northeast) prefectures. The Ministry of Colonial Affairs was in charge of the overall organization in Japan. The first recruits were sent to Katô Kanji’s newly opened training facility for emigrants for a three-week preparation course in September 1932. Led by Sô Mitsuhiko, 493 volunteers left Japan on 3 October 1932 and arrived at their final destination in Jiamusi on 15 October 1932. There they were to found a settlement later called Iyasaka. The resettlement in Manchuria was administered by the Kantô Army. In the meantime the Army decided to offer 20,000 chô of land to new settlers and had compiled its own plans for Japanese paramilitary settlements on 12 October 1932 (Asada 1978: 558).

This first phase of the realization of an official migration policy was closely watched by the Imperial Agriculture Association (Teikoku nôkai). Its research department recorded the planning process and the costs of sending over the migrants in detail. However, the Association was mainly a representative of better-off landowning peasants and landlords, so took no part in the organization and remained an interested observer (Teikoku nôkai chôsabu 1932).

At the beginning of 1933 the Cabinet agreed to send a second group of settlers. Yamaizaki Yoshio, who had helped to promote Katô’s ideas in the Colonial Ministry, became the leader of this second group. Some 492 volunteers were resettled in July 1933 and subsequently founded the settlement of Chiburi (Asada 1978: 559). The

5 Figures for the first settler groups vary slightly; Asada gives 423 as the number of members of the first group and 504 for the second (Asada 1978: 559). Kobayashi states that 493 settlers left with the first group, but only 492 with the second, since the others withdrew after hearing of a guerrilla attack on the first settlers (Kobayashi 1977: 70, 73).
send-off of these migrants was well-publicized, but the fact that 173 settlers from the first group and 179 from the second returned to Japan after problems with the start of farming and an armed uprising against the Japanese settlers in the spring of 1934 remained nearly unreported (Kobayashi 1977: 70, 73).

Meanwhile lobbying for migration on a larger scale continued. In collaboration with the Kantō Army, the Katō group continued to present plans to the Five Minister Council\(^6\) and the Colonial Ministry (Araragi 1998: 64).

In June 1933 a committee known as Jikyoku taisaku iinkai (Committee for Measures against the Current Crisis) published a booklet with plans for agricultural settlements in Manchuria setting the target for the first five years at 40,000 households and another 100,000 households for the following five years (Jikyoku taisaku iinkai 1933: 21-22). Interesting about the booklet – besides the fact that it already envisioned an era of mass migration to Manshūkoku – is the list of the committee members in the back. Among them are Nasu Hiroshi as well as the Christian socialist Suzuki Bunji, founder and long-term president of the moderate labour union Yūaikai (Friendship Association). The booklet itself was printed by the Kyōchōkai (Cooperation and Harmony Society), a quasi-governmental agency founded in 1919 with a lot of intellectuals, bureaucrats and entrepreneurs among its members, which declared the quest for harmony between capital and labour as its goal. The association’s magazine Shakai seisaku jihō had devoted its May 1932 special edition to emigration to Manchuria. Listed among the many members of the Kyōchōkai in the back of the 1933 booklet is also Ishiguro Tada’atsu, a career bureaucrat from the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry who was a key supporter of Katō Kanji’s migration plans.

Despite this seemingly broad support for the idea of mass migration, the transfer of Japanese farmers to Manchuria remained a trickle. In 1933 the religious sect Tenrikyō started to build a village for its Japanese followers in Manshūkoku, where they wanted to create their ideal world. This settlement soon became the object of a study by researchers from Hokkaidō Imperial University (Uehara 1934) and it featured prominently in a study commissioned by the Tokyo City Government to assess migration to Manchuria as a means to solve the problem of urban unemployment (Tōkyōfu 1934). A further push of migration promoters to send more settlers in the spring of

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\(^6\) Established after the Manchurian Incident and later modified by various Prime Ministers, in 1933 this council consisted of the Prime Minister, the Minister of Finance, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Army Minister and the Marine Minister (Kokushi daijiten 1979-1997: vol. 5, 782).
spring of 1934 coincides with some serious attacks by Chinese guerrillas on the first two settlements of Iyasaka and Chiburi, but the construction of settlements and the recruitment of settlers continued nevertheless. In May 1934 the first settlement of the predecessor organization of what would from 1938 be called the Youth Brigade was founded. In October a third group of settlers with 298 volunteers went to Manchuria to erect the settlement of Mizuho, and in November 1934 the village of Tenrikyō was completed with 515 inhabitants in 43 households. The settlement of Iyasaka opened its elementary school and the Kantō Army held its First Settlers’ Conference from 25 November to 5 December 1934 (Manshū tōshinsha 1940: 1). This conference focused on the development of agriculture in the settlements. It formulated four principles: the settlers should be able to produce enough food for themselves, they should farm their own land as landowners and not as tenants, they should combine agriculture and animal husbandry, and they should cooperate within the settlements. The conference demanded for every settler household to be given a total of 20 chō of land: 8 chō of dry fields, 2 chō of paddy fields, 2 chō of pasture and 1 chō for buildings. Since the documents compiled at this conference became the basis for a migration plan the Colonial Ministry finished on 7 May 1935, the above-mentioned principles and the amount of 20 chō of land for each household became an ideal standard within the migration movement, although it was not always achieved. The Colonial Ministry’s plan contained the long-term vision of the resettlement of more than 100,000 households over a period of 15 years and asked for the formation of institutions exclusively in charge of the resettlement in Manchuria (Asada 1978: 560).

The first few settlements and their economic situation became the subject of quite a few studies in 1935. The Association for Japanese-Manchurian Business (Nichi-Man jitsugyō kyōkai 1935) and the Japanese Society for the Promotion of Science (Nihon gakujutsu shinkōkai 1935) were both mainly interested in the productivity of the new settlements. The Mantetsu took an interest in the economic situation of the new settlers, too (Mantetsu keizai chōsa kai 1935), and compiled an internal document about all current group settlements (Mantetsu sōmubu shiryōka 1935). Despite the obvious interest, the number of migrants was still relatively small, but the promoters were making further progress. In November 1935 the Colonial Ministry established the Association for Emigration to Manchuria, which in April 1937 was turned into an incorpo-

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7 This figure is cited according to the 1940 Manshū kaitaku nenkan (Yearbook of development in Manchuria), according to Asada, however, the third group consisted of 362 settlers (Asada 1978: 559).
rated foundation. In December 1935 the 68th Parliamentary Session of the Japanese Diet finally agreed to another migration plan for 1,000 households. In January 1936 the Corporation for the Development of Manchuria (Manshū takushoku kabushigai-sha) was founded as an affiliated institution to the Colonization Bureau (Kaitaku sökyoku) of the Manchurian government. Its task was the acquisition of land for Japanese settlers and help with the financial and formal aspects of resettlement in general. On 12 October 1937 it was turned into the Public Corporation for Land Reclamation in Manchuria (Manshū takushoku kōsha = Mantaku) and became an important agent for the founding of settlements (Araragi 1998: 65; Young 1998a: 355-356).

Thus the trial phase set many important precedents for the unfolding of the mass migration campaign. It was clearly dominated by the Kantō Army and the image of settlers with a hoe in one hand and a gun in the other, living in the constant danger of being attacked by Chinese guerrillas. Nevertheless, since the settlements persevered, they were soon studied for their economic profitability and their possible contribution to solving Japan’s economic problems. The first settlers together with their mentors from the Kantō Army formulated the basic principles for settlers’ life in Manchuria, which the Ministry of Colonial Affairs used to formulate the first official mass migration plan. Although the proponents of emigration had in this phase not yet gained much financial support from the government, they had nevertheless created some basic infrastructure for the administration of settlers’ recruitment, like the Association for Emigration to Manchuria as well as for the acquisition of land for the settlers in Manchuria through the Mantaku.

2.3. The Mass Migration Phase, 1937 – 1941

A decisive moment for the further development of the migration plans was the assassination in the course of the attempted coup d’état on 26 February 1936 of Finance Minister Takahashi Korekiyo, who had staunchly opposed all larger-scale plans for financial reasons. The general impact of this “February 26 Incident” (ni niroku jiken) was a political shift to the right, which over the course of spring and summer 1936 opened the way for the formulation of the “Millions to Manchuria Plan”, i.e., the policy to resettle one million households or five million people from Japan to Manshūkoku over the course of the next 20 years (Nijūkanen hyakumanko sōshutsu keikaku).
This plan was based on a scheme that the Kantō Army had presented to the Second Settlers’ Conference in Xinjing on 11 May 1936. The conference unanimously adopted the plan, which envisioned the resettlement of one million households over the course of the years 1937 to 1956 in groups consisting of 300 households each. The figure of one million resulted from a calculation that started with 5.6 million rural households in Japan, of which around two million had less than five tan of arable land at their disposal. Farmers with this small amount of farmland were classified as poor peasants, so measures to improve their situation were explored. One such measure, according to the proponents of mass migration to Manchuria, was to resettle half of these impoverished farm households over the next 20 years. The implementation of this mass migration plan would result in an estimated 10% of the population of Manshūkoku being of Japanese origin (Asada 1978: 561). Hardly anybody questioned the feasibility of this calculation. When after these figures had become official government policy a participant in a round-table discussion in 1937 remarked that the resettlement of five million people over the course of 20 years would nevertheless result in a daily resettlement quota of 700 people and was therefore difficult to fulfil, nobody caught on to the argument and the moderator of the discussion just changed the topic (Nobiyuku 1937: 126-127). The same holds true for the notion that every settler household according to the standard recommended by the First Settlers’ Conference in 1934 should be provided with ten chō of farmland. A Chinese historian examining the Japanese migration to Manchuria calculated that ten chō for one million households would have necessitated ten million chō of farmland for Japanese peasants only. With a total of 30 million chō of farmland available in all of Manshūkoku this would have resulted in 10% of the estimated population of Manshūkoku after the completion of the mass migration having a third of the country’s farmland in their possession (Xie 1995: 553).

The advocates of mass migration in the spring of 1936, however, were seemingly not interested in such calculations; they were rather concentrating on government sponsorship for their plans. The scheme of May 1936 proposed that the Japanese government recruit settlers among the rural poor and the urban unemployed. Resettling these people in northern Manshūkoku would minimize the frictions with the Chinese
population, which was concentrated in the southern part of the country, and could also serve as a means of defence against possible Soviet aggression at the northern border (Asada 1978: 561-562). At the beginning of July 1936 the Kantō Army had drafted the results of the Second Settlers’ Conference into a proposal that it submitted to the Colonial Ministry. The ministry accepted the proposal and passed it on for discussion by the government. On 25 August 1936 the Cabinet of Hirota Kōki finally decided to include the promotion and sponsorship of mass migration to Manchuria in its “Seven Big Policies” (shichi daikokusaku). This technically turned the plan to resettle one million households in 20 years into a national policy. The core points of this national policy for mass resettlement of Japanese in Manchuria was the strengthening of relations between Japan and Manshūkoku, defence against Soviet aggression in northern Manshūkoku, industrial development in the region, the spread of Japanese culture in the region resulting in “cultural uplift”, and the solution of the economic and social problems in Japan resulting from the economic crisis and Japan’s overpopulation (Araragi 1998: 65).

The details of planning the resettlement of this enormous number of people were left to the Colonial Ministry, which over the next year developed detailed schemes for the implementation of the overall “ Millions to Manchuria Plan”. The period of 20 years for the overall endeavour was split in four stages of five years each, with a rising quota of households to be resettled in each stage (Table 1).

Table 1. The four phases of the Plan for the Resettlement of 1 Million Households over 20 Years (Nijūkanen hyakumanko sōshutsu keikaku)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Number of households to be resettled</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1937-1941</td>
<td>100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1942-1946</td>
<td>200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>1947-1951</td>
<td>300,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>1952-1956</td>
<td>400,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Manshikai 1965: 185)

By the time the plan for the first period from 1937 to 1941 was finished in May 1937, the mass migration idea had become connected to the movement for Rural Economic Revitalization and contained the notion that exporting substantial parts of the rural population would solve the economic problems of the countryside. Thus the guidelines of the Colonial Ministry prescribed that among the 100,000 households
earmarked for migration during the first five years, 70% should be farm households. Table 2 shows the numbers of households to be resettled in the first five-year plan of the Ministry.

**Table 2. Resettlement plans for the first five-year phase, 1937-1941**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1937</th>
<th>1938</th>
<th>1939</th>
<th>1940</th>
<th>1941</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Households of group settlers</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>70,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Households of ordinary settlers</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>6,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>15,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>21,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>28,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>30,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>100,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Takumushō takumukyoku 1937a: 2-3)

Group settlers were better supported by the government and therefore sometimes also called “Type A” settlers, whereas the ordinary settlers did not receive so many government subsidies and were sometimes called “Type B” settlers or just “free settlers” (Asada 1976a: 47).

To fulfil the ambitious quotas of these plans, constant propaganda to persuade people to participate in the migration movement was necessary. The Colonial Ministry published a booklet in February 1937 that portrayed the life of settlers already in Manchuria, and invited more volunteers to come to “blessed Manshūkoku” (Takumushō takumukyoku 1937b: 50). An undated photo album with more than 100 pictures showing the everyday life of settlers in Manchuria was probably produced around the same time as the booklet, which contains some of the photographs from the album as illustrations (Takumushō takumukyoku undated). Migration to Manchuria featured in the media, and migration promoters travelled around giving lectures and seminars about the topic. Examples of such lectures are contained in a collection of ten talks given by the main promoters around Kato Kanji (Nagao, Hashimoto and Kanji 1938). Handbooks and guidebooks to migration and the situation in Manchuria appeared on the market, especially in 1938 (e.g., Hishinuma and Kimura 1938; Nakata and Nomura 1938; Yasumi and Yokogawa 1938). However, it was mostly the connection between the Rural Economic Revitalization Campaign and the mass migration movement with the resulting involvement of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry that pushed the numbers of volunteers for resettlement up, even after the start of the Sino-Japanese war on the continent following the Marco Polo Bridge Incident on 7 July 1937. But despite all the propaganda effort, the number of prospective
The interesting aspect of this change is that when the planners in the Ministry realized at the end of 1938 that they had not fulfilled the quotas for the first two years, they did not rethink the feasibility of the plan as such. They just lowered the figures for the years 1937, 1938 and 1939, and added the missing numbers onto the last two years of the first five-year plan. This constant reshuffling of quotas and the postponement of quota fulfilment into the future became a tool often employed in the course of the migration policy, but it could not hide that the mobilization of prospective settlers was a problem for the whole campaign right from the start.

An important phase for the emigration campaign was the implementation of mass migration in the countryside and in the villages in the early years from 1937 to 1939. During this time a movement developed that turned the individual decision to emigrate to Manchuria into the effort of a village community: the Village-Division Campaign. The migration planners hoped that this would be the key to real mass mobilization and encouraged villages to join the campaign by promising subsidies and a swift recovery of the ailing economy in the villages. From 1938 on, the recruitment of Manchuria settlers in villages that had agreed to “divide” their community by earmarking a substantial number, i.e., around 30% or 40% of the households for outmigration, was the form of implementation preferred by those in charge of administering the plans. A bunson imin keikaku (Plan for emigration through village-division) was adopted in May 1938 at a joint conference of all institutions in charge of rural revitalization and promotion of mass migration to Manchuria. In June 1938 the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry added funding to its plans to subsidize village-division plans (Yunoki 1976: 297-300). This campaign did in fact generate more migrants than in the previous years, thus making the foundation of more settlements and the

**Table 3. Modified resettlement plans for the first five year phase, 1937-1941**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1937</th>
<th>1938</th>
<th>1939</th>
<th>1940</th>
<th>1941</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Households of group settlers</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>70,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Households of ordinary settlers</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>17,000</td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>6,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>6,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>11,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>30,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>47,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>100,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Manshikai 1965: 186)
allocation of more farmland to the newcomers an important issue for the agents involved in the endeavour in Manchuria (Mantetsu 1939a and 1939b).

In 1938 the Manchurian government had founded a Colonization Bureau which from 1940 onwards took over the drafting and publication of outlines and plans for land reclamation in Manchuria (Kaitaku sōkyoku 1940 and 1941; Kaitaku sōkyoku sōmushō keikakuka 1940). This was probably a consequence of the promulgation of the Manshū kaitaku seisaku kihon yōkō (Outline of the basic policy of the development of Manchuria), a joint declaration of the Japanese and Manchurian governments on 22 December 1939. It was the result of a yearlong discussion process and emphasized the cooperation of both governments in the development of Manshūkoku (Asada 1978: 562-562). However, the word used for the “development” of Manchuria, kaitaku, has not only the connotation of “opening up”, for instance of farmland, it can also mean to colonize. From 1939 on it was more and more used in the terminology for Manchuria settlers. Whereas these settlers in the beginning of the campaign were called nōgyō imin (agricultural migrants), this was later changed to kaitakumin (developers or colonizers). The reason for this change was that imin emphasized the loss of one’s home, whereas kaitakumin had the positive connotation of the starting a new life. The joint declaration of December 1939 made this change in terminology officially binding (Okabe 1977: 158, Umeda 1988: 44).

However, despite all propaganda efforts and considerable pressure within Japan on communities to fulfil the migration quotas, the actual figures lagged behind the planners’ expectations, even when the members of the Youth Brigade who went to Manchuria are included. The Youth Brigade was officially founded in 1938 from a predecessor organization under the auspices of Katō Kanji and had not been included in the original migration plan, but when the numbers of volunteers were not as high as expected, they were more and more seen as substitutes for migrating households.
Table 4. Quota fulfilment for the first five year plan in household units

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Figure from the Original Plan</th>
<th>Figure from the 1938 Plan</th>
<th>Figure according to 1944 Yearbook</th>
<th>Households actually resettled</th>
<th>Percentage resettled compared to 1944 Plan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>4,690</td>
<td>3,741</td>
<td>79.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>4,689</td>
<td>78.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>21,000</td>
<td>11,000</td>
<td>12,270</td>
<td>7,334</td>
<td>59.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>28,000</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>19,085</td>
<td>9,091</td>
<td>47.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>47,000</td>
<td>30,555</td>
<td>17,780</td>
<td>58.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>72,600</td>
<td>42,635</td>
<td>58.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Sources: “Original plan” from Takumushō takumukyoku 1937a: 2-3; “1938 Plan” from Manshikai 1965: 186; other figures from Asada 1976a: 90 citing Manshūkoku tsūshinsha 1944: 129)

As can be seen from Table 4, the actual number of resettled households never reached even the adjusted quotas, let alone the original figures from the earlier planning phase. Moreover, the sudden surge in resettled households in 1941 is misleading, since from this year onwards 70-90% of the so-called resettled households were members of the Youth Brigade who were sent to specific settlements in Manchuria after completing their training – each young man counting as one household (Asada 1978: 567).

Although this is usually called the “mass migration phase”, migration in large numbers was more an ideal than an achievement in the years 1937 to 1941. The greatest masses were moved on paper. When the initial quotas were not fulfilled, the numbers were shifted from the quotas planned for the previous few years into the quotas for future years. To mobilize enough volunteers for resettlement, the implementation of migration plans was shifted to the local level. Prefectures and their communities were asked to develop and implement local plans to recruit settlers that would lead to the effective out-migration of a substantial part of the population. But as enthusiasm for migration to Manchuria waned, not least because of the Sino-Japanese war on the continent, local migration quotas could not be fulfilled either. What started as an ambitious plan to divide villages and send nearly half their population to a new settlement in Manchuria ended up as the fulfilment of migration quotas in counties and regions by forcing the communities to contribute a least a few dozen migrants to the regional settler groups.
2.4. The Stagnation and Breakdown Phase, 1942 – 1945

Signs for stagnation in the migration movement did not only appear in 1942; they were evident years before. However, at that time planners did not admit these problems and argued that they were rather typical initial difficulties. At the beginning of 1939 they could still argue that communities that declared their willingness to divide the village for the out-migration to Manchuria but planned to send ten emigrants over the course of the next ten years had certainly misunderstood the Village-Division Campaign (Asahi shinbunsha 1939: 8). However, at the beginning of the 1940s the sending of just a few dozen volunteers from a village to join the regional migrant group, often forced upon communities by their prefectures, became common practice.

Despite the difficulties in the recruitment of settlers, a strong demand for labour in the war economy within Japan as well as the drafting of soldiers into the Japanese Army, the government nevertheless continued to pursue the migration policy. In the autumn of 1941, just before Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor, the second five-year plan for migration to Manchuria was completed. It was promulgated by the Privy Council of the Manchurian government on 27 December 1941 and four days later by the Japanese Cabinet (Araragi 1998: 66). Due to the changing circumstances this plan put more emphasis on the settlers’ role in the defence of Manchuria against Soviet aggression and explicitly included members of the Youth Brigade – each counting as an individual household – in its numbers (Table 5).

| Table 5. Resettlement plans for the second five-year-phase 1942-1946 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1942 | 1943 | 1944 | 1945 | 1946 | Total |
| Households of ordinary settlers | 13,000 | 25,600 | 33,000 | 41,000 | 47,000 | 159,600 |
| Members of the Youth Brigade | 10,500 | 8,800 | 11,700 | 9,700 | 19,700 | 60,400 |
| **Total** | **23,500** | **34,400** | **44,700** | **50,700** | **66,700** | **220,000** |

(Source: Amazawa 1944: 307)

The members of the Youth Brigade showing up in this chart were those who by the time of their inclusion in the plan should have already completed their three years of training to be placed in settlements in order for them to start a family and live like the ordinary settlers. It was planned to send another 130,000 trainees of the Youth Bri-
gade to Manchuria over the course of the second five-year plan (Amazawa 1944: 308).

Migration groups in the late 1930s, as shown in the optimistic village-division plans in the first years of the campaign, usually consisted of 200 or sometimes even 300 households. Over the course of the implementation of these plans, however, it became clear how difficult it was to mobilize so many households for one group. Therefore a new type of migration group was invented in the early 1940s, consisting of only 30 to 100 households. As always, this change of plan was disguised by a change of terminology. Now there were the *shūdan kaitakumin*, i.e., migrants belonging to a group of 200–300 households, and the *shūgō kaitakumin*, i.e., those in a group of 30–100 households. *Shūdan* and *shūgō* both mean “group”, and the difference in number of group members is artificial, but it shows how desperately the planners tried to keep up their campaign (Umeda 1988: 44).

It is only the reduction in the size of the migrant groups – either by non-fulfilment of the original quota of the group or the redefinition of group size in the beginning – that explains the number of migrant groups sent to Manchuria even in the stagnation phase (Table 6).

**Table 6  Number of migrant groups sent to Manchuria 1932-1945**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Structure of group</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Migrants from several prefectures</td>
<td>Migrants from one prefecture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932-35</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>34</strong></td>
<td><strong>69</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Araragi 1998: 46)
At first sight, it seems that initial groups came from one or more prefecture, but later groups of volunteers came from the same county or even community. But this conclusion is misleading: in fact, outsiders were often recruited to the “county” or “village” migration groups in order to force the fulfilment of local migration plans (Yamada 1978: 40-41).

The publication frenzy about emigration to Manchuria died down at the beginning of the 1940s. What had started as a movement carried by considerable public enthusiasm was continued as a government policy that became more and more unrealistic in implementation. The second five-year plan asked the settlers for higher productivity to meet the growing demands of the Japanese Army on the continent. To achieve this goal, the plan even officially discarded the policy of settling the Japanese peasants on unused land. This policy had not been followed in practice anyway – until April 1941 approximately 20 million hectares of land had been confiscated forcefully for Japanese settlers, and 17.6% of this land had been cultivated by Chinese farmers before that. But the second five-year plan explicitly allowed the use of already cultivated land by Japanese settlers if militarily or otherwise necessary (Asada 1978: 565).

Despite the outbreak of the Pacific War, the agricultural colonization of Manchuria through Japanese settlement was treated as if it were a natural development. The Japanese-Manchurian Society for the Research in Agricultural Policy held meetings about the development of Japanese rural settlements in Manchuria (Nichi-Man nōsei kenkyūkai 1940 and 1942). Even in the last years of the war, detailed assessments of the settlement policy and the productivity of the new settlements were conducted (Amazawa 1944, Kantōshū keizaikai 1944). Following the new trend of the second five-year plan, which had stressed the importance of settlements in the northern part of Manchuria as a guard against Soviet aggression, a study of the possibility of farming hitherto unused land in northern Manchuria (completed in 1942) was finally published with a foreword by Hashimoto Denzaemon in 1944 (Okagawa 1944). The Manchuria Daily Company even printed a Yearbook for 1945 which still contained a section on Japanese rural settlements (Manshū nippōsha 1945).

Despite the considerable pressure on communities and prefectures to mobilize more settlers, the actual number of migrants declined in the 1940s (Table 7).

---

10 Even in the settlement of the model village of Ōhinata nearly one-third of the members of the migrant group present for a population census in December 1939 originated not in Ōhinata but in neighbouring communities (Tōdai 1940: 20-21).
Not only was the total number of migrants for the period a far cry from the originally envisioned figures – the latest available planning figures called for the resettlement of 183,855 households between 1941 and 1945 (of which the actual figure of 74,367 households is just over 40%) – this quota could only be achieved by sending large numbers of members of the Youth Brigade out as settlers. They constituted on average three-quarters of the migrants in the 1940s, and more than 90% in the last year, when hardly any new ordinary migrants were joining the settlements.

In the last years of the Second World War, settlements had to be closed because settlers there were no longer able to feed themselves. Most able males between 18 and 45 years of age were drafted into the Army, leaving women, children, elderly people and the administrators behind. The Kantō Army provided no protection for the settlements and no provisions were made for the eventual end of the war. When the settlement leaders learned of Japan’s surrender after 15 August 1945, they had to decide whether to stay in the settlement and try to defend it, or to flee south to bigger cities. Many settlements were attacked by the Chinese after the end of the war. Some migrant groups even opted for group suicide in their settlements (Sakamoto 2000). Other settlers fled their settlements sometime in August or September, often on foot because they were not let onto the few trains still running. The fate of settlers who survived the winter in Manchuria, hunger, disease and other adverse circumstances was often recounted in recollections of emigrants (e.g., Nozoe 1979, Yano and Yan 2001). Often it took more than a year to repatriate survivors to Japan. Many repatriates had no place to go or were ashamed to return to their village of origin (Wakatsuki 1995).

### Table 7. Number of Manchuria settlers 1941-1945

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Ordinary migrants</th>
<th>Members of the Youth Brigade</th>
<th>Total migrants</th>
<th>Percentage of Youth Brigade members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>5,052</td>
<td>16,110</td>
<td>21,162</td>
<td>76.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>4,526</td>
<td>10,100</td>
<td>14,626</td>
<td>69.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>2,895</td>
<td>9,049</td>
<td>11,944</td>
<td>75.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>3,738</td>
<td>11,541</td>
<td>15,279</td>
<td>75.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>1,056</td>
<td>10,300</td>
<td>11,356</td>
<td>90.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>17,267</td>
<td>57,100</td>
<td>74,367</td>
<td>76.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Asada 1978: 567)
In retrospect, the last phase of the resettlement campaign often dominates the view on the whole migration process. On the whole 1,271,479 Japanese were repatriated from Manchuria, most in the summer of 1946 (Saitamaken 1997: 34-35). Kijima gives a detailed list for every locality in former Manshūkoku with the number of Japanese inhabitants in August 1945, the number of dead and missing, and those who returned to Japan (Kijima 1986). For the agricultural settlers it is difficult to give exact numbers of returnees since most men were drafted into the Army before the end of the war and maybe died elsewhere or were taken to Siberia as prisoners of war. Of the approximately 270,000 people still in the settlements in August 1945, about 80,000 died, mostly women and children (Wilson 1995: 283).

The tragic fate of the settlers influenced especially the market for popular books with titles like Tōdo no ishibumi: Tsūkon no kokusaku Manshū imin (Tombstones in the frozen earth: The plight of the settlers sent to Manchuria by the national policy) (Jinno 1981). This title is a prime example of the often oversimplified explanation used for the reasons that brought all those people to Manchuria in the first place. Just like in the movie about the migration campaign in Ōhinata released in 1940, the answer to the question of the settlers’ motivation to emigrate to Manchuria often is “Kore zo kokusaku da” (It is the national policy!) (Shimizu 1994: 64). This study will therefore look into the details of the implementation of this national policy to find out how people were mobilized in the decisive phase of the beginning of the mass migration campaign and how the campaign that was used for this mass mobilization came into being.
3. The Struggle for Economic Revival in the Countryside

In the decade between 1920 and 1930 everyday life for people in the Japanese countryside was dominated by economic woes, high debts and tenancy disputes. Profits and wages in agriculture had been rising until 1920, but after the economic boom in Japan triggered by the First World War ended, development in the countryside stagnated. Until then the use of chemical fertilizer, improved seeds and some mechanization had resulted in higher yields. Due to falling prices, however, this surge in productivity was not translated into higher income for producers. Imports of cheap rice from the Japanese colonies of Taiwan and Korea led to further price falls and thus reduced income for Japanese grain producers. Revenue from agriculture decreased in the 1920s in spite of rationalization in production and efforts to commercialize agricultural products. People from the countryside were also hit by the industrial recession, because due to the slack in manufacturing, most companies were not hiring as many seasonal labourers – usually migrant workers from the countryside – as they had done during the economic boom years (Waswo 2003).

The number of disputes between landlords and tenants, usually conflicts about rent payments, rose continuously before the outbreak of World War II (Figure 1).

Figure 1. Number of tenancy disputes from 1920 to 1941 in Japan

(Source: Based on data from Nōmin undōshi kenkyūkai 1961: 121)
This graph shows that the number of tenancy disputes rose steeply in the early 1930s, reaching its peak in 1935 and declined again after the start of the Sino-Japanese War on the continent in 1937. This decline, however, was not an outcome of the solution of the social problems in the countryside; it is usually attributed to the impact of World War II (e.g. Nishida 2003: 17; Waswo 1988: 585).

Japanese government agencies regarded the financial problems of rural households as well as the disputes between landowners and tenants as mainly economic problems caused by rural poverty. Thus the measures taken to improve the situation in the countryside at the beginning of the 1930s were first and foremost applied to the production process in the villages. Based on the conviction that a certain amount of government interference was necessary to solve rural problems, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (Nōrinshō) initiated a campaign to revitalize the economy in the countryside. In the course of the 1930s, discussion about the relief of rural poverty and government social management measures for rural economic revitalization became closely connected to the new policy of mass migration of peasants to Manchuria (e.g., Smith 2001: 345-349; Takahashi 1997, Yunoki 1976).

A case study that examines the process which led to the out-migration of a substantial number of households from Ōhinata therefore must start with an investigation of the economic background of the village and the concrete measures taken to improve its situation. In this regard Ōhinata serves as an example for all the communities targeted by successive government policies to ease rural poverty, first by improvements in the production process and then by the promotion of mass migration to Manchuria. To explain the trends that finally resulted in the relocation of a part of Ōhinata village to the Asian continent, it is necessary to first look at the complexities of making a living in the countryside in Japan, where rural households – contrary to the stereotypical image of the rice farmer working in the paddy fields all day – were usually earning their money from a range of sources – not just agricultural products but also a considerable amount of side businesses such as raising silkworms or making charcoal. This look at the local level already shows the first discrepancies between the official ideology of the need to occupy new land in Manchuria as a panacea for the presumed number-one problem in the Japanese countryside – the lack of arable land – and the complex rural reality. It furthermore introduces the various actors in the implementation process, the most important being local activists who adapted abstract
notions from political plans to the concrete conditions in their communities, and propagated their implementation.

Whereas the complex economic situation in the Japanese countryside can be illustrated and explained by using a specific village, the analysis of the connection of a government campaign for the revitalization of the rural economy and the beginning of a mass migration campaign to Manchuria must go beyond Ōhinata. Many villages like Ōhinata were affected by social management measures that are generally known as the Rural Economic Revitalization Campaign. An overview of this campaign and its outcome is necessary to understand the evolution of the Village-Division Campaign and Ōhinata’s role in it. This chapter analyses the economic problems of Ōhinata as one exemplary community before explaining how the struggle for economic revival in the countryside triggered the movement which is the main subject of this study: the Village-Division Campaign. The focus of the analysis is on the role of local agents in this process and the interaction between the central, prefectural and local levels of the administration to explain how individual communities were drafted into the government programmes.


The village (mura) of Ōhinata is situated in the southeast of Nagano Prefecture in the valley of a river called Nukuigawa. It consists of nine hamlets (buraku), which were grouped together into five wards (ku) in the course of the 1880 administrative reform. In those hamlets that are located in the upper part of the valley there is hardly any space for paddies and dry fields between the river and the mountain slope. Due to the absence of this prerequisite for farming, traditionally agriculture in the village was practised only for subsistence. Most inhabitants earned cash from off-farm occupations. In the Meiji era (1868-1912), people from Ōhinata specialized in transporting rice and other goods from neighbouring Gunma Prefecture in the east, to towns and villages west of Ōhinata. At the end of the nineteenth century, however, the construction of a private railway started in the area. When the line to Saku in the vicinity of Ōhinata was completed in 1915, the transport business was no longer profitable for the villagers. Some then found employment in small coal mines or started growing silkworms in their homes. Since the village was surrounded by mountainous forest, another widespread cash industry in the area was charcoal production (Ikegami 1995: 20-21). Many of the families mainly living from charcoal production had moved
into the region from Hida only during the latter half of the nineteenth century (Tōdai 1940: 56).

Thus the economic structure of the village did not really fit into the picture planners from the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry had in mind when they singled out the lack of arable land as the main reason for rural poverty. The villagers of Ōhinata have traditionally had various sources of income and have earned cash that they also used for other purposes than bare necessities. In the Taishō era (1912-1926), for instance, there was enough business for two private taxi companies whose cars would drive people from the village to and from the nearby town of Iida for shopping, to visit the cinema or coffee shops (Ikegami 1995: 21-22). Data taken from the village gazette for the mid-1930s shows that the percentage of village income coming from agriculture continued to be rather low, whereas the majority of the income was generated through sericulture and charcoal production (Figure 2).

**Figure 2. Comparison of sources for village income in Ōhinata 1934–1938**

![Figure 2. Comparison of sources for village income in Ōhinata 1934–1938](image)

(Source: Based on data from Miyai 1981: 56)

At the beginning of the 1930s there were approximately 400 households in the village, which had a total population of slightly over 2,000 people. A survey for the village revitalization plan of 1936 shows that 336 households were somehow engaged
in agriculture, and 228 had some arable land. Compared to the overall situation in the region during the 1930s, this looks average and unremarkable. Some 47% of the farmers in the village owned all the land they farmed; 20.8% owned some of their land and rented some more. Only 32.2% of the agricultural households were tenants without land of their own (Asahi shinbunsha 1939: 294). The impression changes, however, when we look into the size of the average plot worked by a household (Table 8).

Table 8. Size of farmland per household in Ōhinata

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arable land per household</th>
<th>Number of households</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Up to 5 tan</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>36.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 – 10 tan</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>49.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 – 20 tan</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 – 30 tan</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 – 50 tan</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>336</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Asahi shinbunsha 1939: 296)

A *tan* equals 993 square meters, and 10 *tan* make up one *chō*. The overall majority of households in the village had only up to one *chō* of arable land, which was not even enough to produce sufficient food for their own consumption.

From September 1929 to October 1930, the Youth League of Ōhinata (*rengo seinendan*) undertook a survey of the economic situation in the village, to which 369 households responded. According to its count, the total productivity of Ōhinata in surveyed year reached 136,841 yen, including 8,000 yen in wages earned by young women from Ōhinata in the textile industry outside the village. This amounted to merely 60% of the income of the preceding year and only half of the amount earned two years before the survey (Miyai 1981:58). Since the total amount of expenses in the village for the year in question came to 289,768 yen, the survey revealed a deficit of 152,927 yen for nearly the whole village. Spread statistically over the number of households which participated in the survey, this deficit would amount to an average of 414.43 yen per household. The survey contains interesting details about the amount of money spent by the surveyed villagers in the course of one year (Table 9).
Table 9. Example of annual expenses in Ōhinata at the beginning of the 1930s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kind of expenses</th>
<th>Amount (£)</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Clothing</td>
<td>16,617.06</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polished rice</td>
<td>80,485.35</td>
<td>27.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sake</td>
<td>15,848.24</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (soybean paste, soya sauce)</td>
<td>43,922.93</td>
<td>15.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal</td>
<td>140,256.52</td>
<td>48.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Production</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raw material for sideline businesses</td>
<td>21,124.25</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fertilizer</td>
<td>11,199.53</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (seeds, fodder)</td>
<td>15,495.50</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal</td>
<td>47,819.28</td>
<td>16.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintenance, electricity</td>
<td>15,118.41</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taxes</td>
<td>14,088.00</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social occasions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marriages, funerals</td>
<td>25,380.03</td>
<td>8.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rent</td>
<td>13,566.63</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>16,933.06</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>289,767.99</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Yamada 1978: 16)

Thus in the 1930s households with the typical small amount of arable land had to spend on average more than a quarter of their annual budget to buy their staple food. The average 4.9% of the budget for taxes and another 4.7% for rent of farmland look rather moderate in comparison. Again these figures show that the economy of Ōhinata could not have been solely based on the production of grain, but depended on a variety of products sold for cash and different forms of wage labour. Since all households engaged in more than one form of production in the village, they could make a living as long as prices for charcoal and silk were stable and consumer prices for grain stayed relatively low.

The Wall Street Crash of 1929 and the ensuing worldwide economic depression, however, threw this relation off-balance. First the price for raw silk dropped drastically, because the US market for silk, where most of the Japanese output went, collapsed. Between September 1929 and September 1930, the price for silk cocoons, a major source of cash for many rural households, dropped by 47% (Waswo 1988: 596). Many silk mills in Nagano had to close down, sending home their mostly female work force to rural households that depended on the extra income from their daughters’ factory work (Smith 2003: 130). After a bad harvest in 1931, the price of grain went up. As a consequence rural households were left with less profit for the same
amount of output and had to pay higher prices for their staple food at the same time. Many had to borrow money and ran up significantly more debts than they already had from previous years.

The above-mentioned data leads to two important conclusions. First, it points to the enormous difference between income and expenses as the main reason for the notorious debts of rural households in the 1930s. However, it was not the scarcity of farmland but the sudden drop in prices for products from rural sideline businesses that caused this imbalance and forced many rural people to borrow money. Like most villagers in Japan, the people in Ōhinata had always pursued various non-agrarian occupations to earn cash to pay taxes, buy fertilizer and raw materials for sideline businesses, as well as to pay for food and clothing. Borrowing money for these expenses had always been an important option, but debt became a serious problem when the economic depression destroyed the balance between rural income and expenses. The explicit inclusion of the debt problem and its underlying cause was in fact a merit of the Youth League survey, which became the basis for the first plan for the revival of the village economy in 1932. An earlier attempt by the Ōhinata village office and some representatives of the prefectural government of Nagano in May 1931 for such a plan had completely ignored the debt problem and had only recommended an increase in production through rationalized and improved production methods as a remedy for rural poverty (Ikegami 1995: 24-25).

The second noteworthy point is that the first initiative to tackle the economic problems of Ōhinata came from within the village, and more specifically from young people who were active in an institution of local politics, the Youth League of Ōhinata.

3.2. The Role of Sideline Businesses: Ōhinata’s Charcoal Industry

The economic role of rural businesses other than agriculture and the importance of local initiative in Ōhinata can best be observed in the charcoal industry. There we find a typical attempt to improve the economic situation of poor households initiated by a local activist. Horikawa Kiyomi, who later became the leader of Ōhinata’s emigrant group, founded the first industrial cooperative (sangyō kumiai)11 for charcoa-

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11 Based on the “Law for Industrial Cooperatives” (sangyō kumiaihō), which was in effect from 1900 to 1943, these organizations were created to provide small businesses with low interest credits and an infrastructure for marketing their products. Industrial cooperatives spread in the first decade of the twentieth century in the countryside, where in 1924 nearly half of all peasant households were orga-
burners in the 1920s. Traditionally villagers had been allowed to enter 2,700 chō of village owned forest to harvest wood for charcoal after a fixed date each year, the so-called opening of the forest (yama no kuchi). When charcoal burning became an important source of income for the people in Ōhinata and a considerable number of families relied mainly on charcoal burning for their living, the village office started to sell the right to chop wood for charcoal on an annual basis. Nevertheless more and more villagers took up charcoal production and decimated the forest. Therefore the village office decided in 1919 to control the usage of wood from its forest. A plan was set up which regulated the usage of 2,347 chō of village forest for the next ten years and entailed the promise to reforest another 327 chō. A second plan for the usage of the village forest, however, had to be set up in 1928, i.e., before the official end to the first ten-year plan. This time the size of the forest area to be used for charcoal production over the next ten years was enlarged to 2,604 chō. A third plan drafted in 1936 enlarged the usable area further, giving up the village forest for total exploitation for production of one of Ōhinata’s most important cash crops12 (Ikekami 1995: 23-24).

The charcoal industry in Ōhinata, however, became more and more dominated by one single company, Yoshihon Limited (Yoshihon gōshigaisha). This company had large amounts of privately owned forest at its disposal nationwide and supplied the railway with its charcoal. Many charcoal-making families depended upon it: they bought their license for chopping wood from the company and sold the charcoal they had made back to it. As the local monopolist, Yoshihon Ltd. forced the small-scale charcoal-burners to accept relatively low prices for their charcoal. Those without their own business, or those who had lost their business due to insolvency, could earn a living as labourers for Yoshihon Ltd., and were willing to accept the company’s relatively low wages. To liberate the charcoal-burners from their dependency on the local monopolist, Horikawa Kiyomi founded the Cooperative for the Production and Marketing of Charcoal in Ōhinata (Ōhinata seitan hanbai kōbai kumiai) in 1922. However, since becoming a member of this cooperative cost 30 Yen, only 171 of the roughly

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12 The term “cash crop” is usually only applied to agricultural products planted, harvested and then sold for cash, which in a strict sense is not the case with trees chopped down and turned into charcoal. However, an important aspect of the charcoal and silk industries is that their products cannot be consumed as food, but are marketed to generate cash income for rural households, so both charcoal and silk cocoons might be labelled “cash crops.”
300 charcoal-burning families of the village could afford the membership. The new cooperative could not provide enough products to their members and in some cases even had to rely upon Yoshihon Ltd. for material and money. It provided its members with credit, but since its capital was not sufficient, this practice led to financial troubles. In 1924 the cooperative had to be reorganized under a new name as the Cooperative for the Provision of Credits and Marketing in Ōhinata (Ōhinata shin’yō hanbai kōbai riyō kumiai), but it was usually just called the industrial cooperative of Ōhinata. It struggled to survive by improving its quality standards and its infrastructure until it succeeded in consolidating its business in 1928 (Ikegami 1995: 24; Miyai 1981: 57).

Horikawa, who was the first president of the cooperative, played a decisive role in the development of this organization. In 1934 he again organized an Executive Committee for the Improvement of Charcoal Production (Seitan kaizen jikkōkai) with funds from the industrial cooperative of Ōhinata. The committee used the funds to buy licenses for wood-chopping wholesale, gave them to charcoal-burners, bought their products and marketed them. Charcoal-burners did not have to pay for the chopping licenses and received good prices for their charcoal. They were paid in vouchers that could be used for purchases in stores in the village and its neighbourhood. In this process the committee tried to gain enough money through the sale of charcoal not only to be able to purchase wood-chopping licenses, but also to pay back the money it initially received from the industrial cooperative. The idea was to liberate the charcoal-burners from their dependency on Yoshihon, which in some cases also meant giving out vouchers in advance as a form of credit in order to keep the members from taking up debts from moneylenders (Ikegami 1995: 24).

This practice, however, could not change the underlying dilemma of the families who lived mainly off charcoal burning. When charcoal-production rose thanks to the commitment of the industrial cooperative and its Executive Committee for the Improvement of Charcoal Production, market prices for charcoal dropped due to oversupply, and profits shrank correspondingly. As Figure 3 shows, when charcoal production started to rise in Ōhinata in 1931, prices dropped and stayed relatively low during the years of high charcoal production between 1932 and 1934.
Figure 3. Development of charcoal production amounts and sale prices in Ōhinata

![Bar chart showing charcoal production and sale prices from 1928 to 1935. The chart includes the following data:

- Amount of charcoal produced in units of 10 KAN (=35.7 kg)
- Charcoal price (SEN per KAN)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Amount of Charcoal (KAN)</th>
<th>Charcoal Price (SEN)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>31.59</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>28.57</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>29.94</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>37.66</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>33.32</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>66.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>63.50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>29.48</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Figures based on data from Tōdai 1940: 117-128)

This effect meant that the situation of the charcoal burners in Ōhinata did not improve significantly. It also affected the industrial cooperative, one of the main providers of loans for charcoal burners. In a 1939 report about the charcoal industry, the village mayor had to admit that the cooperative had accumulated around 70,000 yen of outstanding debts. However, since most debtors were not even able to pay interest on their loans, it was very unlikely that these debts would be repaid in the near future (Asahi shinbunsha 1939: 79-80).

The analysis of the developments in the charcoal industry of Ōhinata in the 1920s and 1930s as an example of the role of a sideline business for the rural economy shows the importance of market mechanisms even in the countryside. Contrary to the picture of self-sufficient peasant families, which was promoted by many agrarianists as the ideal form of existence for all Japanese, the average Japanese farmer had to find ways to earn enough cash to pay taxes and purchase chemical fertilizer, seeds, etc. The economic problems, i.e., debts and rural poverty, were thus not caused just by the lack of arable land in the villages. They were to a large extent an effect of the business structures and the money economy in the villages. It is therefore no coincidence that local activities for the improvement of the financial situation of poor rural households can be found especially in the sideline business sector. The charcoal
burners’ cooperative in Ōhinata is a typical example for a local agent playing an important role in the struggle against rural poverty.

### 3.3. The Start of the Rural Economic Revitalization Campaign

Situations like the one in Ōhinata with debts that were nearly impossible to repay were rather common in the countryside in the 1930s. The urgency and scale of the problem can be deduced from the fact that groups of farmers even decided to petition the government for the so-called regulation of debts. On 4 June 1932 representatives from eleven counties and two towns in Nagano, among them representatives of Minamisaku, the home county of Ōhinata Village, went to Tokyo to submit a petition in the name of the Association to Fight Recession in Northern Shinano (Hoku-Shin fukyō taisakkai). This association comprised roughly 5,000 members. They claimed to speak for the lower social strata in the countryside, the poor and often landless peasants, who did not feel represented by the Imperial Agricultural Association with its majority of landlords and landowning peasants. The demands of the Association to Fight Recession in Northern Shinano for a moratorium on debts were published in the *Miyako shinbun* the following day (cited in Takahashi 1997: 132, Footnote 39). It can be inferred that this was not an unusual occurrence from another mid-June 1932 article in the *Tokyō asahi shinbun*, which states that up to the time of writing 911 similar petitions had been received in 1932, 390 of them from Nagano Prefecture alone (cited in Takahashi 1997: 132, Footnote 4). A survey of the Social and Labour Affairs Bureau of the Home Ministry on “Poverty in Farming, Forestry, and Fishing Communities (Nōsangyoson ni okeru seikatsu konkyō jōkyō)”, published in 1932, reported that hardship was most severe in the Tōhoku Region (Nakamura 1998: 71).

As a reaction to the economic crisis in the countryside the Five Minister Council decided on 5 August 1932 to start a campaign to resurrect the rural economy. Although its official title *Nōsangyoson keizai kōsei undō* (Campaign to Revitalize the Economy in Farm, Mountain and Fishing Villages) contains different types of rural communities, in practice it was mainly geared toward agricultural villages and was usually just called *Nōson keizai kōsei undō*, i.e., Rural Economic Revitalization Campaign (Takahashi 1997: 94). The Diet convoked an extraordinary session about the economic problems in agriculture from 22 August to 4 September 1932 (Young 1998b: 97-98), and in September the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry created a new section – the Economic Revitalization Section (Keizai Kōseiibu) – to plan and supervise the
campaign. Kodaira Gon‘ichi, who later became an active proponent of mass migration to Manchuria, was its first section head. The basic outline of the campaign was drafted in October and discussed at an internal conference from 12 to 14 November 1932. The results of this process were then presented to the newly established Central Committee for Rural Revitalization (Nōson keizai kōsei chūō iinkai) at its first meeting at the end of November to be implemented at the grassroots level starting from December 1932 (Takahashi 1997: 94).

According to the proponents of this campaign, the crisis in Japanese agriculture had not only economic reasons, but also a social and even an ideological dimension. Hardest hit and least able to recover from the crisis were the rural poor, the landless and the day-labourers. To alleviate their plight would at the same time contribute to the resolution of some of the current social and political problems. The campaign aimed at increasing agricultural productivity first of all through careful planning, selective financial aid and close monitoring and control of the process and its outcome. Its main intention was to revive the rural economy not through help from outside, but by its own strength from within the villages through efficient use of resources and the reform of production processes in agriculture to reach modern standards (Takahashi 1997: 94). To achieve this ambitious goal, local Economic Improvement Committees (Keizai kaizen iinkai) had to be created. Their task was to engage as many village households as possible in the campaign, draw up detailed economic plans for their village, and help the participating families to formulate improvement plans for their specific household. The campaign was mapped out to run for 12 years and to incorporate 1,000 new villages into the programme each year.

It is noteworthy that the original initiative for this campaign came from activists at the grassroots level who lobbied for their interests in Tokyo. The issue in turn was then taken up by the central government, which devised a nationwide campaign to tackle the problem. The village of Ōhinata was among the first communities which decided to participate in this new campaign. On 1 September 1932 – not even a month after the invention of the Rural Economic Revitalization Campaign – the village decided to participate and created its local Economic Revitalization Committee, which drew up the above-mentioned plan for the revival of the village economy with a special focus on debt reduction (Miyai 1981: 58).
3.4. From Rural Revitalization to Mass Migration

The Rural Revitalization Campaign had a promising start. In the first three years the actual number of participating villages even surpassed the goal of 1,000 intakes per year. From the mid-1930s onwards, however, numbers started falling behind expectations (Table 10).

Table 10. New Entries into the Rural Economic Revitalization Campaign

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Agricultural Villages</th>
<th>Mountain Villages</th>
<th>Fishing Villages</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Special Assistance Villages</th>
<th>Village-Division</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>1,057</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>1,469</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>1,183</td>
<td>393</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>1,796</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>935</td>
<td>291</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>1,401</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>637</td>
<td>237</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>994</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>586</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>929</td>
<td>350</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>436</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>705</td>
<td>403</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>379</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>675</td>
<td>407</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>446</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>690</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>331</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>494</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>??</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>69</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>5,990</td>
<td>2,063</td>
<td>1,100</td>
<td>9,153</td>
<td>1,595</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Takahashi 1997: 109)

Originally laid out for 12 years, the programme should have resulted in a total of 12,000 participating communities. But the adoption of new villages into the scheme was discontinued from 1941, when only 69 villages already associated with the programme were upgraded to become Special Assistance Villages (Keizai kōsei tokubetsu joseison).

As early as 1935 the number of new entries in the Rural Revitalization Campaign started falling behind expectations. To continue working towards the greater goal of the campaign – to reverse the downward trend in Japanese agricultural production – politicians shifted their emphasis from quantity to quality. On 26 June 1936, the cabinet of Prime Minister Hirota proclaimed the Keizai kōsei keikaku tokubetsu josei kisoku (Regulation for Special Assistance to Economic Revitalization Plans). This scheme allowed further financial assistance to villages that were complying fully with their Economic Revitalization Plans drawn up under the supervision of the Ministry of
Agriculture and Forestry. This was supposed to create an incentive for villages not only to participate in the campaign, but also to strive for good results and thus acquire additional funds (Takahashi 1997: 115).

The plan each individual village had to draw up to receive Ministry funds usually included a wide range of measures for the consolidation of the village economy. Among them were the propagation of chemical fertilizers and some mechanization, diversification of produce, especially into animal husbandry (pigs, sheep, chickens and rabbits), improvement of infrastructure, as well as small public works projects such as local processing plants and storage facilities. The plans also stipulated the aim of organizing a greater number of households in industrial cooperatives to integrate more producers into the planning process and have better control over them at the same time. To further consolidate the village budget, the plans explicitly mentioned the necessity for the village office to collect all outstanding taxes from the villagers. And last but not least, the plans included the requirement to educate the villagers about the campaign and agriculture in general, thus indicating once again that the initiators of the campaign perceived a need for a so-called spiritual revitalization (seishin kōsei) alongside the economic revitalization to fix "ideological", i.e., political and social, problems (Takahashi 1997: 192).

The result of these meticulously planned economic measures in the participating villages, however, was not what the planners had envisioned. Instead of improving the situation of the poorest peasants, the campaign brought benefits mostly for the middle and high-income segments of the rural population. Only households with a certain income had the resources to implement measures like diversifying their production, reclaiming new land and raising output with fertilizer. So instead of helping the poorest segment of the village population, the campaign widened the gap between the owners of middle-sized plots and the local have-nots and day labourers. Social tension in the villages rose, and it should come as no surprise that a climax of tenants’ unrest was reached in 1935 and 1936. These unrests in turn were often resolved with the help of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry by offering Special Assistance status to the village in question, if the tenants ended their protest. The Special Assistance status then basically meant higher government subsidies for the village, which the village elite could use to appease the dissatisfied members of the community (Takahashi 1997: 128).
This strategy, however, did not work out in the long run. The study on out-migration from Ōhinata undertaken by Nasu Hiroshi from the Faculty of Agriculture of Tokyo Imperial University wrapped up the results of the Rural Economic Revitalization Campaign in the village of Ōhinata, stating that “the lower layer of peasant families could not receive special favour from the Revitalization Campaign” (Tōdai 1940: 2). Sugino Tadao, an agricultural economist who was also involved into the promotion of emigration to Manchuria, expressed the same reservations about the success of the Revitalization Campaign and even claimed that the campaign in some places intensified the class conflicts to an extent that people had to struggle for sheer survival (Sugino 1940: 139).

The fact that the Rural Economic Revitalization Campaign failed to address the problems of the poorest segment of the rural population forced those in charge of solving the crisis in the rural economy to think about other ways to address it (Young 1998a: 328). Before 1936 there had not been much interest for the issue of emigration to Manchuria in the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. Through the persistent lobbying by a group of bureaucrats and academics around Katō Kanji, this issue was put on the agenda of the fourth meeting on 28 March 1936 of the Central Committee for Rural Revitalization. The fifth meeting of this committee took place on 28 and 29 June, only two days after the Hirota Cabinet had proclaimed the above mentioned Regulation for Special Assistance to give more money to villages complying fully with the revitalization campaign’s goals. It adopted the promotion of emigration to Manchuria as one of the committee’s tasks. This decision of the Central Committee for Rural Revitalization followed the general trend of the time, since the Diet in the summer of 1936 discussed government sponsorship for mass migration plans in earnest, and the Cabinet made the sending of one million households from Japan to Manchuria over the course of the next 20 years an official national policy on 25 August 1936 (Takahashi 1997: 150).

The connection of the Rural Revitalization Campaign and the new promotion of mass migration to Manchuria followed a simple logic: The measures for the improvement of the economic situation in the countryside failed to solve the problems of the poorest segment of Japan’s rural population. Households without any resources could not improve their economic situation by employing (non-existent) resources in an efficient way. According to the mainstream opinion of the time, the economic problems of the poor in the countryside were mainly caused by rural overpopulation. At the eighth
general meeting of the Social Policy Association (Shakai seisaku gakkai)\(^\text{13}\) convened at Tokyo Imperial University in November 1914, the agricultural economist Takaoka Kumao had named the lack of farmland as the main reason for the distress of small farmers. As a solution for families without enough farmland to exploit the family’s labour power fully, he proposed out-migration as the best alternative (Vlastos 1998: 83-84). Takaoka later became president of Hokkaidō Imperial University, which published its own series of research papers on Manchuria, and he did research about Manchuria migrants himself (e.g., Takaoka 1938). The idea that a surplus of people trying to earn a living from scarce areas of arable land could not produce enough to survive without debts caught on in academic circles and the media in the aftermath of this meeting. In the 1930s emigration activists found the overpopulation theme of the agrarianist movement useful for the promotion of their cause and adopted it, thus establishing a link between the two topics (Young 1998a: 327). When the Rural Revitalization Campaign ran into trouble in the mid-1930s, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry in 1937 even developed a formula to exactly calculate the overpopulation rate of a community. The formula is based on the assumption that the average farm household needs at least one \(chō\) of arable land for survival\(^\text{14}\), in other words that in order to be able to survive economically a community must not have more households than \(chō\) of farmland. By subtracting the total area of farmland in a village from the number of village households, the number of so-called surplus households can be calculated. A division of the number of “surplus households” by the total amount of farmland results in the percentage of overpopulation of the community, the “overpopulation rate” (\(kajō jinkōritsu\)) (Araragi 1998: 95). Sending away the “surplus households” to a new settlement, for instance in Manchuria, could lower the “overpopulation rate” or even reduce it to zero, thus giving the remaining households the resources to improve their standard of living by the means introduced through the Rural Revitalization Campaign.

\(^{13}\) This association was founded in 1896 by Japanese academics who modelled it upon the German “Verein für Socialpolitik”. Among its famous members was Kanai Noburo who gave the first lectures on social politics in Japan (Kokushi daijiten 1979-1997: vol. 7, 190).

\(^{14}\) The notion of the standard household plot varied considerably. The first migration plans from northeast Japan considered 3 \(chō\) as the necessary farmland size for a household. After the 1937 survey the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry first concluded 1.6 \(chō\) to be the national standard size (Asahi shinbunsha 1939: 518). However, since this was still an unrealistic goal, the benchmark was lowered to 1 \(chō\) (Araragi 1995: 95). This figure was subsequently used in standard village-division plans.
The interesting point of this development, however, is that the connection between the revitalization of the countryside and the promotion of emigration to Manchuria in the course of a modification of the Rural Revitalization Campaign was not decided at the central level and just communicated to the localities to be carried out as a government policy. It resulted from the interaction and the ongoing consultations of bureaucrats from the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry with bureaucrats from the prefectural and local levels. Important actors at the village level were local associations for the promotion of emigration as well as reservist organizations, i.e., groups that were already involved in the management of migration to places outside Japan. After mass migration to Manchuria became one of the main goals of the Japanese government in August 1936, its promotion was often taken over by the local committees in charge of implementing the measures of the Rural Revitalization Campaign, since it was regarded as another remedy for rural poverty and its organization was therefore seen as the responsibility of the local committees created for the administration and supervision of improvement measures. The overall plan for village-division, the bunson imin keikaku, which specified this as the preferred form of emigration to Manchuria was completed only in May 1938 (Yunoki 1976: 297-300).

The idea of a village-division as a means to effectively organize mass migration to the continent, however, was brought into the discussion by grassroots actors involved in village politics. It was a group of young activists from the village of Nangō in Miyagi Prefecture who developed their plan for emigration to Manchuria by village-division even before migration was made one of the “Seven Big Policies” by the Hirota-Cabinet. The first person from Nangō had emigrated to Manchuria as early as July 1933 to join the second group of paramilitary settlers bound for the settlement of Chiburi, so the village had an early precedent and a personal connection to Manchuria. In 1934 one of the local activists, Matsukawa Gorō, met Katō Kanji for the first time. Over the next three years from 1934 to 1936, another 37 individual settlers from the village were supported on their way to the continent through this personal connection.

Then in 1936 the emigration supporters in the village decided to form an official association to coordinate their work. In February 1936 they held the first meeting of the Nangō Village Committee for the Sponsorship of Emigration to Manchuria and Mongolia (Nangōmura Man-Mō imin kōenkai). At this meeting an emigration scheme for the whole community (Nangōmura imin keikaku) was presented. It aimed at sending
40% of the current village population in family units to Manchuria, thereby vacating enough arable land for the remaining households to farm at least three chō each, a farm size that was adapted to the conditions in northeast Japan and not yet based on the general standard of one chō given out by the Ministry in 1937 (Abiko 1988: 343; Asahi shinbunsha 1939: 63). In March the new committee presented the following ambitious plan for “mass migration” from Nangō to Manchuria to the Ministry of Colonial Affairs to ask for its support.

Table 11. The migration scheme of Nangō Village

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Amount of arable land in the village</th>
<th>1,800 chō</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total number of household in the village</td>
<td>1,005 households</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Desirable” number of households (farming 3 chō each)</td>
<td>600 households</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Surplus population”</td>
<td>405 households</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Emigrant quota for 1936 | 50 households |
| Emigrant quota for 1937 | 100 households |
| Emigrant quota for 1938 | 100 households |
| Emigrant quota for 1939 | 155 households |

(Source: Okabe 1990-1992 [7]: 8-9)

By earmarking 405 of its 1,005 households for emigration, the village of Nangō planned to virtually split the community in two halves, a smaller and a bigger one. Like many other concepts used in the organization of migration to Manchuria, this idea was not totally new. The first paramilitary Japanese settlers sent to northeast China were called tondenhei, just like the Japanese settlers in Hokkaidō in the nineteenth century.15 Thus in the beginning the migration to the continent was compared to past colonization movements that were also state-administered and had a clear paramilitary connotation (Asada 1976a: 10-11). The concept of migration in groups consisting of a substantial part of the village population had also been used in the colonization of Hokkaidō and in one case half a village even emigrated to South America (Araragi 1998: 68-69). Thus planners from Nangō did nothing more than taking up an existing concept and employing it for the restructuring of their village.

15 Originally an ancient Chinese concept, tondenhei in general are soldiers sent out in military formation to open up new territory at the periphery of the empire. Although their task is basically of an agricultural nature, their position in a possibly dangerous environment might lead to their switching back to being soldiers again. In China tondenhei were used to enlarge and guard the fringes of the Chinese empire from the Han (-206 to 220) to Ming dynasties (1368-1644). In Japan tondenhei were already sent out in the Heian Period (794-1185) and then again from 1875 to 1904 to colonize Hokkaidō (Kokushi daijiten 1979-1997: vol. 10, 491-492)
It is not clear, however, when the term *bunson* (village-division) for this concept came into being. Most probably it was coined when local emigration support committees like the one in Nangō started discussing their plans with the Ministry of Colonial Affairs, which was in charge of migration to the continent before the promotion of mass migration was made a central government policy and the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry took over the national part of the recruitment and training of settlers within Japan. *Bunson* definitely became common usage from February 1937 when it was applied to the Village-Division Campaign’s famous showcase, the village of Ōhinata (Abiko 1988: 342).

In summary it can be said that the Village-Division Campaign evolved as the product of the cooperation of various groups with different agendas working together to further their respective goals. A lot of activities started from the village level, where local groups tried to improve the economic situation using all kinds of measures ranging from tenants’ protest and petitions to organization in cooperatives and committees. This activism was taken up at the central level in the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry and channelled into a campaign of social management, the Rural Revitalization Campaign. The example of Ōhinata shows, however, that the remedies prescribed by the central level were often not addressing the local problems. Contrary to the interpretation by agricultural scientists and ministry bureaucrats, rural poverty was not mainly caused by the scarcity of farmland in Japan and the ensuing rural “surplus population”. According to the assumptions of the Ministry not only Ōhinata, but also every other village in Japan in the 1930s was seriously overpopulated. But just like Ōhinata, the typical Japanese village at that time did not live from agriculture alone. The decisive factor for the rural economy was to which extent villagers had the possibility to earn cash either through sideline businesses like charcoal making or sericulture, or through seasonal labour migration. Peasants were not indebted because their fields were too small, but because they had much higher costs for rent, fertilizer, seeds and food than they could earn from products where the market prices kept dropping due to a general recession, or from seasonal labour migration that was negatively affected by the economic depression.

Actors at the local level clearly perceived this problem and formed organizations like the industrial cooperatives to raise their profits from their various economic activities and offer possibilities for cheap loans. These activities, however, were hampered by the scarcity of capital among the participating peasants. Offers like the subsidies
given out by the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry in the course of the Rural Rehabilitation Campaign were readily accepted. At the same time, government interference in the local economy which came with the subsidies had to be accepted as well. Village leaders and local activists dutifully formed local Economic Revitalization Committees and carried out the planning and rationalization measures demanded by the Ministry. When these measures failed to improve the local situation, frustrated activists started to look for other options. Thus the promoters of migration to Manchuria around Katō Kanji could address the desperate local actors.

Katō Kanji, too, used the argument of rural “overpopulation”, but offered a different solution to the problem. In order to draft substantial numbers of volunteers for the agrarian settlements the migration promoters planned to erect in Manchuria, Katō encouraged local activists at the village level to help with the export of their “surplus population” to the continent. From these personal contacts grew a movement that was in turn taken up by the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry under the name Village-Division Campaign with the village of Ōhinata as its best-known example.
4. The Village-Division Campaign

Since the idea of employing village-division as a tool to direct “surplus population” from the Japanese countryside to new settlements in northeast China was brought into the discussion by the village of Nangō, it could be legitimate to assume that Nangō became the national model for the Village-Division Campaign. It is listed as the first village to start the implementation of its village-division scheme (Okabe 1990-1992 [7]: 5-10). Sixty-six households from Nangō joined the fifth transport of settlers, which marked the beginning of mass migration, leaving Japan in March 1937, at a time when the village of Ōhinata had only just decided to participate in the mass migration scheme (Abiko 1988: 343). Nevertheless Nangō never turned into a national showcase, nor was it presented as a model for successful village-division. This place was taken by the runner-up Ōhinata.

To understand how Ōhinata ended up in this position, it is necessary to examine the early phase of the Village-Division Campaign. An investigation of the dynamics of this movement must then also examine the agents at the village and prefectural levels as well as their respective agendas. A closer look at the evolution of the campaign at the local level is necessary to understand the mechanisms which accounted for the participation of villages in the Village-Division Movement as well as the success or failure of the schemes.

This chapter starts with an analysis of the village that invented village-division for emigration to Manchuria, but did not succeed despite its pioneer status in the movement to become a national role model. Then the analysis follows the spread of the idea of village-division to Nagano Prefecture and finally to the one village in Nagano which came to stand for the campaign in the nationwide propaganda effort for the promotion of village-division, Ōhinata. To understand the scope and the further evolution of the campaign, the focus then shifts from the exemplary case of Ōhinata to the spread of the idea to the national level, where the grassroots movement was turned into a mobilization scheme planned and implemented in a top-down process. At this stage, village-division was no longer propelled by local activists but by central planners who used the village-division of Ōhinata as a propaganda tool for moral

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16 Most statistics about migrants use the term household as the basic measurement unit. Unfortunately a household can consist of only one member, but can theoretically also refer to an unlimited number of family members belonging to one household. However, in the case of the early paramilitary settlers and the preparation groups the emigrating “household” usually consisted of only one male member.
suasion in their social management efforts aimed at fulfilling the migration quotas for Manchuria. Since this chapter provides an analysis of the making of the Village-Division Campaign and the specific role local activists played in it, it encompasses only the time when the campaign was still a grassroots movement initiated by actors at the local level. It concludes with an explanation of the mobilization process when the movement was still carried by local activists.

4.1. The Pioneer Village of Nangō

The driving force behind the emigration plans in Nangō was the principal of Nangō’s National Higher Level School (Nangō kokumin kōtō gakkō), Matsukawa Gorō. Despite the similarity in name, this school was not part of the 1920s movement which over the course of the 1930s and early 1940s established so-called Japan National Higher Level Schools (Nihon kokumin kōtō gakkō)\(^\text{17}\) all over the country to promote a self-sufficient farm economy. Nevertheless, the National Higher Level School in Nangō was also devoted to the vocational training of farmers. Land-owning peasants had petitioned the village office for such a school when the elementary schools in the community were restructured at the beginning of the 1930s. The village assembly agreed to the creating of the school in March 1930, and the school itself was opened in April 1931 with Matsukawa as its founding headmaster (Abiko 1988: 327). Matsukawa later acted as a consultant to the Association for Emigration to Manchuria and in the spring of 1936 was involved in the drafting of the mass migration plans by Katō Kanji in cooperation with the Kantō Army, which laid the foundation for the government decision in August 1936 to send one million rural households to settle in Manchuria (Abiko 1988: 338). After the first meeting of Matsukawa and Katō in March 1934, Matsukawa became an enthusiastic promoter of emigration and participated in an inspection tour to Manchuria in the autumn of 1934. His promotion of migration to Manchuria, however, triggered a fierce discussion in the village. Some argued that these activities interfered with his responsibilities as a school principal, and Matsukawa was forced to resign from this position in March 1935. Conflicts between advocates and opponents of migration to Manchuria broke out in the village.

\(^\text{17}\) The first one of these schools was founded in May 1926 in Tomobe, Ibaraki Prefecture with Katō Kanji as headmaster. Although sponsored by the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry and the Ministry of Education, the schools were only nominally self-supporting and in reality had to rely on public and private contributions (Havens 1974: 282).
Nangō was a relatively new village; most of its 3,000 chō of farmland had only been opened up for cultivation after the Meiji Restoration. The village had a high percentage of big landlords as well as social conflicts in its history. The conservative local elite in the village office was opposed to Matsukawa’s activities and thus did not participate in the drafting and implementation of migration plans. Local activists had to rely on their contacts with Katō Kanji; the first households to join the emigration movements were usually relatives of these activists (Asahi Shinbunsha 1939: 60-63).

This background knowledge elucidates point no. 5 of the fundamental principles of Nangō’s village-­division plan, which says: “Restrict the responsibility [for the implementation of the scheme] to those who seriously strive for the prosperity of our village and our country, and therefore under no circumstance rely on institutions like the village office or school.” (Okabe 1990-1992 [7]: 8) This is a unique passage not found in other village-­division plans. Instead of making the village-­division a project of the whole village implemented by its local administration, this plan draws a clear line between those in favour of migration to Manchuria and the institutions of local administration not interested in “the prosperity of our village and our country”. It shows that the rift between the local proponents of migration and the representatives of the local government led to deep distrust in government institutions among the migration activists of Nangō.

The lasting effect of this distrust can be seen at a symposium of local activists of the Village-­Division Campaign on 14 and 15 January 1939, hosted by the Association for Rural Revitalization in Tokyo. In the discussion, Matsukawa’s main supporter in the village, Minakawa Nananosuke, still opted against asking for financial support for the migration movement from the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (Asahi Shinbunsha 1939: 55-56). This is a strange remark in the light of the fact, that this Ministry had become an important sponsor of activities in the rural sector with the start of the Village-­Division Campaign. It shows, however, that the local conflicts about the promotion of migration in Nangō village had led to the conviction among the emigration activists that they should not make themselves dependent upon any bureaucrats, not even those from the Ministry that was supposed to support their promotion activities. This conviction in turn must have certainly made the activists from Nangō difficult partners for those representatives of the Ministry in charge of propagating the mass migration and may have further deflected the Ministry’s interest from the Nangō case when they were looking for a national role model.
On the other hand Nangō had excellent connections to the agrarianist core group of proponents of mass migration to Manchuria. Katō Kanji had accepted an invitation by Matsukawa to give a seminar about emigration in Nangō on 7 and 8 March 1934. Matsukawa arranged for a nephew of Minakawa to meet Tōmiya Kaneo, the early promoter of Japanese settlements in Manchuria from the Kantō Army, who recruited the young man for one of the early settler groups (Abiko 1988: 330-332).

Nevertheless, because the local elite was opposed to mass migration out of the village, Nangō could not be used as a national role model. Even though the village office and local landowners had gradually accepted the government’s migration policy after their initial resistance (as Matsukawa said at the above-mentioned 1939 symposium), a community where the main activist (Matsukawa) had to resign as school principal and had to organize his own pro-emigration association together with his main supporter, the local newspaper-delivery man (Minakawa) – such a community was not seen fit to become a role model for the propagation of a new scheme of mass migration organized by the village communities themselves.

The original village-division plan for Nangō compiled and published by the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry in July 1937 concludes with two points, one asking for the support of the Colonial Ministry for the construction of “a branch village for 405 households” in Manchuria and the other emphasizing the necessity of close contacts between the mother village (boson) and the branch village (bunson) (Okabe 1990-1992 [7]: 9). However, this branch village was never constructed. The majority of emigrants left Nangō in the early phase of mass migration until the spring of 1939, but instead of founding a branch village they joined different settlements in Manchuria. Of the 133 households originating from Nangō which settled in four different locations in Manchuria, only 70 or 78 had already been registered as households in the Japanese village. The other settlers’ households were newly founded branch families of younger sons. A few latecomers from Nangō emigrated in later years, and political pressure coerced another 22 households to resettle in 1943. This time the recruitment of migrants was so difficult that Minakawa Nananosuke had to announce that he would resettle himself and assume the leadership of the settlers’ group of the village. In the end, not even 100 households that had existed before migration in the village and were therefore counted in the calculation of the village-division plan (or in other words only a quarter of the “estimated surplus population” of 1936) had left Nangō by the end of the migration programme. Most of the migrants had been ten-
ants, which means that the farmland they left behind was just rented out by the land- lords to some other poor tenant family. The original plan of providing every house- hold in the village with 3 chō of farmland could not be achieved (Abiko 1988: 344- 351).

Instead of becoming the avant-garde of the Village-Division Campaign, Nangō turned to a certain extent into the negative example of a village-division which failed because of conflicts at the local level. The fact that the village was nevertheless kept in high esteem on record as a pioneer in the migration movement is mostly due to the fact that Matsukawa Gorō, the main proponent of mass migration from the Nangō, turned into an important organizer of mass migration at the central level.

4.2. Early Developments in Nagano Prefecture

Around the same time Nangō in Miyagi Prefecture was preparing the out-migration of hundreds of village households, bureaucrats in the prefectural office of Nagano contemplated ways to increase the amount of settlers from their prefecture going to the continent. Among the nearly 1,700 settlers who emigrated to Manchuria in the first four years (1932 – 1935) (Asada 1976a: 90), 146 were from Nagano Prefecture. To further motivate emigrants from the Nagano Prefecture, the head of the Education Department sent a letter on 11 June 1936 to all village and city mayors asking for their help in recruiting 200 new settlers before the deadline of 15 July 1936. These settlers were to found the first of the so-called Shinano Villages. These villages, named after the old designation for Nagano Prefecture – Shinano Province – were planned to become special settlements for migrants from Nagano. A plan to build Shinano Villages in Manchuria had been drafted as early as 1932 under the auspices of the Shinano Overseas Association (Shinano kaigai kyōkai). This association had been established in 1923 to promote emigration from Nagano; usually its president was the governor of Nagano Prefecture, its vice-president the head of the prefectural Board of Education (Naganoken rekishi 2000: 16).

In effect four Shinano Villages were erected in Manchuria from 1935 to 1939, one each year, their population reached between 250 and 309 households. The first Shinano Village in Heitai (Japanese: Kokutai) was founded in a hurry in the summer of 1936, just when the broadening of the scope of migration to Manchuria was being discussed at the national level. By the time emigration to Manchuria had become one of the Seven Big Policies, more than 50 former inhabitants of Nagano, mostly young
men trained for the project at the National Higher Level School in Harbin, were building the Shinano Village of Heitai (Naganoken kankōkai – sōhen 1984: 316).

In November 1936 the Prefecture of Nagano conducted a meeting with all its village and city mayors to promote the creation of more Shinano Villages. In order to fill these villages, different models of settler recruitment were put forth. One simple possibility would be for every community in the prefecture to recommend one candidate. Since larger groups would be better, the meeting decided to ask communities to recommend groups of 30 prospective settlers. Eight villages followed this appeal and produced their own plans for group migrations from their communities in December 1936. In retrospect this can be seen as the beginning of the Village-Division Campaign at the local level in Nagano, although only two of the eight pioneer communities, Kamihisakata and Yasuoka, realized the division of their village in the end.

Hirane, one of the above-mentioned eight communities, was chosen by the prefectural office to serve as the forerunner for Nagano. Its mayor, Kozawa Tokutaro, visited the village of Nangō and gave a report of his experience of the first village planning a large-scale migration scheme to the Hirane village assembly on 12 December 1936. With this expertise, the village office prepared a plan for out-migration from Hirane for the next five years (Table 12).

Table 12. The migration scheme of Hirane Village

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Households</th>
<th>Total households in the village</th>
<th>377</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Emigrant quotas for</td>
<td>1937</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1938</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1939</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1940</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1941</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>165</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Naganoken kankōkai – sōhen 1984: 217)

The plan was handed in at the prefectural office on 23 January 1937. In February the recruitment of settlers started in the village. In April the mayor of Hirane went on an inspection tour to the continent. Everything looked as if Hirane was to become the Nangō of Nagano, sending more than 40% of its population to a new village in Manchuria. The start of the Sino-Japanese War after the Marco Polo Bridge incident on 7
July 1937, however, changed the mood in Hirane. Suddenly migration to the continent seemed not as desirable as before, applicants for resettlement withdrew their applications, and the village office decided to give up its division plan in August 1937. Some villagers still resettled to Manchuria, but they did so as individual settlers, not as part of a quota to be fulfilled for a village-division plan (Naganoken kankōkai – sōhen 1984: 217).

The analysis of this early development of the promotion of migration in Nagano Prefecture reveals another decisive factor in the making of the Village-Division Campaign: support from the prefectural level. Nagano is the prime example for this, and it is no coincidence that in the end it became the prefecture which sent the highest number of agricultural settlers to Manchuria. However, even an enthusiastic prefectural office had to rely upon the people at the local level. The village of Hirane is a case in point. Without a grassroots movement, the migration promoters at the prefectural office had no lasting local partners for the implementation process and had to give up the village-division plans. This experience of the prefectural office in Nagano certainly played an important role in the choice of the next candidate for Nagano’s first divided village.

4.3. The Village-Division Campaign in Ōhinata

It was Ōhinata which took the place of the forerunner for village-division in Nagano Prefecture instead of Hirane. Although Ōhinata had not even been among the first eight communities contemplating their own group migration plans, it quickly rose to national prominence. To understand how this rather obscure village came into this leading position in the Village-Division Campaign, it is necessary to look into the details of village politics and the interaction of local activists and the prefectural level in Ōhinata in the 1930s.

Like many other rural communities Ōhinata participated in the nationwide Rural Revitalization Campaign in the hope of consolidating its financial situation. However, other than the average participating community, in the course of the campaign Ōhinata was afflicted with a corruption scandal that resulted in the removal of the village mayor and the whole village assembly, and made the community notorious with all in the prefectural office. The scandal had its roots in the mid-1920s: in 1926 the village assembly decided to construct a new building for the local elementary school. The old building was no longer sufficient for the rising numbers of pupils due to the
recent growth in village population. To finance this construction, the village assembly used 50,000 yen from a fund of government money earmarked to bring electricity to the village. The manipulation of the village budget came to light in 1934. The mayor of Ōhinata was charged with embezzlement and document fraud in February 1935, and the whole village assembly was forced to resign. The prefectural government of Nagano commissioned one of its officials to act as mayor and transferred the administration of the village finances to the mayor of a neighbouring community.

The outcome of this scandal was a nearly total purge of the traditional local elite from politics in Ōhinata. Since all members of the traditional elite were somehow accomplices in the embezzlement of funds, the prefectural office decided to find a mayor who had not been involved in village politics before 1935.

They found Asakawa Takemaro from a family of landlords with a good reputation in the village. One of his ancestors had been a major activist in the Chichibu uprising of 1884 when peasants had protested against their excessive indebtedness, a situation similar to the one in the 1930s. Asakawa Takemaro had graduated from the Faculty of Economics of Waseda University and had contacts to the group of agronationalists around Katō Kanji. He was made mayor of Ōhinata village in June 1935. Right from the start he devoted his energy to the ongoing reform of the agricultural sector in the village. Ōhinata had entered the Rural Revitalization Campaign as early as September 1932 and must have made considerable progress, since in March 1933 it already received an award as an “excellent village” (ゆるぎ村) from the Imperial Agricultural Association (Takahashi 1997: 155).

The placement of Asakawa at the top of the village administration by the prefectural office in Nagano in the summer of 1935 led to a special relationship of Ōhinata with higher levels of administration. Officials not only from the prefectural level but also from the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry as well as the Home Ministry kept in close contact with the new mayor and the village office. Soon after the mass migration to Manchuria had been declared a national policy, the village office in Ōhinata in October 1936 decided to implement the national scheme at the local level (Ikegami 1995: 25). Although village-division had not yet been declared the preferred form of implementation and Ōhinata was not among the villages planning to contribute to the new Shinano Villages, Asakawa must have known about Matsukawa’s plans for Nangō, since both Asakawa and Matsukawa were members of the inner circle of ac-
tivists around Katō Kanji. Whereas Matsukawa had to promote the emigration scheme in his village despite the opposition of the village office, Asakawa could use his position as the head of the village office to organize promotional events in his community. In January 1937 for instance, the village office held an exhibition of photographs showing the life of Manchuria settlers. Accompanying the event was a talk given by the director of the training centre for prospective Manchuria settlers in Kikyōgahara (Nagano Prefecture), Nishimura Tomisaburō (Tōdai 1940: 189).

One of Asakawa’s reform measures in the village was the restructuring of the local Economic Improvement Committee founded in 1932 to administer the Rural Revitalization Campaign. The new committee, now renamed Economic Revitalization Committee (Keizai kōsei iinkai), had an elaborate structure which incorporated all layers and forces of political participation in the village. At the core of the committee were the so-called four pillar institutions of Ōhinata:

- The village office (the control department)
- The local Imperial Agricultural Association (the management department)
- The industrial cooperative (the economic department)
- The local school (the social and education department)

All other institutions and organized groups existing in the village, for example the local Reservist Association, the Youth League, the fire brigade, etc., were lumped together in the category of cooperating associations. The major part of the villagers was represented in this structure through their membership in the local network of the industrial cooperative. All five wards of Ōhinata had an Executive Committee for Economic Improvement (Keizai kaizen jikkōkai), which consisted of the various farm practice associations in the hamlets (Kōsei nōji jikkō kumiai). These associations in turn comprised of numerous so-called squads (han) modelled after the historical five-household-groups (gōningumi) (Yamada 1978:24-25). This structure of the local industrial cooperative functioned like a web that entangled all village households and enabled the transmission of economic and political measures to all levels of village society.

In February 1937 these four pillar institutions of the newly renamed Economic Revitalization Committee made their first decision in favour of a village-division of Ōhinata. On 20 March 1937, another meeting of the Economic Revitalization Committee had a heated discussion about such move, which ended with the adoption of a
written pledge signed by 33 committee members vowing to mobilize 150 households to erect a new settlement in Manchuria in order to improve the economic situation of the people in Ōhinata (Asahi Shinbunsha 1939: 309).

At the same time that the Economic Revitalization Committee discussed a possible participation in the nationwide mass migration scheme, it also applied for the status of Special Assistance Village for Ōhinata in order to receive additional government funding. To examine the village’s eligibility for this new stage of the Rural Revitalization Campaign, an official from the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry visited Ōhinata on 23 February 1936, and in April the official in charge of the campaign from the prefectural office in Nagano came to the village (Yamada 1978: 28). The Special Assistance Village status was finally granted in September 1937. In contrast with the usual procedure of awarding an additional 10,000 yen for economic revitalization measures, Ōhinata received a total of 38,000 yen of special funding (Okabe 1977: 152).

After the village-division had been officially decided, mayor Asakawa Takemaro and Horikawa Kiyomi, head and founder of the local charcoal-makers cooperative, went on an inspection tour to Manchuria on April 16, 1937 as representatives of the village.\textsuperscript{18} When they came back three weeks later, they enthusiastically recommended emigration to a land of plenty. Horikawa had even brought Manchurian soil and agricultural products to prove his point. He soon turned into the driving force of the migration movement in Ōhinata, acting as the emigrant group’s leader and thereby persuading many to follow his example and join the group. Soon after the village representatives’ return from their promotion tour through Manchuria, concrete measures to implement the village-division were drafted, the final plan was accepted on 9 June 1937, and Asakawa and Horikawa were sent to the Colonial Ministry to officially submit Ōhinata’s village-division scheme (Tōdai 1940: 189).

According to this plan 150 of the 406 households of the community should migrate to Manchuria and resettle in a branch of Ōhinata village. In addition to the existing households, 50 new households, usually younger sons not inheriting the household headship in Japan, should be given the possibility to form their own new households in the Manchurian settlement. This would leave approximately 250 households with

\textsuperscript{18} Although Yamada mentions only Horikawa Kiyomi’s participation in the inspection tour (Yamada 1978: 28), Asakawa Takemaro himself speaks about going to the continent together with Horikawa (Hishinuma and Kimura 1938: 94-95).
around 1,250 persons back in Japan. These numbers were not chosen randomly. They corresponded to the formula set up by the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry for computing the “surplus population” of a village community. Since the total amount of arable land in Ōhinata comprised 49.8 chō of paddy fields and 216 chō of dry fields, this formula aiming at a minimum one chō per household would only allow a maximum of 266 households to remain in the village (Asahi Shinbunsha 1939: 295, 311-312).

The first volunteers left the village soon after the formulation of the migration plan. Since the settlements in Manchuria had to be built from scratch, the usual procedure was to send a small number of volunteers in advance to prepare the arrival of the main group. Twenty members of Ōhinata’s advance group were sent to a preparation course in Nagano Prefecture’s Kikyōgahara Agricultural Training Centre and left Japan on 11 July 1937 to continue their training at Chiburi in Manchuria. They were followed by another 17 volunteers on August 9. Horikawa Kiyomi as the prospective leader of the emigrant group was sent to a special course for the leading personnel at Katō Kanji’s Training Centre at Uchihara19 and left Japan on 11 September 1937 to complete his training in Harbin in Manchuria (Tōdai 1940: 190).

The new settlement for the people from Ōhinata was allocated to the advance group under Horikawa in January 1938. Horikawa had chosen this area in Jilin Province, called Sijiafang in Chinese (Japanese: Shikabō), because of its fertility, the forest adjacent to the settlement and the relatively short distance of 23 km from the railway (Naganokken 1984 – kakudanhen: 159-162). The land had originally belonged to approximately 4,000 Chinese and 2,000 Korean farmers and was allocated to Japanese settlers by the Public Corporation for Land Reclamation in Manchuria, the Mantaku, which usually acquired this kind of farmland for low prices with the help of the Kantō Army. Although the settlers from Ōhinata might have arrived somewhat earlier, the official date for the founding of the settlement given is 11 February 1938. Since this date corresponds to the mythical founding of the Japanese empire, i.e., Jinmu Tennō’s access to the throne on 11 February 660 BC, the foundation date of the Ōhinata settlement in Manchuria is more of symbolic relevance.

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19 In 1934 Katō Kanji moved his Tomobe National Higher Level School (Tomobe kokumin kōtō gakko) to a 275-hectare tract of national forest land in Uchihara, Ibaraki Prefecture. This new school became the main centre for agricultural training in general and training centre for prospective Manchuria emigrants in particular (Havens 1974: 286-287).
From this development it can be concluded that Ōhinata came into the position as “Japan’s first divided village” due to the coincidence of various factors. Despite the later emphasis on the critical situation of Ōhinata, the village had the typical economic profile of the region. What brought this otherwise obscure community to notoriety in its prefectural office was a fraud and embezzlement scandal in the early 1930s, which resulted in close supervision of village politics by the prefecture. Local activism and a good performance in the Rural Revitalization Campaign on the other hand showed that the village had the potential to improve its situation. Through his personal contacts with Katō Kanji, the new mayor introduced the idea of migration to Manchuria and created at the same time an organizational structure that helped transmit this idea to virtually all village households. The special attention paid to the village led to higher subsidies when it applied for the status of a Special Assistance Village. Thus the local promoters of emigration started from a good basis and succeeded in securing an attractive place for their settlement. All of this made the village a highly presentable case for the migration propaganda.

4.4. The Spread to the National Level

The spread of the idea to implement group migration to Manchuria by means of village-division plans occurred during the course of 1937. In July of that year, a meeting sponsored by the Ministry of Colonial Affairs discussed the connection of the economic revival in the countryside and this new national policy of mass migration to Manchuria. An important part of the discussion was the presentation of the first village-division plans and the discussion about their implementation (Hishinuma and Kimura 1938: 68-138). A chart from the records of this meeting lists 23 villages planning to organize the out-migration of a substantial part of their inhabitants and their resettlement in a branch village in Manchuria. Adjacent to the chart, however, are only six more-or-less detailed plans for village-division, plus one general plan for village-division in Fukushima Prefecture. The Fukushima plan does not contain the name of a specific village, but might have been handed in by the two communities from Fukushima on the list of 23. (Okabe 1990-1992 [7]: 5-6) The other 15 communities had probably only declared their general willingness to set up a branch village in Manchuria and to devise a plan for the implementation of mass migration from the community at a given time. Most of the 23 villages on the list, however, in fact did not follow though with their plans. A survey of 275 communities that had handed in vil-
lage-division plans in 1938 lists only seven communities from the original list. Although Nangō and Ōhinata had drafted their plans earlier and therefore do not show up in the survey, only nine out of 23 villages from the pioneer group of villages seriously tackling village-division makes for an initial success rate of not even 40% (Okabe 1990-1992 [7]: 60-85).

The roster of participants for the above-mentioned discussion does not list any “ordinary” participant from the villages in question. The names on the list all belong to prominent activists and collaborators of Katō Kanji. It is interesting that although most of the communities had already named a person in charge of the migration group, only four out of 23 villages list “the village mayor” in this category.

The meeting’s discussion was moderated by the agrarian economist Sugino Tadao, listed on the roster as a representative of the Association for Rural Revitalization. His introduction explained the new focus of combining rural revitalization with mass migration to Manchuria.

Four speakers then elaborated on their experiences in planning emigration from their communities. The first was Matsukawa Gorō, leader of the migration activists in Nangō until he was forced to resign from his position as the headmaster of Nangō’s new vocational school and moved to Tokyo. He is listed as a representative of the Association for Emigration to Manchuria. He reiterated the importance of administering the planning process at the local level, i.e., communities and prefectures, instead of leaving the decision for migration with individual households (Hishinuma and Kimura 1938: 73).

Matsukawa was followed by his main supporter in the village, Minakawa Nananosuke, who talked especially about the problem of debt regulation for emigrants and financial support for migrating families. Since the lack of financial resources for migration was actually one of the main reasons for villagers’ reservations against emigration, Minakawa argued for what he called a “deposit” (kyōtakkin), obviously meaning a fixed sum for each migrant donated by the communities to pay for some of the costs of migration, such as the application procedure, and clothing suited for the continent’s weather. Other worries of prospective migrants were the dangers of bandit attacks in Northern China, which were a real threat for the early Japanese settlements in Manshūkoku (Manshūkoku tsūshinsha 1940: 1-6), and possible problems with the food supply in a new settlement where farming had to be started from
scratch (Hishinuma and Kimura 1938: 81-83). Minakawa’s descriptions show that Japanese peasants had a quite realistic notion of the risks involved in a move to the continent and were not easily lured into the government migration scheme by promises of a new paradise in Manshūkoku – such as book titles like Manshū wa imin no rakudo (Manchuria is a settlers’ paradise) (Mantetsu 1937).

The next speaker, Togashi Naotarō, represented the village of Yamato in Yamagata Prefecture. He had experienced the scepticism of his fellow villagers first hand, when he initially tried to persuade them to join the migration movement. After the Rural Revitalization Scheme applied in Yamato since 1932 had not improved the lot of most inhabitants of the village, Togashi proposed out-migration as a solution, but was mostly laughed at for his utopian ideas. Only by persuading prospective settlers individually could he recruit the first few dozen willing to apply for migration (Hishinuma and Kimura 1938: 87-89). Togashi, like Matsukawa and Asakawa, the mayor of Ōhinata, who spoke after Togashi, were all drawn into the promotion of migration to Manchuria by their personal connection to Katō Kanji. In their effort to transmit their enthusiasm to their respective communities, however, they achieved mixed results.

Asakawa Takemaro referred to himself openly as the outsider brought into the chaos of local politics in Ōhinata with the task to consolidate the village economy as fast as possible. His connection to Katō Kanji and the Nagano prefectural office nearly naturally associated his community with migration to Manchuria, although the specific economic situation in Ōhinata’s did not fit the picture of the ideal “village to be divided” with landless tenants waiting for their chance to start their own farm in Manchuria. Even Asakawa in his speech at the July 1937 meeting had to admit that Ōhinata’s biggest problem was the reliance on charcoal as a “cash crop”, naming the scarcity of farmland only in a few short sentences (Hishinuma and Kimura 1938: 91-93).

For Sugino, the moderator of the discussion, the centre of the locally emerging migration movement had to be Yamagata anyway. He therefore delegated the explanation of the situation in Yamagata prefecture to Nishigaki Kiyoji, listed as a representative for the National Higher Level School in Kaminoyama City in Yamagata. He had just promoted his migration ideas in a meeting of local politicians from six Tōhoku prefectures in Yamagata on 1 May 1937. The local Youth Leagues and the Colonial Association (Takumu kyōkai) in Yamagata as well as the Yamagata chapters of the Re-
servist Organization and the Patriotic Women’s Association (Aikoku fujinkai) collected money to support Manchuria settlers. According to Nishigaki, this enthusiasm convinced the governor of Yamagata prefecture to support the migration movement by promoting the drafting of village-division plans, and seemed destined to make Yamagata the driving force behind the migration movement for the whole country (Hishinuma and Kimura 1938: 98-106).

The documentation of this early phase in the making of the village division campaign shows the problems of the transformation of a locally developed idea to the national scale. Although the number of communities interested in the new scheme multiplied in the first application phase, only a relatively small number of villages succeeded with a swift implementation of their plans.

4.5. The Invention of the Shōnai-Type Migration

Yamagata Prefecture is a good example of the problems arising when the implementation of village-division plans progressed rather slowly despite the enthusiasm of some activists and the support from the prefectural office. Two villages from Yamagata were among the first 23 prospective candidates for village-division in July 1937. One of them was Yamato Village, which had a structure of landownership that was typical for the Tōhoku Region. Only twelve families in the village owned 43% percent of the farmland, 60% of all farmland in the village was rented out to tenants, and the local elite of landlords was so powerful that tenants did not even dare to protest against them. Since the village administration was dominated by landlords not interested in schemes like the Rural Revitalization Campaign, the revitalization plans for Yamato were drawn up in the prefectural office and the campaign was directly administered there. However, since this campaign could not improve the economic situation of households directly dependent upon the local landlords, it turned out to be a failure (Yunoki 1977: 47-50).

So Togashi Naotarō, the main supporter of migration to Manchuria and the representative of his village and region in the Village-Division Campaign, was disadvantaged from the start. Although the activists in Yamato had drafted their village division plan as early as February 1937 – one month before their fellow activists in Ōhinata – they could not rely upon an organizational structure like the one in Ōhinata to help them promote their scheme. Their original plan was based on the assumption that 3 chō of farmland should be left for each agricultural household in the village after the out-
migration of the “surplus population”. However, it did not take into consideration the uneven distribution of landownership in the village and just “redistributed” the arable land among a “desirable number” of households left in the village after the migration (Table 13).

Table 13: The original migration scheme of Yamato Village

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Amount of arable land in the village</th>
<th>890.76 chō</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total households in the village</td>
<td>468 households</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Desirable” number of households (farming 3 chō each)</td>
<td>297 households</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Surplus population”</td>
<td>171 households</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New households for non-inheriting sons</td>
<td>30 households</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emigrant quotas for</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>30 households</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>30 households</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>40 households</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>50 households</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>51 households</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Okabe 1990-92 [7]: 12-13 and Asahi Shinbunsha 1939: 268-269)

At the following discussion meeting in January 1939, however, Togashi had to admit that resistance in the village against this migration scheme had been too strong. Forty-seven persons interested in resettlement could be mobilized in 1937, of which 37 actually handed in their application and underwent training at Nishigaki Kiyoji’s Yamagata National Higher Level School. However, since the driving force behind the mobilization in Yamato was not the village mayor, the bureaucratic process of resettlement was drawn out. The first 37 migrants from Yamato were not able to leave the village before 31 March 1938. Frustrated by the slow progress, Togashi named the local elite – the members of the village assembly, the local leaders of the Imperial Agricultural Association and the local landlord – as culprits. Especially the landowners were afraid to lose the cheap workforce of poor peasants and day labourers they needed to farm their land (Asahi Shinbunsha 1939: 99-106).

In the end the ambitious village-division plans for Yamato could not be realized. Instead Togashi and his village became the kernel of a new migration scheme, dubbed Shōnai-type-migration after the name of the region where Yamato was situated. Due to the consideration that people originating from the same region in Japan would have a better basis to form a community than people from different parts of the coun-
try, the activist from Yamato tried to attract volunteers from neighbouring villages to come to a new settlement in Manchuria. The scope of the recruitment was broadened to the three counties and their total of 69 villages making up the Shōnai region. A new migration scheme was devised, this time comprising a total of 1,500 households for the first phase from 1937 to 1940. In two following phases an additional 3,000 for the second and 4,330 households for the third phase were envisioned (Manshū kaitakushi kankōkai 1966: 215-216).

Table 14. Migration scheme for the Shōnai region in Yamagata Prefecture: Household quotas per year and county

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Higashi Tagawa County (28 villages)</th>
<th>Nishi Tagawa County (16 villages)</th>
<th>Hōkai County (25 villages)</th>
<th>Total (69 villages)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1937: advance group</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938: advance group</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938: main group</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939: advance group</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939: main group</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940: main group</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>630</td>
<td>387</td>
<td>483</td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Asahi shinbunsha 1939: 280)

This plan can only be called overoptimistic. Despite Katō Kanji’s firm belief that approximately 9,000 households from a total of more than 24,000 households, i.e. 37.5% of the Shōnai region, would eventually emigrate, leaving 3 chō of farmland for each remaining household (Asahi Shinbunsha 1939: 104), a survey dated September 1939, showing all communities which applied for participation in the Village-Division Campaign in 1938, lists only 256 households from all of Yamagata Prefecture which had already resettled under the Village-Division Scheme. Depending on whether the arrival of the main group for 1939 was already anticipated for the time of the survey, this figure means a quota fulfilment rate of less than 50% (or only 25% if the 1939 main group is not included) (Okabe 1990-1992 [7]: 64-65).

The conclusion to be drawn from this example is that right at the beginning of the Village-Division Campaign, even enthusiastic supporters of the mass migration could be
frustrated by the traditional structures in their villages. Instead of giving up the endeavour, people active at the local and prefectural level adapted the structure of the plans to the changing situation. Since promoters of mass migration, like the governor of Yamagata Prefecture, or Katō Kanji himself, could not prevent that the mobilization of enough volunteers at the village level was often obstructed by parts of the village society, they had to find ways to circumvent them. That meant the quick invention of a new type of migration that they called Shōnai-type-migration after the region where the first such plans originated, and which soon became the blueprint for redefining the Village-Vision Campaign into a District-Division Campaign.

4.6. From Village-Division to District-Division

Surveys from the early stage of the Village-Division Campaign are important sources, which show that despite all the enthusiasm about migration to Manchuria created in the press and the endless stream of resettlement plans, the actual implementation and realization of plans lagged from the start. The 1940 Yearbook of Development in Manchuria contains a survey of the status quo of village-division in June 1939. The text claims that this survey was based on data from the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry and contains detailed entries for 59 communities. In the introduction, however, a figure of 282 communities which had submitted their plans for village-division to the Ministry by 1938 is given, followed by the announcement that another 250 communities had already done so in 1939 (Manshūkoku tsūshinsha 1940: 473-474).

The Economic Revitalization Section of the Ministry had compiled its own list of communities in the Village-Division Campaign, dated September 1939. This list contains data for 275 communities which had handed in division plans in 1938, but only 168 villages renewed their application to continue their participation in 1939. For 1939 the Ministry list claims to have registered 288 new applications, bringing the number still in the campaign to a total of 456 (Okabe 1990-1992 [7]: 58-59). All of these communities were entitled to financial support for setting up plans and sending their local activists on inspection tours to Manchuria. Most of the communities on the short June 1939 list also show up on the comprehensive September 1939 list; only six villages from the short list are not among the 1938 applicants. These are the two pioneer villages of Nangō and Ōhinata as well as four other villages that had probably also submitted their village-division plans in 1937.
Unfortunately the short list is not just an abridged version of the comprehensive ministry list. Although in many cases the numbers of total inhabitants originally living in the participating community, the number of peasant households and their average amount of arable land are identical in the two lists, the most important figure, the number of migrants who already left the community, differs in nearly all cases. Interestingly enough the number of out-migrants in the June 1939 list is usually higher than the corresponding figure in the September list.

Nevertheless, both lists prove that the implementation of village-division had merely begun in 1939. Only around a dozen villages had sent more than 30 households to Manchuria by June 1939 from an average target of 200 migration households, among them the early birds, Nangō and Ōhinata, which are not even on the ministry list. Both lists taken together give a picture of the progress of the Village-Division Campaign in mid-1939. Table 15 is based on the ministry survey of September 1939; it shows differing figures from the June 1939 list in italics.

### Table 15. State of the Village-Division Campaign in 1939

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prefecture</th>
<th>Village</th>
<th>Total number of households</th>
<th>Number of peasant households</th>
<th>Average plot size per household (tan)</th>
<th>Total migration quota (households)</th>
<th>Number of emigrated households</th>
<th>Percentage of quota fulfilment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nagano</td>
<td>Ōhinata</td>
<td>406</td>
<td>336</td>
<td>6,1</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>80,5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miyagi</td>
<td>Nangō</td>
<td>1,292</td>
<td>1,039</td>
<td>18,0</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>52,7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagano</td>
<td>Yomikaki</td>
<td>620</td>
<td>393/412</td>
<td>7,3/6,0</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>56/66</td>
<td>28,0/33,0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yamagata</td>
<td>Yamato</td>
<td>598/608</td>
<td>472/455</td>
<td>15,0</td>
<td>147/200</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>25,2/18,1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saitama</td>
<td>Nakagawa</td>
<td>603</td>
<td>380/407</td>
<td>8,7/8,3</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>23,5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yamagata</td>
<td>Ōtani</td>
<td>604</td>
<td>529</td>
<td>8,1</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>42/34</td>
<td>21/17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagano</td>
<td>Fujimi</td>
<td>951/860</td>
<td>610</td>
<td>8,1</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>61/81</td>
<td>20,3/27,0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kagawa</td>
<td>Kurikuma</td>
<td>581</td>
<td>472</td>
<td>7,0</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>19,3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagano</td>
<td>Yasuoka</td>
<td>1,135</td>
<td>730</td>
<td>5,7</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>42/47</td>
<td>14,0/15,6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagano</td>
<td>Kamihisakata</td>
<td>683</td>
<td>599</td>
<td>5,0</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>11,3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ishikawa</td>
<td>Najimi</td>
<td>530</td>
<td>437</td>
<td>7,9</td>
<td>308</td>
<td>34/40</td>
<td>11,0/13,0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagano</td>
<td>Chiyo</td>
<td>865</td>
<td>710</td>
<td>4,8</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>33/32</td>
<td>11,0/10,6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Okabe 1990-1992 [7]: 60-85, Manshūkoku tsūshinsha 1940: 474.)
The table shows that both surveys were based largely on the same village-division plans, given the fact that data which could be extracted from these plans like the total number of inhabitants, the number of peasants, their average plot size as well as the plan’s target number for migrating households are identical in many cases. It is the number of settlers already in Manchuria that often differs, and this seems to have declined between June and September 1939 instead of rising, as one would normally expect.

Since the abridged version of the survey in the 1940 Yearbook of Settlement in Manchuria includes only some exemplary communities from each prefecture – usually those with the highest number of settlers already in Manchuria – the general public as the intended reader of the yearbook gained the impression that the start of the Village-Division Campaign was going rather smoothly, with an average resettlement quota around 10% of the average target of 200 migrant households in every community in the summer of 1939. According to the yearbook, by the time of the survey another 250 communities had submitted village-division plans in 1939 (Manshūkoku tsūshinsha 1940: 473). The yearbook fails to mention, however, that not all communities which applied in 1938 had renewed their application in 1939. According to the ministerial figures, only 168 of the initial 275 communities which had submitted plans in 1938 decided to continue with the programme in 1939 (Okabe 1990-1992 [7]: 59). This equals a dropout rate of nearly 40%. The comprehensive ministerial survey lists a total of 36,804 households earmarked for migration in village-division plans handed in 1938. Of these only 1,858 households had settled in Manchuria by the time of the survey, setting the overall implementation rate as low as 5%.

Although settlers continued to move into the new communities created in Manshūkoku over the course of the early 1940s, there was nothing like the wave of people expected by the activists and planners. To conceal the fact that quota fulfilment lagged behind nearly everywhere, the planners followed the example of Yamagata Prefecture and their ingenious Shōnai-type-migration. After the euphoria of the Village-Division Campaign in 1939 subsided, it became clear that it was nearly impossible to mobilize 200 or even 300 households for emigration from a single community. However, since the idea was to create a new community in Manchuria of 200 to 300 households sharing the same geographical background in Japan, this geographical background was simply redefined. From 1940 onwards the entity to divide was no
longer the village but the “region”. The Village-Division Campaign (bunson undō) had officially turned into a District-Division Campaign (bungō undō).

The first district-division scheme was prepared for Hanishina County in Nagano Prefecture in April 1938. At this point in time village-division was still the order of the day. Therefore the conference held to discuss the plans was called Burokku bunson keikaku sokushin kyōgikai (Conference for the promotion of block village-division plans), “block village-division” meaning that the quota of 300 households to be send each year in 1939, 1940 and 1941 should originate from a “block of villages” from Hanishina County. A committee for the implementation of these plans was founded and staffed with the mayors of the participation communities of the region, further bureaucrats from these village offices and head of local elementary schools. Since the recruitment of volunteers for this scheme was slow, the sending of the first group was postponed and the committee in charge of implementation was reorganized.

The history of this attempted district-division is a prime example for the unceasing effort of the planners to fulfil their quotas and the passive resistance of the populace which reduced their attempts to absurdity. After the sending of the first settlers group was postponed, the deadline for applications for the first advance group of 45 settlers was set for 13 October 1940. However, by November 1940 only 15 volunteers had applied. Thereafter the vice-mayor of one of the villages in the region, Miyamoto Masatake, was recommended by his mayor to head the advance group, an offer that he could not decline and which led to his official nomination for the job on 5 December 1940. At the same time the committee in charge of implementation of the district-division plan decided that every participating village in the region had to name another three to five prospective settlers. This decree led to another 14 “volunteers”, enlarging the advance group to 29 persons, still only half of the 60 settlers needed to form a group capable of erecting a settlement in Manchuria.

Instead of giving up the endeavour, however, the committee kept on trying to make plans and recruit settlers. Despite constant adjustment of plans, i.e. postponement of deadline and downward correction of quotas, the number of households from the region which effectively resettled to Manchuria came to only 75 at the end of World War II (Kimijima 1978, Okabe 1977: 154-155).
4.7. The Activists’ Role in the Development of the Village-Division Campaign

This analysis of the evolution of the Village-Division Campaign and its development into a District-Division Campaign illustrated how the abstract “One Million Households to Manchuria Plan” was implemented at the prefectural and local level, and also introduced important activists at these levels. It has put the developments of the campaign in Ōhinata in a national perspective, which is necessary to understand the specific role of the village in the campaign of moral suasion for emigration to Manchuria that started at the end of the 1930s when the above-mentioned stagnation process was delaying the fulfilment of migration quotas. A further discussion of the redefinition of migration types and a wrap-up of the specific role of local activists in the evolution of the migration campaign will conclude the explanation for Ōhinata’s rise to national prominence.

It has been shown that the Village-Division Campaign developed mostly due to circumstantial constraints. Nevertheless for clarity sake, many histories of the Japanese migration to Manchuria classify the mass migration of rural families into three categories connected to the names of the communities which represent it: the Nangō-type migration, the Ōhinata-type, and the Shōnai-type (e.g., Manshūkoku tsushinsha 1940: 473; Manshū kaitakushi kankōkai 1966: 208-216). Nangō-type migration simply means that although a considerable number of migrants left the village, they did not resettle into one community in Manchuria, but were spread over various settlements. The Ōhinata-type migration could also be called the pure or ideal form of village-division, since in this case a large number of people actually left the village and founded a new community in Manchuria, which could rightfully be called the branch village of the mother village in Japan. In the case of Shōnai-type migration, a new settlement in Manchuria was not peopled by migrants from only one village in Japan, but at least by migrants mobilized together from a common regional background. When the scope of village-division plans had to be enlarged to neighbouring communities and thus the Ōhinata-type migration had to be transformed into a Shōnai-type, the results was often also called migration by district-division.

As could be demonstrated, these different forms of migrations did not originate in some planner’s office at the top of the planning hierarchy, but developed during the implementation process and were somehow classified after the fact for convenience sake. Plans were continuously adjusted to the actual development of the implemen-
tation process, a behaviour that seems to be in tune with tendencies of planning and decision making in Japan in general.

Those with the advantage of hindsight might ask why the general goal of mass migration were not given up in 1939 or 1940, when it was clear that due to the developments in the Sino-Japanese War on the Asian continent and the effects the war had on the Japanese populace, society and economy the migration quotas were impossible to fulfil. Whereas Western systems of thought are said to be dominated by universal principles and the use of axiomatic rules, swift correction of rules of action in order to direct the progress to the overall goal can often be observed in decision making in Japan (Pauer 1996: 5-9).

Whereas the overall goal to send five million settlers from the Japanese countryside to Manchuria in the course of 20 years was set after a political process involving a few high-level lobbyists like Katō Kanji, Nasu Hiroshi, and Hashimoto Denzaemon as well as top bureaucrats like Ishiguro Tada’atsu and Kodaira Gon’ichi, the constant adjustment of plans to local situations was the outcome of the interaction between local elites like prefectural officers, village bureaucrats and the so-called village mainstays. From the course of the events described above, a few general patterns of this interaction can deduced. Although the official propaganda for mass migration was geared towards all peasants without enough land for cultivation, prospective settlers were not drawn into the migration movement by making the logical connection between the size of their arable land and the necessity to relocate to a place offering vast amounts of farmland to all newcomers. The development from the initial stage of occasional migration of a few brave young man to a stage where migration of whole families in large numbers became a duty for the nation was highly influenced by local politics; volunteers for migration applied not because they had computed the necessity of their relocation according to the government’s figure for “surplus population”, but because some charismatic leading figure in their community persuaded them to join the movement.

Although chosen by the prefectural government of Nagano to become the first divided village in Japan, Hirane backed off from the endeavour when the first enthusiasm had waned and reality set in with the start of the Sino-Japanese war on the continent. Obviously there was no migration enthusiast or avid follower of Katō Kanji’s idea in the village who kept the village-division scheme going. The mayor just did his
job when he went on information tours and dutifully reported his findings to the villagers. The same might have happened in the many villages which had somehow declared their willingness to participate in the Village-Division Campaign, handed in standard plans, and then silently vanished from the statistics without realizing the migration scheme. The protagonists of the Village-Division Campaign, however, were not those villages perfectly fitting the picture of the central planners, but those with the most enthusiastic promoters and activists who managed to gather a following in their community.

In most cases those in favour of organized mass migration from their communities had to fight the resistance of a conservative elite which feared the costs of migrants’ support to the village budget and the loss of tenants and day-labourers working the land that the elite owned. A case in point is the village of Nangō, where a new elite of better-off land-owning peasants tried to gain influence in village politics against the opposition of the traditional elite of landlords who had dominated the administration up to then. To break the domination of the traditional elite, the rising group first tried to improve the organizational structures of the peasantry through an industrial cooperative, then provided educational opportunities like the National Higher Level School, and finally planned the construction of a new community out of the reach of the traditional elite. In contrast to the official propaganda which portrayed the out-migration of “surplus population” as the key to a just redistribution of farmland, the situation in Nangō did not really change after the migrants left the village. All the land left behind by those migrants belonged to landlords anyway and was just rented out to tenant families who had not departed (Abiko 1988: 344). Instead of resolving their conflicts with the traditional elites, the activists belonging to the new elite avoided the conflicts by founding their own community and taking with them their followers who were equally dissatisfied with their living conditions in Japan.

Some activists like Togashi Naotarō, who lamented the passive resistance of the landowners in Yamato village, could not even gather enough followers to keep a village-division scheme for their own community going. In cases like Yamato, where the activists were well-connected to some higher-level bureaucrats sympathetic to their cause, the regional promoters of migration adjusted the migration plans in search for other ways to reach the final goal of mass migration. However, as can be seen from the resulting Shōnai-type migration or the District-Division Scheme, political and social pressure on the villages to name volunteers for the campaign did not fill the ranks
of migrant groups like the personal efforts of well-respected persons from the community.

The influence of the personal factor can be observed clearly in the case of the village of Ōhinata, the model community in the propagation of village-division. Due to the unique circumstances described above, the traditional elite of the village was purged from the administration of village affairs, and an activist with close connections to Katō Kanji was made mayor, so landing in the very position usually occupied by a representative of the traditional elite. The high percentage of out-migrating households from Ōhinata was certainly also a result of the early and fast relocation process in a phase when the migration movement was not as seriously affected by the progress of the war as it was later. However, even a swift and smooth relocation needs enough people volunteering for the endeavour. In the case of Ōhinata they were obviously generated by a general mood in favour for village-division. Whereas village-division in Nangō was a concept of the opposition forces in the community, in Ōhinata the mainstream opinion approved of the village-division. The out-migration was headed by a figure, Horikawa Kiyomi, who was highly respected for his contributions to the improvement of the villagers’ living conditions (Yamada 1978: 338-339). In this case again, villagers did not follow a government logic attesting them a lack of arable land, but a charismatic role model and a general mood in the village assuring them that they were doing the right thing.

It can be concluded that Ōhinata started its participation in the national mass migration scheme with an ordinary economic background and a general potential of local activism for improvement measures like many other communities which participated in the Rural Revitalization Campaign. It can thus be called a typical Japanese village, with the typical problems caused by the economic depression of the early 1930s. The coincidence of factors like its close connection to the prefectural office in Nagano, the purge of the traditional elite from village politics, a new enthusiastic mayor with a degree in economics and close connections to Katō Kanji, the main promoter of migration to Manchuria in Japan, as well as a charismatic leader of the local production cooperative who led the migrants to Manchuria himself, however, made the village special among the other communities with an early start in the campaign. Whereas in many other cases there were factors like an uncooperative traditional elite or a lack of real enthusiasm for migration in the village obstructing the swift implementation of village-division plans, everything went fine for Ōhinata. This in turn made the “typical
Japanese village” an exception to the rule. However, since this exception came close enough for the migration planners to their ideal case of total quota fulfilment, it was turned into the national role model for the migration campaign.
5. Administration of the Resettlement

Before looking into the use of Ōhinata and especially its local activists in national propaganda, it is necessary to take a look into the actual implementation of the resettlement at the village level, since the planning and recruitment process in Ōhinata was used as an example for a successful mobilization and a harmonious decision of the whole village for out-migration of a substantial part of its inhabitants. However, this process did not stop with the community’s decision to participate in the Village-Division Campaign. For the village and its prospective settlers, it merely started there. Communities and their inhabitants alike had to handle a variety of issues connected to the migration process. Drafting a village-division plan based on some general ideas about the relation of farmland and the desirable number of households in the community was rather easy. The difficult part was the recruitment of volunteers who were willing to fulfill the division-plan’s quota. Those volunteers had to be prepared and properly trained for their task. Even when a village succeeded in finding enough volunteers fit for the endeavour, there was another important problem to solve before they could be sent off to Manchuria. Migrants were sometimes leaving behind property that had to be redistributed fairly in the village, but more often migrants also left behind heavy debts. In order not to turn migration to Manchuria into an easy opportunity to escape from debts without a possibility for the creditor to enforce their repayment, complicated debt-regulations schemes had to be developed.

This chapter revisits the planning and recruitment process in Ōhinata to analyse how volunteers were mobilized for the participation in the village-division scheme. By retracing the steps of the mobilization process it analyses how prospective settlers were exposed to the recruitment efforts in their village and who was potentially recruited for migration. The next question for those who were recruited was the regulation of possible debts and the financial arrangements of the resettlement. The solution found for the problem of debt-regulation and property redistribution in Ōhinata was publicized in the media and soon became a model applied by many other villages.

This aspect of the implementation of the migration plan is usually neglected by studies concentrating on the macro-level. From a grassroots perspective, however, this is one of the most important points, where the local agents of village politics were negotiating changes with a massive impact on most villagers’ lives. It is therefore no coin-
cidence that this was one of the topics explained thoroughly in the propaganda for mass migration.

An analysis of the mobilization of migrants for Manchuria must therefore also take into consideration how the settlers’ questions about their preparation and resettlement to the continent were answered, since the answers to these questions were surely equally important for activists trying to persuade fellow villagers to join the migration movement as promises of a better life on the continent. It is rather difficult to assess what local promoters of Ōhinata’s village-division plan told their fellow villagers in response to questions about the details of the resettlement process. What can be analysed, however, is a handbook about this process that was compiled in late 1937 and printed in 1938. Like a snapshot, this handbook preserves the state of the knowledge about the migration process just at the time when the Village-Division Campaign started. Although the specific campaign is shortly mentioned as the newest migration policy (Nakata and Nomura 1938:55), the text mainly describes the procedures when migration was still administered by the Ministry of Colonial Affairs, which recruited volunteers and financed them with government subsidies, a practice that changed when the villages became an important grassroots agent in the course of the Village-Division Campaign. It is nevertheless an important source for the analysis of what the promoters knew about the implementation of the migration policy and especially about the specific opportunities that were waiting for those local activists who were aspiring to a leading position in the migrant group of their community.

5.1. The Planning Process

The planning process in Ōhinata is well documented, since its mayor Asakawa gave a detailed report about the proceedings at the Nagano Association for Revitalization (Naganoken kōsei kyōkai) in 1938. According to this report, the official discussion process in the village began in February 1937 at the meeting of the four pillar institutions of Ōhinata: the village office, the local Imperial Agricultural Association, the industrial cooperative, and the local school. The formal decision about the future course of village politics in regard to migration to Manchuria was reached at the March 20 meeting of the Economic Revitalization Committee, where its 33 members signed the already mentioned written pledge about the division of Ōhinata Village (Yamada 1978: 249-250).
The documentary novel by Wada Tsutō about the mobilization process in the village carries a vivid description of this meeting which resulted in the pledge. The historicity of this description is hard to prove and since there are fictitious elements in the novel that can be proven wrong by source material, Wada’s description cannot be introduced here as hard evidence. Nevertheless it is noteworthy that Wada described the meeting as an affair of the whole village which was strongly influenced by the opinions of young activists (Wada 1964: 134-140).

Those who signed the pledge were all functionaries of local political bodies. The first name on the roster is Horikawa Kiyomi, who represented the industrial cooperative of charcoal makers as its general manager together with Hatakeyama Shigesama, the vice-president of the cooperative, and its director. Horikawa’s name is followed by the mayor’s name, Asakawa Takemaro. Six persons on the list were affiliated with the Imperial Agriculture Association; nine were heads of the various farm practice associations in the hamlets. Further participating were five members of the village assembly, three functionaries from the education sector, two members of the local Reservist Association, two members of the Youth League, a ward head and the village office secretary.

This is a balanced mixture of the various interest groups in the village. The local branches of the Imperial Agriculture Association were created after the passage of the Agricultural Association Law (Nōkaihō) in 1899 and received government subsidies. Large landowners were required to join and therefore these associations were usually said to represent landowners and the well-off peasants (Smith 2001: 89). The farm practice associations had traditionally been under the control of the agricultural associations and originally were rather informal groups made up of a number of peasants from the same hamlet for the purpose of cooperation and mutual aid. But in the course of the Rural Revitalization Campaign, these small local groups were given the possibility to become legal bodies (hōjin) and join the industrial cooperatives in that form. Thus they became the grassroots organizations of the industrial cooperatives representing the lower income strata in the villages (Smith 2001: 199, 213).

Although Wada portrayed some members of the village assembly who were present at the meeting as opposed to the village-division plans, five members of the assembly signed the pledge, together with three local educators and two members each of
the two most influential local groups that did not belong to the four pillar institutions, namely the Reservist Association and the Youth League.

According to the report later given at the prefectural office in Nagano by Horikawa and Asakawa, the meeting also formulated the outline of the village migration plan and decided to send 150 households from the village to build a new settlement in Manchuria. To assess the situation on the continent the meeting commissioned two of its participants, Horikawa Kiyomi and Asakawa Takemaro, to assess the situation on the continent and then persuade households to join the resettlement movement. (Yamada 1978: 249-250) After they returned from their inspection tour to the continent from April 16 to May 4, they started to spread their enthusiasm about resettlement to Manchuria in all grassroots organizations of the village.

These inspection tours were an important means for drafting local opinion leaders to promote emigration to Manchuria in their home communities (Takahashi 1997: 211-212). In February and March 1937, *Ie no hikari* featured the report of a journalist about his experiences on such a tour through Manchuria in the autumn of 1936. This inspection tour was organized by the Association for Emigration to Manchuria and personally guided by Matsukawa Gorō. Among the twenty participants were not only journalists, but also mayors, functionaries of emigration associations and members of the Imperial Agricultural Association. The departure of the group took place in a very serious and official setting with a visit to the Yasukuni Shrine, the Meiji Shrine, a ceremony in front of the Imperial Palace, a farewell ceremony at Tokyo station with Ishiguro Tada’atsu, at that time the head of the Association for Rural Revitalization, and last but not least a ceremony at the Ise Shrine. In Manchuria the group travelled around to see several Japanese settlements, especially the first two settlements of Iyasaka and Chiburi as well as the newer settlement of Heitai, the site of the first Shinanomura (Saikibara 1937).

After Horikawa returned from such an inspection tour with a similar travel schedule, he not only reported on his impressions of the settlements in Manchuria at the assemblies of the five ward associations in Ōhinata, but he also declared his willingness to resettle to the continent himself. The village assembly then formally adopted the village division plan on 9 May 1937, just three days before two high-ranking representatives of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry made an official visit in the village to finalize the decision about whether Ōhinata should be granted the status of
a Special Assistance Village under the Rural Revitalization Scheme. Discussions about this upgrading had already begun in February with the first visit of a commission from the Ministry. The final and positive decision came right after the visit in May and thus accompanying the decision for village division. This parallel development of the discussion about village division and the application for higher subsidies from the government given to those communities following the policies of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry is hardly coincidental (Yamada 1978: 249-250). Rather the two developments were mutually reinforcing. Since the village had applied for higher subsidies, it was important to convey the impression of activity and compliance with the latest government policies to the Ministry commission. And since the village had decided to comply with the mass migration policy by sending a substantial number of households to Manchuria, it had to secure additional funding for the implementation of this policy.

Ōhinata was the first village that was granted the status of a Special Assistance Village in the Rural Revitalization Campaign during the process of the development of a village-division plan. Although this was probably a mere coincidence at the beginning, over the course of the further development of this campaign, a rising number of villages discussing village-division also applied to become Special Assistance Villages. At the round-table discussion of 14 and 15 January 1939 at the Association for Rural Revitalization, two participants from government bodies in charge of Rural Revitalization finally contemplated whether it would not be a good idea to make village-division compulsory for all villages receiving the status and funding of a Special Assistant Village (Asahi shinbunsha 1939: 125-127). This status had been used in the course of the Revitalization Campaign as an incentive and a reward for villages complying fully with the campaign goals. The precedent of Ōhinata then linked it to the Village-Division Campaign. For a short time thereafter it was awarded in some cases in connection with the Village-Division Campaign, as can be seen in Table 16. However, before this tool could be fully applied to all applicants for government subsidies for economic revitalization to persuade them to participate in organized mass migration to Manchuria, the Rural Revitalization Campaign petered out around 1940 (Takahashi 1997: 109).
Table 16. Percentage of applicants for village division which attained Special Assistance Status

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of villages which received Special Assistance Status in that year*</th>
<th>Number of villages which registered for village-division in that year**</th>
<th>Number of village-division applicants with Special Assistance Status*</th>
<th>Percentage of village-division applicants with Special Assistance Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>403</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>1 (= Ōhinata)</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>407</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>17.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


This look into the planning process at the local level shows the importance of the cooperation of the various actors of village politics as well as the influence of incentives like promotion tours to Manchuria and the possibility to receive higher government subsidies for the local economy through participation in government programmes of social management. In cases like Ōhinata, where the cooperation at the local level and between the local and upper levels was smooth, the planning process was short and successful.

5.2. Recruitment Measures

The hardest part of the implementation of village-division, however, was probably the recruitment of volunteers to people the new settlement soon to be founded in Manchuria. To popularize the idea of moving permanently to the continent, the promoters of emigration in Ōhinata organized an exhibition with photos from existing Japanese settlements in Manchuria. They brought the head of the training centre for prospective settlers in Kikyōgahara, Nishimura Tomisaburō, to the village to give a talk. Nevertheless, mayor Asakawa lamented the passiveness of the villagers who were asked to volunteer for resettlement. Thus, he brought more functionaries from the prefec- tural office and even bigwigs like Kodaira Gon’ichi, the head of the Economic Revitalization Section in the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, and Sugino Tadao, professor for agrarian economy and director of the Central Committee for Rural Revitalization, to give presentations about emigration to Manchuria to Ōhinata. On 15 August 1937 he even started to publish a gazette called Ōhinata-mura hō, the “Ōhinata Village News”. Thirty-five issues were published until October 1940 to familiarize villagers with all issues surrounding emigration (Ikegami 1995: 25-26; Miyai 1981: 71). It is hard to determine these efforts’ effect on the outcome of Ōhinata’s
recruiting campaign. A large part of the persuasion surely also took place in face-to-face communication and is therefore not officially recorded.

A closer look at the recruitment in other villages reveals some evidence for the importance of personal communication. The most drastic wording for this practice can be found in the report about the village-division of Kurikuma Village compiled for the January 1939 round-table discussion. The author of the report bluntly stated: “In Kurikuma Village home visits in the evening were adopted as the most powerful weapon (for the recruitment of settlers)” (Asahi shinbunsha 1939: 436). A notorious example for this practice actually was Minakawa Nananosuke, the main supporter of emigration in the village of Nanyō. Minakawa worked as the local newspaper deliveryman and obviously used the professional contact with his customers to ask villagers to join Nangō’s emigrant group (Abiko 1988: 337-338).

A functionary from another village participating in the Village-Division Campaign, Furune Takezō, even left a diary where he recorded how he was trying to promote emigration to Manchuria in his village of Yomikaki, and that it was rather difficult to spread enthusiasm among the general populace. As a member of the village assembly of Yomikaki, Furune was also sent on an inspection tour to Manchuria in March 1939, but that was basically because nobody else wanted to go. Since his own brother had emigrated, Furune was more or less pressured to participate in the inspection tour on behalf of his village, although the necessary preparation for the tour caused financial problems for the family (Yamada 1978: 66-68). After his return he gave several public speeches about the inspection tour in his village, but the number of participants in those meetings was rather small. Furune’s diary reveals that he also went to visit people in their homes in the evening to persuade them to join the emigration movement, but when it was time to send the roster of volunteers for the next migrant group to the prefectural office at the end of April 1939, there were only ten names on the list, all of them people who were not even from the village of Yomikaki (Yamada 1978: 77-79).

The first volunteers from Yomikaki who had left the village for the continent in the summer of 1938 in the first advance group had been selected for their enthusiasm and physical fitness. A second advance group was recruited among volunteers with professions useful for the construction of houses, like carpenters or masons. This group was sent over in March 1939 together with the inspection tour Furune partici-
pated in (Takahashi 1997: 204). These first two groups, however, must have exhaus
ted the village reservoir for those volunteering for resettlement by themselves,
as can be seen from Furune’s frustrating experience. On the other hand, not even
the local promoter Furune was willing to be a good example for the villagers, since
although he was asked to emigrate himself; he declined to participate in a migration
group (Yamada 1978: 58). Throughout his diary he kept on contemplating resettle-
ment from time to time, but in the end he stayed in Japan for personal reasons.

It is difficult to assess the reactions of the villagers to these recruitment efforts. What
can usually be quantified are the effects of the recruitment measures in form of mi-
gration numbers from the village, which do not allow any conclusions about the set-
tlers’ motives or their opinion about the migration campaign.

A rare exception is a survey conducted among 62 Ōhinata households that did not
emigrate. The research team around Professor Nasu Hiroshi doing in-depth research
on the Village-Division Campaign in 1939 asked these households for their opinion
on emigration to Manchuria and the consequences this had on their home com-
nunity. Most of the respondents to the survey who answered these questions had rela-
tives who emigrated (45 of 52 responding households), and most households at least
officially declared their approval for the project: 40 households were in favour of emi-
gregation, ten households did not comment on this question, and only two households
voiced their objection to the emigration movement. Thus most families surveyed were
somehow affected by Ōhinata’s participation in the Village-Division Campaign and
approved of it. Some had even profited from the out-migration from their village: 14
households had bought land and 12 had bought houses or furniture left behind by
migrants. Asked what they thought about those villagers who joined the migration
movement, three respondents were indifferent, 14 said that they had preferred them
not to leave, but 18 were of the opinion that it was a good thing that the emigrants left
the village of Ōhinata. Not every household answered the question about the conse-
quences of the Village-Division Campaign for the whole community. Only four of
those who responded saw no particular effect of the campaign on the village. The 21
other respondents to this question all agreed that village-division brought consider-
able problems for the village (Tōdai 1940: 92). A conclusion which could be drawn
from these two aspects of the survey is that villagers actually had the feeling that the
activism and the reorganization frenzy coming to their community with the Village-
Division Campaign affected their life, but that they could profit from it nevertheless.
Those who answered that they thought it was good that some emigrants had left the village might have said so because they thought that the emigrants had certainly found a better life in Manchuria, but they could also have been glad that some people left the village because those who stayed profited from the situation, maybe by acquiring the migrants’ houses and land or even by getting rid of people they did not get along with.

According to the official ideology of emigration, prospective settlers should be healthy people qualified to earn their living through agriculture. Migration to Manchuria was advertised as the prime possibility for non-inheriting second and third sons of farm households to open up their own branch family (Nakata and Nomura 1938). In reality the campaign must have also attracted all kinds of social misfits who saw the well-organized emigration movement as their chance to get away from difficulties in Japan. To deter those people from applying for the campaign, *le no hikari* published a short article in the summer of 1937 about people not fit for joining the migration movement. The author states that in 1937, 3,000 people had applied for migration, but that after the first screening procedure only 1,000 of them were accepted. This means that two-thirds of the applicants did not meet the qualification criteria to become settlers. Among them, the article states, were not only those physically unfit for the endeavour, but also all kinds of mentally ill, drunkards, gamblers, and prowlers (Satō 1937). They did certainly not possess the required “pioneer spirit” with which the proponents of the campaign wanted to generated the “cultural uplift” and the “harmony of the five races” in Manchuria (Asahi shinbunsha 1939: 15). Thus the local promoters of emigration who knew the members of their communities best had to look for hard-working farmers and well-integrated members of rural communities and persuade them to fulfil the quotas set by the migrations plans. However, as can be concluded from the above-mentioned example, this was not an easy task.

5.3. Financial Arrangements

The migration plan of Ōhinata called for 150 already existing households to resettle in Manchuria, and offered 50 persons not yet registered as independent households to open up their own branch families in the continental settlement. The first step for the volunteers before resettlement was the dissolution of all their obligations in their home village. On the one hand there was farmland, usually rented, and houses to dispose of. On the other hand, most emigrants had debts whose repayment had to
be secured somehow. Whereas belongings such as houses and farmland could theoretically be sold in private transactions, the clearance of debts was more difficult. The migration planners had to ensure that emigration to Manchuria could not be used as a way to avoid debt repayment. Thus the local industrial cooperative was called upon as a mediator and guarantor for the settlement of the migrant’s debts. After migrants resettled in Manchuria and were making profits with their new farmland, they should then start repaying their debts to the industrial cooperative of their home village. Mayor Asakawa reckoned that the liabilities from migrants’ debts for the cooperative in Ōhinata would amount to something around 400,000 yen, an enormous sum at that time. Nevertheless, he argued that this way of debt regulation was the only possibility to keep social peace in the village, where rich families and creditors feared to be cheated out of their money by debtors taking off to the continent (Kokusaku 1937).

Another potential threat to social stability in the village could be a sudden drop in prices for land and houses, when a large number of families were trying to sell their houses, farmland or forest. Landlords or racketeers could try to take advantage of those trying to get rid of their belongings fast by cutting prices for these items. Worse even, they might sell or rent the farmland to outsiders, thereby undermining the aim of the Village-Division Campaign – the redistribution of farmland to those villagers not having enough arable land to scrape a living. Again the cooperative acted as a mediator, buying houses, farmland and forest off prospective settlers to resell these assets to villagers staying behind in Japan. When volunteers for resettlement left family members behind who relied on the prospective settler’s support, the cooperative gave out vouchers for food and other supplies from the cooperative. Where labour was lacking, families could apply for help (Asahi shinbunsha 1939: 30-33; Tōdai 1940: 47). The village office in Ōhinata even created a communal centre at the local elementary school for family members of settlers expecting to join their relatives in Manchuria once they were settled. The centre offered childcare and a communal kitchen for those families where the absence of family members forced women to spend more time tilling the field as well as other services like the provision of firewood (Kokusaku 1937: 68).

Volunteers from Ōhinata themselves were awarded 50 yen as subsidies each. Those leaving debts behind had to use a part of this sum as the first instalment of their debt-repayment to the cooperative; the rest of the money was seen as capital for the start of their new life (Ikegami 1995: 26). The way Ōhinata supported its settlers with sub-
sides and guarantees for debt regulation became the model for the whole Village-Division Campaign.

Other communities often could not be as generous as Ōhinata, which as a special case had been granted a lump sum of 38,000 yen when it was upgraded to Special Assistance Village instead of 10,000 yen, which later became the standard sum for new entries into this programme (Okabe 1977: 152). The village of Yomikaki, which had pushed through its division plan in 1938, for instance decided to award 50 yen per person only to those leaving as the first advance group. Members of the second advance group from Yomikaki were given only 30 yen, settlers of the first main group were handed 25 yen, and those leaving with the second main group were given only 10 yen. The village of Yomikaki further earmarked 10,800 yen from the village budget to support left-behind family members of settlers (Takahashi 1997: 205).

The responsibility for funding individual settlers, supporting their family members where necessary, redistributing assets as well as clearing debts thus rested with the administration of the villages participating in the Village-Division Campaign. Some villages like Nangō and Yamato were aspiring to shoulder these responsibilities without government subsidies. Other villages like Ōhinata relied on funds given out in connection to the Rural Revitalization Campaign. Mayor Asakawa defended this approach at the 1939 round-table discussion, arguing that his village could have never financed the campaign on its own and that more money meant faster construction of the new settlement in Manchuria. Thus family members waiting for facilities to be completed in the new village could join their household heads earlier and would therefore cost less money in support while waiting for resettlement in Japan (Asahi shinbunsha 1939: 74-81).

Matsukawa Gorō, the consultant to the Association for Emigration to Manchuria who had made bad experiences as a school headmaster in Nangō, however, voiced his suspicion at the same round-table discussion. According to his experience, government subsidies given out under the Rural Revitalization Scheme were often taken by local functionaries and put into their pet projects without having any positive effects for the villagers. Katō Kanji argued that these functionaries probably did not know the real needs of the peasants. Nishigaki Kiyoji, head of the National Higher Level School in Kaminoyama, even cited cases where government subsidies were misappropriated deliberately (Asahi shinbunsha 1939: 112-116).
The financial aspect of migration for the individual settlers and maybe their dependents again indicates how important local conditions and village politics were for the concrete implementation of the resettlement. A working debt-clearance scheme and a fair way to sell possible assets before resettlement were important incentives for prospective migrants. Guarantees for creditors and a fair and orderly redistribution of land were prerequisites for the maintenance of social peace in villages attempting village-division. The success of local promoters of village-division when recruiting volunteers for emigration rested on their credibility to provide such fair and orderly debt management and redistribution of assets.

5.4. The Training and Resettlement of Emigrants

The recruitment of volunteers and the sorting out of their liabilities were not the only administrative procedures preceding the actual resettlement. Volunteers had to apply officially, undergo an examination of their physical fitness, and pass one month of training before they could become Manchuria emigrants. Details of this process can be deduced from the above-mentioned handbook that was published in 1938 by the two directors of the so-called Manchurian-Mongolian School (Man-Mo gakkō) in Tokyo, Nakata Ryō and Nomura Eiji. The book is designed to be a handbook for those propagating and administering emigration at the local level as well as for people contemplating emigration themselves. With a title that roughly translates into “Guide to inevitable success in the migration to Manchuria” (Kanarazu seikō suru Manshū imin annai), its focus on all kinds of practical questions concerning the resettlement process, and furigana (reading aids showing the pronunciation of Chinese characters) for readers with only a basic education, it looks like a self-help book for prospective settlers (Nakata and Nomura 1938).

A short introduction assured prospective settlers that migration during the trial phase had been going on according to schedule, that settlers already in Manchuria were rather well-off, and that prospects for the future were bright. Nevertheless, it emphasized that settlers had to be ready to work hard and so candidates had to undergo a thorough screening process and a demanding training phase. Candidates had to apply in their prefecture, where the prefectural office assessed their physical fitness as well as their suitability of character. They had to pay their own travel expenses when going to the test. Those declared fit by their local authorities were admitted as so-called provisional settlers into a one-month course in a prefectural training facility,
where they were subjected to a daily schedule that had probably strongly resembled the one shown in Table 17.

**Table 17  A typical schedule of a day in a settlers’ training facility**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Activity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5:30</td>
<td>Awakening by drum signals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6:00 – 7:00</td>
<td>Chorus singing the national anthem, recital of the Imperial Rescript, cheers for prosperity, spiritual work, martial arts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7:30</td>
<td>Breakfast followed by a 30-minute break</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8:30 – 11:30</td>
<td>Classes and training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12:00</td>
<td>Lunch followed by a break</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13:00 – 17:00</td>
<td>Agricultural practice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18:00</td>
<td>Dinner, bath time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19:30 – 21:00</td>
<td>Lectures, discussions, war songs, dormitory songs, poem recitals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21:30</td>
<td>Roll call, evening service, lights out</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Manshū kaitakushi kankōkai 1966: 201)

In the course of one month, the trainees attended on average the number of classes shown in Table 18 to prepare them for all aspects of the migration endeavour.

**Table 18  Contents of subjects taught at the settlers’ training facilities**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic of classes</th>
<th>Total number of hours</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Japanese spirit and the way of the farmer (номиндо)</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The situation in Manchuria and its industry</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture in Manchuria and the planting of grain</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The situation in the settlements</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese gymnastics</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outline of self-cultivation</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Animal husbandry</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vegetable cultivation</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martial arts</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge about the role of the settlers</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military drill</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lectures outside regular classes</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Practice in procession of agricultural products</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural training</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inspection marching</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Manshū kaitakushi kankōkai 1966: 201)
It is noteworthy that although the highest number of class hours was used for agricultural practice accompanied by classes about the specifics of agriculture in Manchuria, a considerable number of class hours was also devoted to ideological aspects of the migration endeavour as well as military training. Even a “way of the farmer”, a term imitating the “way of the warrior” (bushidō), was taught, giving the whole training process an even more ideological touch. After completion of this course, the provisional settlers returned to their village while the Ministry of Colonial Affairs decided whether to actually send the applicants over to Manchuria according to their performance in the course. Successful applicants were then sorted into resettlement groups according to their destination on the continent (Nakata and Nomura 1938: 8-12).

In the first five years since 1932 more than 3,000 households had moved to settlements in Manchuria (Manshu imin kenkyūkai 1976: 90). Settler groups are customarily sorted into the year in which the resettlement was prepared and executed, starting with the “first-year settlers” (Dai ichi ji imin dan), i.e., emigrants of the year 1932, the “second-year settlers” (Dai ni ji imin dan), i.e., emigrants of 1933, and so on. Since in the first three years one group per year left Japan to found the settlements of (1) Iyasaka, (2) Chiburi and (3) Mizuho, these “first”, “second” and “third year” settler are identical with the respective groups going to the first settlements. From the fourth year onwards more than one group per year left Japan. Thus “fourth-year settlers” belong to two groups. “Fifth-year settlers” were divided into four different groups, one of them being the above-mentioned Shinano-mura group (Manshū kaitakushi kankōkai 1966: 199).

In 1937, the sixth year of resettlement, the number of groups per emigration year started to increase markedly, reaching dozens of groups every year in the early 1940s. The “Guide to inevitable success in the migration to Manchuria” must have been compiled late in 1937 or in early 1938, since it named 10 October and 10 November 1937 as the passed deadlines for “sixth-year settlers” and mentioned that applications for “seventh-year settlers” to resettle in 1938 were open at the time. The Guide listed 22 new settlements for “seventh-year settlers”, most planned for 200 settler households (a few cases even for 300 or 400 households): all in all, for 5,100 settler households in all locations. It also contains a very rare and interesting figure, which is the number of households already existing in the area (genjūminkosū). Since these figures, which vary considerably and seem to be real numbers rather than planning quotas, amount to a total of 9,210 households, they must represent the
number of Manchurian households in the settlement area (Nakata and Nomura 1938: 10-12).

The 1938 guide contains the idealistic yearly planning quota set up initially in the “Millions to Manchuria Plan”, i.e., the resettlement of 100,000 households in the first five-year phase (1937-1941), 200,000 households in the second phase (1942-1946), 300,000 households in the third phase (1947-1951) and finally 400,000 households in the fourth phase (1952-1956). The first detailed plan for the first phase made by the Colonial Ministry in 1936, which distributed the 100,000 settler households over the years from 1937 to 1941, was also included (Table 19).

Table 19 Resettlement plans for the first five-year phase 1937-1941 (cf. Table 2)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1937</th>
<th>1938</th>
<th>1939</th>
<th>1940</th>
<th>1941</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Households of group settlers</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>70,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Households of free settlers</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>21,000</td>
<td>28,000</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>100,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Nakata and Nomura 1938: 8-9)

This table shows that after the start of mass migration to Manchuria, so-called group settlers, i.e., larger groups of emigrants originating from the same community in Japan, were the preferred form of recruitment, since only the mobilization of existing social entities could fulfill the enormous quotas set by the planners. Other than these group settlers who were drafted and trained under the auspices of the Ministry of Colonial Affairs, the “free settlers” were groups that organized their resettlement mostly on their own. As examples for free settler groups the Guide names adherents of the new religion Tenrikyō, who built their own settlement in Manchuria in 1933, a group calling itself the “Tenshō Group”, i.e., Group of the Shintō Sun Goddess Amaterasu, and finally a group privately assembled by one Kokubu Kameo from Fukushima Prefecture. These free settler groups organized their own recruitment, but when organizing their resettlement they also had to rely upon the migration bureaucracy, for example to buy land for the settlement. Just like the group settlers, the free settlers were entitled to government subsidies, but the amount of money per household was only half of what was planned for group settler households. Whereas free migrants received only 200 yen for the passage to Manchuria and another 300 yen as starting
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capital, group migrants could hope for more than 1,000 yen of government subsidies to finance the start of their new existence according to a list given in the Guide (Table 20).

**Table 20. Planned subsidies for group migrants**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kind of expenses</th>
<th>Amount in yen</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passage to Manchuria (two adults and one child)</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic animals, livestock</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farm implements</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clothing</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Living expenses</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farm sheds</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subsidy for opening new fields</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,060</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Nakata and Nomura 1938: 22)

Government subsidies were given to all emigrants except those classified as “business migrants” (*shōgyō imin*), who were not recruited through the Ministry of Colonial Affairs but by employment agencies like the one in Tokyo that placed 84 salespeople at the newly opened Marushō Department Store in Harbin in November 1936 (Nakata and Nomura 1938: 18). These government subsidies were not handed to the individual settler households, but were entrusted to their respective settler group to ensure they were used properly.

Despite the fact that 1,000 yen was a lot of money for farmers in the 1930s, the Guide reckoned the sum was far from enough for a household to start a secure existence in Manchuria. Although there was an initial discussion whether farmland in Manchuria should be given out to Japanese settlers free of charge, emigrants first of all had to pay for their new farmland. They would then have to spend money to construct buildings on their new land, to drill a well, buy farm equipment and animals, as well as pay their share of communally used facilities and infrastructure in their new village. These costs would amount to 1,900 yen per household.

Furthermore, a household should have a cash reserve of 700 yen to pay further expenses before the new farming operation generated income. To obtain more capital
than provided by the government, group as well as free settlers were offered loans by the Mantaku at an interest rate of 4.5%, to be repaid over a period of 25 years. Since it was not to be expected that settler households would make enough profit to start repaying their loans in their first years in Manchuria, repayment would start only after between five and ten years. Since most settler households were offered 10 chō of farmland, according to this scheme emigrants would have turned into landlords by the time they repaid their loan to the Mantaku (Nakata and Nomura 1938: 20-25).

Besides these general regulations and provisions, the Guide also contains specifications for the leading personnel (shidōsha) of the emigration groups. These leaders comprised not only of the actual group leader (danchō), but also agricultural specialists, medical personnel and teachers. They were selected through personal interviews in Japan. The minimal requirement for such a leading position was the completion of middle school (Nakata and Nomura 1938: 16). In the case of doctors and teachers for the new settlement, it can be assumed that applicants held the respective degrees to qualify for the job.

As for the group leaders, it is questionable whether all had middle school certificates, especially after the village level became the centre of recruitment. The most famous group leader, for instance, Horikawa Kiyomi from Ōhinata, was a non-inheriting son from a poor branch family who had contemplated emigration to Hokkaidō when he was young. He is described as the prototypical representative of the poor peasants who worked his way up in village politics, but he did not have the chance and the financial means to attend a middle school (Yamada 1978: 338-339). According to the documentary novel of Wada Tsutō about the emigration from Ōhinata, Horikawa did not even properly finish elementary school. He was entrusted with the leadership of the Ōhinata emigrant group not because he was selected in a job interview, but because his status and his reputation in Ōhinata made him a natural choice for the leadership position (Asahi shinbunsha 1939: 73; Ikegami 1995: 27, Wada 1964: 130). Horikawa, however, underwent the same training process described in the Guide.

The specialists and the leading personnel did not participate in the same one-month preparation courses in prefectural training facilities as the ordinary settlers. They were all sent to Katō Kanji training centre in Uchihara for a one-month course, and then received another month of training in a facility in Harbin (Nakata and Nomura 1938: 16).
The whole training process of settlers and their leaders was paid for by various institutions. The Ministry of Colonial Affairs paid for all travel expenses and other costs connected to the training of normal settlers in prefectural training facilities in Japan. The training of the leading personnel in Uchihara was paid for by the Association for Emigration to Manchuria, while the Ministry of Colonial Affairs paid for travel expenses and all other costs connected to the second part of the leaders’ training in Harbin. To make things even more complicated, the travel expenses for most of the leading personnel to their settlement in Manchuria were then paid by the Public Corporation for Land Reclamation in Manchuria. Only teachers’ travel expenses to the settlement had to be paid by the emigrant group of the settlement (Nakata and Nomura 1938: 28-29).

It is interesting to note that the recruitment and training process from the beginning distinguished between ordinary settlers and settlers designated for leadership positions. For those expected to take over leadership positions in the new communities, a higher level of education was expected, even though it is questionable whether this was the decisive factor for the political leadership functions like group leader. Whereas the training of ordinary settlers took place in a decentralized manner in the prefectures, the leaders were all educated for their future role under the direct auspices of Katō Kanji in his Uchihara Training Centre in Ibaraki Prefecture, and had to complete a one-month internship in the Harbin Training Centre as well. Those selected for this special training could expect to form the new elite in the Manchurian settlement. They could also look forward to a much higher salary for their job as settlement administrators, doctors, teachers and agricultural experts in Manchuria than their colleagues in Japan, since they were paid the salary for the respective job in Japan plus an additional 70 to 80% (Nakata and Nomura 1938: 29). Thus the job in a specialist of leading position in a Manchuria settlement was a career opportunity, especially for those who could not achieve a leading position in their home village.

Although it is not possible to tell whether those who implemented the village-division plan in Ōhinata had read the “Guide to inevitable success in the migration to Manchuria”, they were surely aware of the information it contained. This was not only necessary in connection to the general process of resettlement, but especially important in regard to the expected costs for the average settler’s household. Thus when the recruitment of settlers and the organization of their resettlement became the responsibility of the village, subsidies for migrants had to be taken into consideration in the village budget. This point was not to be taken lightly, as discussions about the
the village budget. This point was not to be taken lightly, as discussions about the appropriateness of subsidies for out-migration from the village budget that will be referred to in the analysis of the impact of the Village-Division Campaign at the local level clearly show (see the next chapter).
6. Local Impact of the Village-Division Campaign

When the focus of the recruitment of new settlers was switched from individual volunteers to communities participating in the Village-Division Campaign, the resettlement of migrants to Manchuria no longer changed just the lives of the emigrants. It also affected the structure of the participating local communities. These changes were thoroughly intended by the planners of the Village-Division Campaign. The export of “surplus population” was thought to provide enough resources for the remaining population. The details of this change have been best examined for the village of Ōhinata, where Professor Nasu and his students collected data about the economic and social circumstances of the migrants. A closer look at this survey provides a detailed picture of an actual village-division and its local impact, which can then be compared to the officially set goals and emigration policies.

An analysis of the effects of the organized out-migration and the redistribution of the settlers’ property inevitably leads to the question whether the completion of this process fulfilled the goals set by the planners of the Village-Division Campaign. Here the answer given unanimously in the literature about the outcome of the mass migration campaign is that it was a complete failure. Therefore the analysis must continue with the reasons for this outcome as well as the implications of this outcome for the activists who had enthusiastically worked for the endeavour.

6.1. The Economic and Social Structure of Emigrants from Ōhinata

According to the 1930 census, the village of Ōhinata had a total population of 2,025 persons: 1,028 male and 997 female. The village-division plan for the community aimed at having only about 1,250 people in the village after the completion of the local migration scheme. In December 1939, when the group from Tokyo University conducted its survey, the resettlement from Ōhinata was nearly complete. Nevertheless, the number of emigrants did not reach the planned quota. Although the data published by the Tokyo University scholars are not comprehensive, a general tendency can clearly be seen. There were only 586 inhabitants in the continental settlement of Ōhinata, a far cry from the envisioned 1,250. Only 417 of these inhabitants originated from Ōhinata in Japan; the rest came from other Japanese communities. At the time of the survey, 108 household units had left the Japanese village of Ōhinata and resettled in the Ōhinata settlement in Manchuria, but only 97 were originally from Ōhinata. The rest were from neighbouring communities, but had applied to
join the Ōhinata emigration group. Since the original plan was to send about 200 households from Ōhinata to Manchuria, the figure of approximately 100 emigrated households translates into an implementation rate of only 50%.

Since Professor Nasu and his researchers were aware of the statistical inaccuracies created by the Japanese convention of counting emigrants in households-units regardless of the number of persons actually making up this household, they provided some more details about the migration cases. Although the figures given contain some contradictions and inaccuracies, they show that only 56 of the 97 households which had emigrated from Ōhinata were in fact complete households. One of them was presumably the household of labour migrants who had only recently come to the village. In all the remaining 41 cases, only one or several members of a household left the village (Tōdai 1940: 15-21). Although these family members who left Japan reduced the number of inhabitants of Ōhinata, so reducing the village’s “surplus population”, the cases really intended by the village-division planners were the 56 complete households which left Japan. Therefore the researchers took a further look at the economic background of these households and the farmland they left behind to be redistributed among the remaining population. As a first step they compared some economic data from the emigrant households with a set of figures from a 1936 survey of 339 village households by the Youth League of Ōhinata (Table 21).

Table 21. Economic status of complete household migrants from Ōhinata

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Households surveyed in 1936</th>
<th>Complete household emigrants</th>
<th>Emigrant share</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of households surveyed</td>
<td>339</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>16.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area of farmland</td>
<td>202.3 chō</td>
<td>19.8 chō</td>
<td>9.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Profit from sericulture</td>
<td>13,354 kan$^{20}$</td>
<td>1,180 kan</td>
<td>8.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People working in agriculture</td>
<td>939 persons</td>
<td>125 persons</td>
<td>13.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- male</td>
<td>507 persons</td>
<td>79 persons</td>
<td>15.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- female</td>
<td>432 persons</td>
<td>46 persons</td>
<td>10.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour days per annum</td>
<td>15,888 days</td>
<td>3,750 days</td>
<td>23.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Tōdai 1940: 59-60)

According to this comparison, the 16.5% of the surveyed households that later opted for a complete migration to Manchuria farmed only 9.8% of total farmland in ques-

$^{20}$ 1 kan = 3.75 kilograms
tion, so had fewer resources than average to earn a living with agriculture. Their share of the profit from sericulture, which requires adequate space for raising silk-worms and mulberry trees to feed the worms, was even lower. The only figure where the share of the emigrant households is considerably higher than average is the number of labour days per annum, i.e., the number of days a member of the household was hired as a day labourer. The general tendency which can be deduced from this comparison is that the emigrant households had considerably fewer resources for agriculture and sericulture and were dependent more than average upon day labour jobs.

Another survey carried out by the researchers from Tokyo University supports the evidence that most migrants from Ōhinata could not leave behind larger amounts of farmland, because they had earned most of their income from other sources. This survey sorts 340 households into three categories according to their main source of income and then gives the percentage of households from each category which emigrated as a whole or sent only some of their members to Manchuria.

Table 22. Sources of income of Ōhinata emigrants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sources of income</th>
<th>All village households</th>
<th>Complete-household-migrants</th>
<th>Households affected by migration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mostly agriculture (more than 3 tan of farmland)</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mostly charcoal making (less than 3 tan of farmland)</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed income, little profit from charcoal making, less than 3 tan of farmland</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>340</strong></td>
<td><strong>51</strong></td>
<td><strong>81</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Tōdai 1940: 68)

Although this survey contains only 51 of the 56 complete households that left the village, it shows that this kind of household had a comparatively low share in agricultural activities in the village. Only 12% of all village households earning most of their living through agriculture decided to migrate wholly, whereas 23% of the charcoal makers and 19% of households having other sources of income besides agriculture and charcoal production opted for a resettlement of the complete household. The rather high number of mostly agricultural households affected by migration shows that farm households rather opted for sending only some of their family members
over to Manchuria, maybe to found a branch family. These family members, however, did not leave behind any farmland for redistribution. The ones who could have left behind farmland for redistribution, however, often did not have much arable land before they left Ōhinata as a complete household.

Two tables in the research report by Professor Nasu and his students deserve a comparison in this matter. One table, originally compiled with the purpose of showing the usage of hired labour in relation to landownership, gives the amount of farmland owned by 338 households in Ōhinata according to the 1936 Youth League survey. If combined with a second table giving the same figures only for the 51 households which decided to emigrate completely to Manchuria, the table shows the relation between landownership and complete-household-migration (Table 23).

**Table 23. Land ownership and complete-household migration in Ōhinata**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tan of land owned</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>&lt; 3</th>
<th>3-5</th>
<th>5-7</th>
<th>7-10</th>
<th>10-20</th>
<th>&gt;20</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Surveyed households (338)</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complete-household-migrants (51)</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of landowners leaving the village as complete households</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Tōdai 1940: 74-76)

Again the general tendency points to a pattern where households which decided to leave Japan for good had rather small landholdings, whereas households like the 88 households with more than 1 cho (= 10 tan) of farmland in their possession very rarely decided to emigrate as a whole.

The Tokyo University report provides much more statistical data about the economic background of households affected in some form or the other by the Village-Division Campaign, and the statistics all point into the same direction. Mostly economically unstable or disadvantaged households decided to volunteer as emigrants. A large percentage of these were never mainly engaged in agriculture but scraped a living from charcoal making or working as day-labourers.

A similar profile can be drawn for migrants from another famous divided village, Yomikaki, which was also partly surveyed by the Tokyo University research team. Whereas many of the emigrants from Yomikaki in a sample of 214 had an agricultural
background, most had been tenants or part-tenants-part-landowners, not landlords. Many had relied upon sideline businesses, mostly in forestry. More than 20% of the surveyed emigrants from Yomikaki had been full-time day-labourers, and another nearly 15% had worked as artisans or merchants before they joined the village-division movement (Takahashi 1997: 218-220).

This pattern of out-migration of the economically disadvantaged inhabitants of the communities which had to mobilize participants for their village-division schemes follows the general logic of the explanation of population movements by push- and pull-factors. “Pushed out” by the lack of resources to improve their economic situation, many volunteers were certainly “pulled into” the migration movement by the mobilization effort of the local organizers and the well-organized recruitment and resettlement process which made it relatively easy to clear any debts in Japan and obtain some financial aid for a new start on the continent.

Although the planners of the mass movement never managed to fulfil the quotas set in the “Millions to Manchuria Plan”, they succeeded in resettling 300,000 people, a huge number. Of these, more than 90% came from a rural background and more than 80% had had some experience with agriculture before the resettlement. Their education level was below the national average, which was certainly connected to their rural background, and most had a lower-middle class or low-class background (Araragi 1998: 122-125). From this point of view one could argue that in the beginning the mass migration campaign was successful in its achievement of the resettlement of parts of the poorer segment of the rural population and that its final failure to improve the living conditions in the Japanese countryside as well as in the Manchurian settlements was caused by the progress of World War II. However, this would neglect the fact that the intended impact at the local level in Japan was not only the export of some poor families, but also the resolution of the problem of farmland shortage on which the whole theory of the “surplus population” to be sent to Manchuria was based.

6.2. The Redistribution of Farmland and the so-called Land Problem

The village-division plans all contained economic data, not the least to justify the communities’ participation in the campaign. They for instance gave information on the amount of arable land in the villages and also a rough overview of the distribution of the farmland among the village households. Nevertheless, the plans also pre-
sented calculations where the total area of rice paddies and dry fields in the village was divided by the total number of agricultural households in the village to reach the average size of farmland per household. Another calculation dividing the total area of farmland by the number of households left in the community after the implementation of the village-division plan then showed the improvement in the average amount of farmland per household, as if a simple mathematical operation would solve the so-called land problem (*tochi mondai*) of the community. In practice these statistical figures are rather useless, since they neglect the extremely uneven distribution of farmland in the villages. It is therefore necessary to look at the amount of farmland actually left behind by migrant households.

As already mentioned, Ōhinata’s village-division plan provided a table (cf. Table 8) showing that more than 85% of the agricultural households in the village had less than 10 tan of arable land under the plough, but claimed at the same time that the implementation of the village-division plan would nearly double the average size of farmland per household from currently 6.1 tan to 11.3 tan (Asahi shinbunsha 1939: 321). These figures were subsequently cited in Wada Tsutō’s documentary novel about the village of Ōhinata (Wada 1964: 116) and by scholars in their work about emigration to Manchuria (Okabe 1977: 152). But the figures contain arithmetical errors or misprints: 498 tan of paddy fields and 2160 tan of dry fields, i.e., 2658 tan of farmland amount to 7.9 tan per household if divided by 336 agricultural households in the village. If the number of farm households were reduced by the target quota of 150 existing households to reach 186, the statistical average of land per household would actually reach 14.3 tan.

However, this whole calculation is an exercise in futility anyway, since another table in the report showed that the actual amount of farmland left behind by emigrants was rather small. The report was compiled sometime in 1938 when the resettlement, for which it gave the following timetable, was in full swing (Table 24).

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21 The plan handed in for the first meeting of communities planning village-division in July 1937 still contains the correct figure of 1.5 tan of paddy fields and 6.4 tan of dry fields, i.e., 7.9 tan in total as the average size of farmland per agricultural household in Ōhinata (Okabe 1990-92 [7]: 29. A mistaken number of 4.6 tan of dry fields, however, makes for a total of 6.1 tan of farmland on average and has been reprinted throughout the literature about Ōhinata.
Table 24. Departure plan for settlers from Ōhinata

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Households</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11 July 1937</td>
<td>Advance group</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mid August 1937</td>
<td>Advance group</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 1938</td>
<td>First main group</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 1938</td>
<td>Second main group</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 1939</td>
<td>Third main group</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Asahi shinbunsha 1939: 322)

The report claimed that 102 households had already resettled, which left about another 100 households for further migration. It is not clear where the figure of 102 resettled households came from, since another table on the next page based on data from the industrial cooperative gave this figure as 99 households; nevertheless the report kept on using the slightly higher figure (Asahi shinbunsha 1939: 323). According to the report only 21 households among those already resettled possessed farm-land they left behind for redistribution. Most of it was bought by the industrial cooperative (Table 25).

Table 25. Land left behind by Ōhinata settlers until 1938

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Land Type</th>
<th>Left behind by settlers</th>
<th>Bought by the cooperative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rice paddies</td>
<td>13.3 tan</td>
<td>12.3 tan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dry fields</td>
<td>62.3 tan</td>
<td>58.3 tan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forest and waste land</td>
<td>46.0 tan</td>
<td>16.0 tan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land with buildings</td>
<td>4.2 tan</td>
<td>4.1 tan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Asahi shinbunsha 1939: 324-325)

Although land bought up by the cooperative was meant to be redistributed in the village and would therefore give some remaining farm households the possibility to enlarge their fields, the mere 70.6 tan of arable land given back to the community by the first half of settlers’ households amounted to no more than 2.65% of the total farmland area of the village. Unless all village landlords suddenly decided to join the settler’s group, this situation would not change significantly with the resettlement of the other expected 100 households.

---

22 Here the original table used the term “person”. Since the advance groups were usually made up of individual men, this is certainly correct. However, according to the conventions of demography in those days in Japan used by the migration planners, these male individuals were also counted as households. For the sake of clarity this table therefore uses the term household throughout.
The absurdity of trying to solve the problems of a community that had never been able to live of agriculture alone and had always been dependent upon income from small transport businesses and cash crops like silk and charcoal by concentrating on enlarging the statistical average of the farm area per household is sometimes mentioned in the literature about Ōhinata or the emigration movement in general (e.g., Ikegami 1995:21), but seems to have been no problem for the local activists in the Village-Division Campaign. After giving a detailed report about the dangers of the destructive lumbering going on in the village forest of Ōhinata and the economic problems ensuing from this situation, mayor Asakawa suddenly concluded that the most pressing task for the village was the resolution of the land problem (Asahi shin-bunsha 1939: 71).

A possible solution for this dilemma in the analysis of the logic behind the Village-Division Campaign is to stop taking the expression tochi mondai, i.e., land problem as the literal description of the shortage of farmland per rural household in the statistical sense as described in the village-division plans. Studies about the village level like the one conducted about the divided village of Yomikaki where the “redistribution of farmland” was equally ineffective as in Ōhinata (Takahashi 1997: 203-221, 238) as well as Araragi’s look at the national perspective show that the connection between rural “surplus population” and emigration to Manchuria was a mere rhetorical figure. Araragi provides a list of all Japanese prefectures according to their 1930 percentage of overpopulation and the number of Manchuria migrants from the respective prefecture. The national average for the overpopulation rate stood at 31%. If the pressure of overpopulation had really been released by sending the “surplus population” to Manchuria, one would expect the percentage of migrants to be somewhat parallel to the overpopulation rate. However, there is no obvious connection between a prefecture’s presumed overpopulation and the out-migration of its inhabitants to Manchuria as can be seen in Figure 4 and Table 26 showing the overpopulation rate according to the Ministry’s formula, total number of migrants from the prefecture and the percentage of migrant from the total population of the prefecture.
Figure 4. Regional distribution of overpopulation rates and migrant numbers

(Based on the following table from Araragi 1998: 96)
### Table 26. Regional distribution of overpopulation rates and migrant numbers

**OPR** = Overpopulation rate (%) according to the Ministry's formula (cf. page 61-62)

**TNM** = Total number of migrants from the prefecture

**MP** = Migrants as percentage of the total population of the prefecture

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prefecture</th>
<th>OPR</th>
<th>TNM</th>
<th>MP</th>
<th>Prefecture</th>
<th>OPR</th>
<th>TNM</th>
<th>MP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ōita</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>2,571</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>Gunma</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>8,775</td>
<td>0.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagasaki</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>2,151</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>Hiroshima</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>11,172</td>
<td>0.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niigata</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>12,641</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>Ishikawa</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>7,271</td>
<td>0.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shiga</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>1,447</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>Tochigi</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>4,231</td>
<td>0.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aomori</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>8,365</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>Tottori</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>3,626</td>
<td>0.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yamaguchi</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>6,508</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>320,973</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tōkyō</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>11,111</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>Iwate</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>6,436</td>
<td>0.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wakayama</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>3,149</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>Kagawa</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>7,885</td>
<td>1.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fukui</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>5,136</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>Kanagawa</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>1,588</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Okinawa</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>2,994</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>Kyōto</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>3,370</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yamagata</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>17,177</td>
<td>1.59</td>
<td>Nagano</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>37,859</td>
<td>2.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nara</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>5,243</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>Mie</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>4,062</td>
<td>0.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yamanashi</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>5,105</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>Miyagi</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>12,419</td>
<td>1.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kagoshima</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>5,700</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>Ōsaka</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>4,155</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Okayama</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>5,786</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>Tokushima</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>3,325</td>
<td>0.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Akita</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>9,452</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>Miyazaki</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>3,392</td>
<td>0.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saitama</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>4,368</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>Kumamoto</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>12,680</td>
<td>0.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ibaraki</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>3,573</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>Fukushima</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>12,673</td>
<td>0.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tōyama</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>5,200</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>Gifu</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>12,090</td>
<td>1.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fukuoka</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>3,114</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>Kōchi</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>10,082</td>
<td>1.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ehime</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>4,525</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>Saga</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>4,300</td>
<td>0.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chiba</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>2,148</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>Aichi</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>2,358</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hyōgo</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>4,400</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>Shizuoka</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>9,206</td>
<td>0.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shimane</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>3,025</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>Hokkaidō</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3,129</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Araragi 1998: 96)

Some seriously overpopulated prefectures like Ōita, Nagasaki, Shiga, and Wakayama sent only a comparatively small number of migrants to Manchuria, whereas in those prefectures which accounted for the majority of migrants like Nagano, Yamagata, Miyagi, Kumamoto and Fukushima, the overpopulation rate was mostly below the national average. Urban prefectures like Tōkyō, Nara, Hyōgo, Kyōto and Ōsaka
also present on the list did not try to export land-hungry farmers but their social problems like the unemployed or the Burakumin to Manchuria.

Thus the “land problem” in prefectures like Nagano and Miyagi was not so much a problem of too many farmers for an insufficient amount of farmland. It was a problem of the social composition of the villages where a few wealthy families had larger amounts of farmland in their possession, which they rented out to the less wealthy villagers. Families from the lower social stratum in these villages depended on side businesses, day labour in the local industries of wealthy families and seasonal labour migration. Thus the “land problem” was actually the problem of the existence of local landlords having the lion’s share of the local resources at their disposal.

6.3. Opposition against Village-Division at the Local Level

The local landlords belonged to a traditional elite in the villages, which in many cases was not very enthusiastic about the emigration movement if not totally opposed to the whole undertaking. Whenever local activists reported about opposition against their efforts to spread enthusiasm for migration among the villagers and organize a village-division endeavour in their community, they named members of the old elite of wealthy landlords as the prime culprits. Togashi Naotarō, the local promoter of village-division in Yamato Village encountered resistance from the local members of the Imperial Agricultural Association. These landlords feared that out-migration might diminish their pool of cheap day labourers and were worried about a possible drop in land prices and rent provoked by a decrease of peasants and tenants in need of arable land (Asahi shinbunsha 1939: 102).

In Yomikaki wealthy peasants complained about the implementation of the division of their village, arguing that the resettlement of the poor peasants of Yomikaki was a heavy burden on the village budget. To finance the migration scheme, money was diverted from projects that originated with the Rural Revitalization Campaign to the Village-Division Campaign. While mid-level peasants did profit from the Rural Revitalization Campaign, the Village-Division Scheme focused on the poor peasants (Takahashi 1997: 217-218).

The prime example for the clash of the old village elite and those promoting emigration to Manchuria is the village of Nangō, as described in Chapter 3. This village was ruled by a group of landlords who were mostly interested in using the village budget to improve infrastructure such as telephones, a local bank branch, the mail service,
the construction of new roads, bridges and a public park – facilities that would make their life more comfortable. They viewed the industrial cooperative founded by some better-off peasants with great suspicion. Their total lack of support of the cooperative was one reason for the difficult starting phase of the cooperative (Abiko 1988: 326). According to a report by the Association for Emigration to Manchuria for the 1939 publication by the Asahi Shinbun, only 41 households or 3.9% of the farm households in Nangō owned all the land they farmed. Another 385 households, or 36.6%, were part-tenants, part-owners. The majority of the farm households in the village, 626 households, or 59.5%, were tenants without land of their own. At the other end of the stratum were seven households which each had more than 50 čō of land in their possession. The total area of land owned by these seven landlord households amounted to 1,198 čō of farmland, or nearly 50% of all farmland in the village. Another approximately 30% of the village farmland belonged to another mere 35 households owning 10 to 49 čō each. (Asahi shinbunsha 1939: 220-221)

Emigrants from Nangō village left behind only 53 čō of farmland. It was originally planned that the Nangō Village Committee for the Sponsorship of Emigration to Manchuria and Mongolia would redistribute the emigrants’ farmland, however, since it all had been rented land, it was just rented out to some other tenant. The land was in such demand from other tenants that emigrants even started to sell their tenant rights for 20 yen per tan (Abiko 1988: 344). This is exactly what the village division planners feared most: local landlords grabbing the vacated farmland and possibly even taking in new tenants from outside the village (Asahi shinbunsha 1939: 32-33).

In Yomikaki, where the emigrants had vacated slightly more than 16% of the village farmland, some transfers of fields and buildings had actually taken place under the auspices of the industrial cooperative and some remaining households had been able to enlarge their farmland area. The emigration from the village, however, led to an acute shortage of labour in the local charcoal production. To remedy this situation the village ended up importing more than 250 forced labourers from Korea (Takahashi 1997: 219-220, 235-238).

Complaints about uncooperative elements or landlords profiting from the redistribution of farmland are conspicuously absent from the story of the village-division of Ōhinata. The purge in the village administration in 1934 and the ensuing close observation of the village by the prefectural authorities had probably silenced the old
elite. When Ōhinata became the forerunner of the Village-Division Campaign, any open opposition from within the village would have been foolish. Whereas most village administrations were dominated by members of a traditional elite of landlords and old families, the new mayor of Ōhinata was a comparatively young man with a university education. He had had contacts with Katō Kanji before entering local politics in Ōhinata and was trusted by the prefectural administration. This made his village an ideal experimental field for those in favour of mass migration to Manchuria.

The organization and implementation of mass migration was heavily subsidized. The Ministry of Colonial Affairs had earmarked 9 million yen for the promotion of emigration in 1937 and the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry reserved 5 million yen per year for the support of the mass migration campaign after 1936 (Manshū kaitakushi 1966: 203, 807), so they had an interest in reliable staff at the local level who guaranteed the proper usage of their money. They could not afford to have cases like the squandering of ministerial funds reported by an engineer in charge of the Rural Revitalization Campaign in the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, or the local official who answered questions by prospective settlers about the emigration campaign with “I did not make those plans, they were made in the prefectural office. Go and ask them” (Asahi shinbunsha 1939: 116).

6.4. The Negotiation of a New Role for Local Activists

The local impact in those communities where the village-division was promoted by local activists was not so much a change in the economic situation of the villagers or a significant reduction of the village population. The real impact of the village division campaign in communities where the discussion about mass migration was carried out between representatives of the old elite of traditional landlords and locally influential families and a new elite of activists – often politicized through their contact with agrarianist ideas – was a change in local politics at the grassroots level.

The changes in the political landscape at the local level have been discussed for the impact of the Rural Revitalization Campaign by Kerry Smith in her study about the village of Sekishiba in Fukushima Prefecture. Smith argues that most historians stress the importance of the bureaucracy and the military for the development of Japan in the 1930s, neglecting the role of local activists and village mainstays at the grassroots level. The economic crisis of the 1930s provided many opportunities for
political participation for activists at the local level who used the framework of the government campaign to further their own causes (Smith 2001: 15).

In a book about the relationship between state and villages in the pre-war Shōwa period, Nam Sangho argues that mainly Japanese researchers tend to overemphasize the role of the centre in the ultra-nationalist policies in Japan. This perspective implies, however, that the localities were mere recipients of orders from the centre which they implemented as prescribed. For the Rural Revitalization Campaign, Nam cites two scholars representing two possible assessments of the local impact of the developments. Ishida Takeshi sees no change in the traditional order of the village society through the campaign. According to his findings the campaign rather consolidated the political structures in the village, because the industrial cooperatives, which played an important role for the implementation of the revitalization plans, strengthened the grip of the bureaucracy on the villagers. Mori Takemaro, on the contrary, sees the industrial cooperatives as a means of the middle peasants to fight against the landlords. He argues that as a result of the Rural Revitalization Campaign the power structure in the countryside shifted from a system dominated by the wealth and prestige of the local landlords to a system where so-called middle peasants took over the lead in their communities or at least participated significantly in village politics (cited after Nam 2002: 5-6).

Mori Takemaro takes the same stand in the case of the promotion of mass migration. He argues that the Rural Revitalization Campaign, with its emphasis on self-help of the villagers through better education in agricultural techniques, rationalization and planning, brought many active young peasants from the middle farmer families into contact with agro-nationalistic ideas, because they were sent to Kato Kanji’s agriculture school in Tomobe and to other training centres of the Ministry of Agriculture (cf. Nakano 1983: 30). This indoctrination was meant to distance these young farmers from the socialist thoughts that had fuelled the tenant movement in the 1920s and instead inspire them with enthusiasm for the improvement of rural living conditions by planning, rationalization and hard work in agriculture. Thus brought into contact with Kato Kanji’s ideas, many of these new village mainstays easily turned into promoters of emigration to Manchuria when the Rural Revitalization Campaign shifted its focus from planning and supervising the villagers’ household budgets to planning the villagers’ out-migration after mass migration to the continent became a national policy in 1936. According to Mori’s findings this strong ideological conviction of village
mainstays who tried to mobilize their fellow villagers to join the migration movement played a crucial role in the implementation of the migration plans, although only a rather small number of villagers joined the movement in the end (Mori 1999: 160-164; Mori 2003).

To substantiate his claim, Mori takes a closer look at one of these local activists, the above-mentioned Togashi Naotarō from Yamato village, whom he interviewed in 1991. Mori recounts Togashi’s early experiences as an active young farmer who had joined the local youth association and attended some of Katō Kanji’s lectures. When he became active in the promotion of emigration to Manchuria, he encountered the opposition of the local landlords and village elders who were defending the status quo – a pattern typical for the encounter between the old elite and the new elite of young activists.

Through their participation in the nationwide migration campaign, however, some of these activists suddenly came into contact with politicians from the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry and other functionaries connected to the organization of migration to Manchuria. They were invited to discuss their local situations and opinions about possible solutions to the problems of rural Japan with the central planners, which certainly gained them prestige in their communities and improved their standing against their local opponents. It is no coincidence that some participating villages of the Village-Division Campaign implemented their plans rather successfully in terms of quota fulfilment. Only those communities where village-division had some characteristics of a social movement which originated in the village itself and was promoted by well-reputed local activists could mobilize enough volunteers in the early stage of the campaign to resettle a substantial number of households before the arrival of World War II killed so much enthusiasm for emigration to the continent and turned the Village-Division Campaign into a centrally ordered programme for quota fulfilment. In the end there were only a handful of real village-divisions, i.e. the out-migration of more than a few dozen households from one community.

Local activists who came too late to be integrated into the discussion circles when village-division was still a hot topic in 1938 and 1939 were usually met with a total lack of enthusiasm in their communities. Umeda Kinji has traced the activities of such “latecomers” in three different villages which joined the Village-Division Campaign in 1942, mostly in the hope of receiving some government subsidies to improve their
economic situation. None of these villages managed to send more than a few dozen migrants to Manchuria. Usually only the local activists themselves went (Umeda 1988).

In such a situation, where on one side the general enthusiasm for emigration to Manchuria had cooled and on the other side the migration plans called for constantly rising numbers of volunteers to fulfil the quotas, some of the activists and communities of the first phase of the Village-Division Campaign were given a new role in the nationwide mobilization effort: the media campaign to propagate emigration to Manchuria discovered them as bright examples to follow.
7. The Personal Factor

To understand the contribution of local activists in the making and implementation of the Village-Division Campaign it is necessary to evaluate the importance and the activities of individual persons and the personal factor in general. It has been shown how decisive the interaction between central-level promoters of mass migration and the local activists (as well as the activities of these activists in their respective community) were for the development of the nationwide campaign.

This chapter analyses the structure of these personal relationships first at the central level and then in some exemplary cases of villages which participated early and voluntarily in the Village-Division Campaign and were among the communities with a high fulfilment quota of the migration plan. For the sake of the analysis these two levels will be treated as two different networks. But since in both cases the person of Katō Kanji sat in the centre of the network as its constituting factor, he connected both levels into one big group of enthusiastic followers of agro-nationalism, each member working for the implementation of mass migration to Manchuria in his respective capacity. Whereas the number of real followers of Katō at the central level is of manageable size, followers at the local level clearly outnumbered them. Thus only those enthusiasts who somehow show up more prominently in the promotional literature for the Village-Division Campaign are included as examples for local activists and analysed as typical representatives of a group in Japanese society which contributed significantly to the implementation of the abstract central plans at the local level.

The importance of this personal factor was also recognized by the planners at the central level. When the presence of real people enthusiastically promoting migration in their communities diminished due to the resettlement of many of these activists to Manchuria and the progress of World War II on the continent, the planners substituted these local activists with surrogates who visited rural communities on promotion tours, or who were portrayed as heroes in more or less documentary literature, theatre and film productions. The image this propaganda material contains of the ideal activist in turn shows how the campaign makers viewed the activists’ roles and envisioned the ideal course of the Village-Division Campaign. Since Ōhinata was the best-used example in this propaganda effort, the documentary novel about the development of the campaign contains the stereotypical image of a successful village-
division which heavily influenced the whole public picture of the campaign. Because on the other side the history of Ōhinata is well documented, it is also possible to examine how the novel handles the historical events in the village and enquire about the intentions behind the adaptation of the material in the novel. A comparison of the ideal presented in the propaganda with the actual development of the Village-Division Campaign again highlights some of the problems planners and activists encountered, and contributes to the explanation of the outcome of the campaign.

7.1. The “Katō-Kanji Network” at the Central Level

Literature about the lobbying process for Japanese emigration to Manchuria often uses the term “Katō group” for the two bureaucrats and two academics who supported Katō Kanji in his promotional activities (e.g., Manshikai 1965: 182), although more politicians were closely associated with this group. What most of the group members had in common was the place and time of their university education.

Katō Kanji graduated from the Faculty of Agriculture of Tokyo Imperial University in 1911, together with his fellow student and friend Nasu Hiroshi, who in 1923 became professor at this very faculty.

Kodaira Gon’ichi, who in 1932 became the head of the newly created Economic Revitalization Section in the Ministry for Agriculture and Forestry and also served as the vice-minister in this ministry from 1938 to 1939, had graduated from the Faculty of Agriculture of Tokyo Imperial University in 1910 one year before Katō and Nasu.

Arima Yoriyasu, who was the Minister for Agriculture and Forestry in 1937 when the Village-Division Campaign was developed at the grassroots level and communicated to the ministry, was a fellow student of Kodaira and had taught at the Faculty of Agriculture of Tokyo Imperial University for a short time after his graduation in 1910.

Hashimoto Denzaemon, the second academic in the Katō group, was professor for agricultural studies at Kyoto Imperial University. He had been a fellow student of Kodaira and Arima.

Kodaira’s mentor in the Ministry was Ishiguro Tada’atsu, who had graduated from the Faculty of Law of Tokyo Imperial University. An advocate of agrarianism, he became Vice-Minister in 1932 when the Rural Revitalization Campaign was organized. Ishiguro and his protégé Kodaira are usually named as the two core members of the Katō-group in the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. Another one of Kodaira’s
friends and fellow students, Gotō Fumio, made a career in politics and served in turn as Minister of Agriculture, Home Minister and acting Prime Minister.

The connections between these people is one of the constituent factors of a network in which Kato Kanji connected bureaucrats of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry and professors of agricultural studies at two Imperial universities as shown in Figure 5.

**Figure 5. The Katō-Kanji-Network**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Academics</th>
<th>Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ishiguro Tada’atsu (Tokyo University Graduate in Law)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mentor of</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hashimoto Den-zaemon (Professor at Kyoto University)</td>
<td>Kodaira Gon’ichi Arima Yoriyasu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tokyo University Graduates in Agriculture 1910</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nasu Hiroshi (Professor at Tokyo University)</td>
<td>Katō Kanji</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tokyo University Graduates in Agriculture 1911</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The significance of these personal connections and the network resulting from a common university background is hardly ever mentioned and widely underestimated. Young argues that the two figures which are often portrayed as the main spokesmen for Manchuria emigration, Tōmiya Kaneo on the Manchurian side and Katō Kanji on the Japanese side, are usually depicted “in colonization propaganda as government ‘outsiders’ – spokesmen for the popular groundswell of interest in the settlement of the Manchurian frontier” (Young 1998a: 386). It is true that Katō Kanji technically speaking had no government affiliation, but through his personal network of former fellow students he had direct access to people who were at the relevant places in the ministerial bureaucracy for the decision-making in favour of his ideas. Although the promotion of mass migration and the financing of such an endeavour was not possible without the participation of the government bureaucracy as a whole, it is impor-
tant to note that the people in Katō’s network played a decisive role in setting this government machinery in motion.

Young argues that the relative success of the campaign for emigration to Manchuria compared to earlier government programmes and in respect of sheer numbers in the end was due to the role of the state which took over the movement for village-division and turned it into a gigantic migration machine. In this context, she also asks “Who mobilized the state to begin with?” She attributes this mobilization to a general support of an agrarianist movement which promised to solve the economic problems of the countryside, without going too much into the details of the process by which the local activism of those who tried to tackle the economic problems in their villages was carried over into a nationwide campaign brought on the agenda of the central decision making agencies by people who were sympathetic to agrarianist ideas because of their common background with one it their main promoters (Young 1998a: 322).

It is not well known that members of the Katō network were not the only people planning Japanese settlements in Manchuria in the early years of the existence of Manshūkoku. A group of architects and city planners around Uchida Yoshikazu, an academic from the Faculty of Architecture of Tokyo Imperial University, who became university president in 1943, had in cooperation with the Kantō Army presented plans for large Japanese rural settlements in Manchuria as early as April 1933. In contrast to the city planners’ utopian vision of 100,000 rural immigrants, only a few hundred Japanese settlers moved to Manchuria in the first years of the emigration trial phase, so the plans for the settlements were shelved, and the architects around Uchida continued their work in the sector of urban planning and construction in Manshūkoku (Tucker 2005). If a common cause or a goal had been the decisive factor, an early cooperation between Uchida and the architects in Manshūkoku and the agronationalists around Katō would have been a logical consequence. However, there seems to have been no connection between these two groups. Uchida was well connected to the City Planning Section in the Home Ministry established by Gotō Shinpei. He and some of the architects who helped with the utopian settlement plans of 1933 had been employed by Gotō in the reconstruction of Tokyo City after the devastating earthquake of 1923 (Sorensen 2002).

For the proponents of agrarianism, however, city planning and urbanization was irrelevant if not dangerous. Whereas professional city planners around Gotō Shinpei
were working towards a modernization of everyday life in urban terms with gas, electricity, clean water, hygienic sewage systems, public transport, etc., the ideal life for Katō Kanji and his followers was the simple life of a peasant without the pitfalls and environmental as well as spiritual pollution of the city. The fact that people like Uchida and his collaborators who had at some point been interested in the promotion of mass migration to Manchuria did not belong to the Katō network demonstrates the importance of the common ideological background and especially the personal connections in this network.

7.2. The “Katō-Kanji Network” in the Villages

Despite all his personal connections, especially in the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, Katō Kanji would not have been as successful as he was in the implementation of his ideas for settlements based on agrarianist principles in Manchuria without his large following of active young men from rural backgrounds. They mostly came into contact with the ideas of agrarianism in one of his training centres, first in Tomobe and later in Uchihara, or because they had joined other activities in connection to the promotion of migration to Manchuria. In most cases where the village-division plans were drafted in the early phase of the promotion of mass migration and were implemented with at least some success, it was as a result of these followers of Katō Kanji and their grassroots activities. At a stage when the Village-Division Campaign was still propelled by grassroots enthusiasm in January 1939, the Association for Rural Revitalization in Tokyo hosted a meeting where some members of the Katō network from the central level met with the network members from the grassroots level to discuss the progress and the problems of the Village-Division Campaign.

The minutes of this meeting are contained in a book called Shinnoson no kensetsu: Tairiku e bunson daiidō (The establishment of new villages: The great movement of divided villages to the continent) published by the Asahi Newspaper Company (Asahi shinbunsha). It was geared towards the general public at the height of the promotion effort for village-division in the media. In its foreword, Ishiguro Tada’atsu, at that time the president of the Association for Village Revitalization, gave an outline of the Village-Division Campaign, stressing the fact that it was not just an economic necessity but also a spiritual movement (Asahi shinbunsha 1939: 38).

In addition to an appendix of statistical data, this book contains two parts. One is the more-or-less edited record of what participants in the January 1939 round-table dis-
cussion said. The other part contains reports from seven communities implementing village-division, mostly written by representatives of the Association for Village Revitalization or the National Association for the Industrial Cooperatives. Although the choice of villages and their representatives looks as if a certain geographical distribution was intended, villages were certainly also chosen for their eager participation in the Village-Division Campaign. All seven villages were among the top dozen communities in term of implementation of village-division plans (cf. Table 15): Nangō (Miyagi Prefecture), Yamato (Yamagata Prefecture), Ōhinata (Nagano Prefecture), Nakagawa (Saitama Prefecture), Najimi (Ishikawa Prefecture), Kurikuma (Kagawa Prefecture), and Yomikaki (Nagano Prefecture).

Representatives from six of these seven villages discussed with some of the opinion leaders in the promotion of mass migration to Manchuria, among them Katō Kanji and Ishiguro Tada’atsu. The agrarian economist Sugino Tadao attended the discussion in his function as director of the Association for Village Revitalization. Matsukawa Gorō represented the Association for Emigration to Manchuria. Many more functionaries from the Association for Rural Revitalization, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, the Colonial Ministry, the Association for Emigration to Manchuria, the Mantaku, the Central Committee of the Industrial Cooperatives (Sangyō kumiai chūōkai), the Imperial Agricultural Association, the Gratitude for Mitsui Association (Mitsui hōonkai), and the National Youth League were also present.

A substantial part of the minutes contains reports by the village-level experts invited to talk about the state of the campaign in their communities. The contributions of these grassroots members of the Katō-kanji-network show the role and the impact of the personal factor in the implementation of the Village-Division Campaign in those localities where it was initiated by local activists.

The village of Nangō was represented by Minakawa Nananosuke, the most active supporter of the resettlement plans of Nangō, who had come into contact with the migration movement when his nephew left for Manchuria after a meeting with Tōmiya Kaneo arranged by Matsukawa Gorō. Although Matsukawa technically represented the Association for Emigration to Manchuria at the meeting, he still spoke about his personal history of fighting for emigration from Nangō before internal conflicts in the village forced him to move to Tokyo. His close connection to Katō Kanji, whom he first met in 1934, and his continuing involvement in the organization of mass migra-
tion, secured the activist from Nangō a place in the inner circle of the village-division campaigners, despite the fact that no real village division was taking place in Nangō. The school Matsukawa had founded in Nangō became one of the two prefectural training centres for emigrants in Miyagi (Manshū kaitakushi 1966: 202). But the new head of the school, Maeda Katsumi, detected a general mood in the village not in favour of emigration, so he left the propaganda for it to Minakawa (Abiko 1988: 348).

The propaganda on the national scale, however, still featured Nangō as a successful case of village-division as late as January 1940, even calling it Japan’s “first divided village” in an article in *le no hikari*. The article contained a picture of the new local hero Minakawa, and praised Matsukawa’s contribution to the migration movement of Nangō without mentioning any conflict in the village (Manshū 1940).

Ōhinata was represented by its mayor Asakawa Takemaro. At that point in time Ōhinata had already risen to national prominence and was about to be turned into the model village for the whole campaign. A long article in *le no hikari* in December 1937 had recounted the history of the economic problems of the village and the development of the village-division scheme. With its predominantly rural readership *le no hikari* was an ideal medium to educate villagers about the details of emigration to Manchuria and also to propagate this move as the proper solution for the readers’ economic problems. The article explained in detail how the migrants debts were taken care of in Ōhinata and how the village made sure that family members temporarily left behind by the settlers were looked after. Asakawa Takemaro and Horikawa Kiyomi were portrayed as local heroes. After studying among other things the “land problem” at Waseda University, Asakawa sacrificed himself in taking on the mayor’s job in Ōhinata under nearly hopeless circumstances. Horikawa was praised for his long-term involvement in the village community. The article even contained a photograph of the two activists posing together with Hatakeyama Shigesama, the vice-mayor and head of the industrial cooperative who explained the economic situation to the article’s author (Kokusaku 1937: 66-69).

Although not as prominent as the activists from Ōhinata, the representative of Yamato Village, Togashi Naōtaro, was also an undisputed member of the inner circle of local activists connected to Katō Kanji. Due to his involvement in the development of the Shōnai-type-migration campaign in Yamagata, he was for instance invited for a round-table discussion in the prefectural training centre in Kaminoyama City on 8 April 1938, the text of which was later published in *le no hikari*. It praised the success
of the migration movement in Yamagata, especially compared to neighbouring Akita Prefecture. The representative of Akita at the round-table discussion recounted the lack of enthusiasm and understanding for the migration movement, whereas Nishigaki Kiyoji, the head of the school in Kaminoyama hosting the event, stressed the importance of educating the people about the migration campaign through the media. The outline of the campaign in Yamagata was explained by representatives from the prefectural office, whereas Togashi served as the prime example of somebody who promoted migration at the grassroots level against great odds. Even his mother Hatsue was invited to the round-table discussion to talk about the experience she gained while working in the education of continental brides. Local activists like Togashi Naotarō and his mother thus added the human touch to the media propaganda. Just like Asakawa and Horikawa they were promoted as local heroes and leaders to follow (Hakunetsu 1938: 44-52).

The village of Kurikuma was represented by its mayor, Kumatani Sada’ichi. Not as nationally prominent as Ōhinata or Yamato, the village of Kurikuma in Kagawa Prefecture was nevertheless an early and active participant in the Village-Division Campaign. The way the village got into contact with the idea of mass migration by village-division is somewhat typical for participating communities that joined the movement in its early phase. Kurikuma had a group of activists who in 1932 formed a Union of Mainstays (chūken renmei) in the village to organize and implement the Rural Revitalization Campaign in Kurikuma. Although the village worked along the requirements of the campaign and applied for the status of a special assistance village in 1936 – which was granted in 1937 with a special subsidy of 54,255 yen for the next two years – the campaign did not have the desired effects on the economic situation of the poor households. The field size of those households did not increase markedly, nor could they drastically reduce their debts (Asahi shinbunsha 1939: 420-433).

The decision for village-division in the village was inspired by the experiences of Miyoshi Takeo. He was the leader of group of young employees of the village office striving for reform in the village, the so-called sōnendan (Young Men's Group). In May 1936 he participated in an inspection tour to Japanese settlements in Manshūkoku organized and sponsored by the Association for Emigration to Manchuria. In September 1937 the village had set up its first village-division plan which was then modified twice, until the final plan in October 1938 called for the out-migration of 300 households over the course of the next five years. During the planning phase
two village functionaries went on another inspection tour to Manchuria in September 1938, three officials made a trip to Ōhinata in November 1938, and in December 1938 Miyoshi Takeo who was entrusted with the leadership of the village migrants’ group made another preparatory trip to the continent (Nakano 1983: 29-36).

Just as in the other cases where the village-division was organized and implement early, the out-migration started relatively well. The 1939-survey listed 58 resettled households from Kurikuma (cf. Table 15). When the resettlement was completed the Kurikuma emigrant group consisted of 178 households or 703 persons; at the end of World War II it had shrunk to 146 households with 697 people. A large percentage of these people, however, were not originally from Kurikuma, but from neighbouring communities, as had already been 17 of the 32 members of the first advance group (Nakano 1983: 36).

Although the data from the village show that Kurikuma had good reasons to strive to revitalize its economy, the village was relatively well off in terms of its income and debt situation compared to the rest of Kagawa Prefecture. There had been no significant tenant protests in the community. Thus the decisive factor for the comparatively swift and early implementation of village-division in Kurikuma was the activism of local leaders.

Nakano argues that these were for the most part the village establishment itself (Nakano 1983: 39-40). What he fails to mention is that in the early 1930s the political situation in Kurikuma was somewhat similar to the one in Ōhinata. When the old mayor could not handle the financial situation in the village any more in 1932, Kurikuma took over as mayor, but first encountered the opposition of the village assemble and the old village elite. Together with the head of the local elementary school and Miyoshi Takeo, he founded a group of young activists striving for change in the village (Asahi shinbunsha 1939: 84-86). These young activists first promoted the village’s participation in the Rural Revitalization Campaign and then in the Village-Division Campaign, making Kurikuma another example for the importance of village politics and a rising new elite of young activists for the development of the Village-Division Campaign.

Just like Kurikuma, the village of Najimi sent its mayor, Sato Hyōemon, to the round-table discussion. From the adjacent report in the Asahi shinbunsha publication, we know that the community suffered from the same problems as the other villages dis-
discussed at this meeting, i.e. a lack of arable land, and financial difficulties. A special feature of Najimi, however, was its heavy reliance on income from migrant labour. According to the survey, more than 80% of the village households gained a substantial proportion of their income by sending out young men to do seasonal labour over the winter from August to May. The average income in the village was far lower than the prefectural and national average, and the quality of rice produced in the village quite low. The adverse economic situation in the village even affected the health of the population: an examination of all elementary school children of the village in 1935 revealed that 50% were undernourished. Mayor Sato complained about health problems among the labour migrants who often came back from their seasonal jobs with severe illnesses.

Although Najimi decided rather late to join the Rural Revitalization Campaign in 1935, it quickly moved from the planning of local rationalization and improvement in agriculture to the planning of a village-division. This decision again was mostly connected to personal encounters and the enthusiasm of village activists. In the winter of 1936 Sato, then newly appointed as mayor, encountered a certain Matsubara in the prefectural office. Matsubara was originally from Najimi and had just returned from Manchuria where he had served in the army. Due to Matsubara’s enthusiasm for migration to Manchuria, Sato took an interest in the matter, attended seminars about the topic in the prefectural office in the summer of 1937, and started a campaign for village-division in his community. Together with some other local activists from the production cooperative and the elementary school, he set up a plan for the out-migration of 308 households from Najimi and three neighbouring villages over the course of the next ten years. With 34 resettled households in 1939 the village reached the top-dozen group with an implementation rate of 11% (cf. Table 15). Not an especially prominent case, Najimi was nevertheless a community which participated in the Village-Division Campaign due to the activism of its local village mainstays and was fast enough in its implementation to be included in the discussion at the Association for Village Revitalization (Asahi shinbunsha 1939: 134-140, 376-410).

This does not apply for the village of Kamisone in Yamanashi Prefecture. The roster of participants in the January 1939 round-table discussion lists a representative from this village. The minutes of the discussion, however, do not mention any contribution by him. Neither does the Asahi shinbunsha publication contain a report about the village, unlike all the other villages represented. Since the September 1939 survey of
actual resettlement under the Village-Division Scheme still only lists 10 resettled households of a quota of 150, the representative of Kamisone was probably not present to report on the progress in his village but to gather information from communities that were further ahead in the implementation of their village-division plans (Asahi shinbunsha 1939: 39-40).

The village of Yomikaki was represented by Matsuse Shigeri, who according to his own statement was not a village mainstay but was sent to the meeting because he had been working for the village office for the last 22 years. In his report he portrayed the village as the typical case of a community that did not live off agriculture alone and was struggling to cope with rising debts and the drop in the prices for silk cocoons, which were a major village sideline industry. Also typical for a village that joined the Village-Division Campaign in its early stage is the local activism which led to the participation in the Rural Revitalization Campaign of Yomikaki in 1933. Despite the fact that the Revitalization Campaign was taken very seriously in the village and supported by additional funds from the prefectural office in Nagano in September 1936, the economic situation of Yomikaki did not improve. Matsuse put this down to a constant rise in village population that was now to be remedied by out-migration from the village and some neighbouring communities also interested in Manchuria migration (Asahi shinbunsha 1939: 152-155).

The plans for the village-division of Yomikaki were drafted in the spring of 1938 and seem to have been closely connected to the upgrading of the community to a Special Assistance Village of the Rural Rehabilitation Campaign on 13 February 1938. A plan for the out-migration of 100 households was decided the same day by the local Association for Rural Revitalization. Two months later a meeting was held in the village office of Yomikaki with functionaries from the village and four neighbouring villages to discuss the formation of migrants groups from these communities. In May a plan for the out-migration of 200 households was decided, and a committee in charge of settler recruitment was formed. Despite some problems in the coordination of the advance group, volunteers who were eager to go were sent to settlers’ training and were sent off to Manchuria in a ceremony on 23 June 1938 (Takahashi 1997: 195-200).

According to the village representative at the January 1939 discussion, the leader of the settler group, Matsubara Senju, president of the local Industrial Cooperation and
vice-president of the Agricultural Association, spontaneously decided to emigrate and head the village’s settlers group after spending three days at one of Katō Kanji’s training centres. Matsubara was an unlikely candidate for emigration. He was among the five “capitalists” of the village and thus had no reason to leave, especially since he had to look after an 80-year old mother and had three sons who were already in the service of the empire, one in the army, one in the navy and one as a Young Pioneer. His encounter with Katō’s ideas must have left a deep impression with Matsubara (Asahi shinbunsha 1939: 160).

Last, the village of Nakagawa is represented in the publication about the establishment of the new villages on the continent, but no participant is listed on the roster of the January 1939 round-table discussion. The village of Nakagawa is situated in Saitama Prefecture, which was not on the forefront of the promotion of migration to Manchuria and had a governor who was not especially enthusiastic about sending settlers from his prefecture. Since, however, two local activists promoted village-division in Nakagawa, the community drafted migrations plans as early as October 1937. One of these activists was a young man named Kurita Masa’ichi who underwent training at Tomobe to become a Manchuria settler. He was supported by Horiguchi Tatsusaburō, the leader of the local Reservist Association. Nakagawa village had been taking part in the Rural Rehabilitation Campaign since 1933 and was upgraded to become a Special Assistance Village in 1937. Probably the participation in the mass migration scheme was already proposed in the process of this upgrade, although no documentation of the decision-making process exists. The attitude of the village office towards the promotion of migration, however, is said to have been passive, until the activism of Kurita and Horiguchi convinced the mayor to initiate the drafting of migration plans for the village (Yamakawa 1995: 33-35).

A common characteristic of the communities which decided early in the formation of the Village-Division Campaign to participate was the presence of local activists who were followers of Katō Kanji’s ideas and contributed decisively to the process of implementation of out-migration schemes from their respective villages. Examples for this pattern can also be found in other communities that participated in an early stage of the campaign and were for whichever reason not portrayed in the Asahi shinbunsha publication or represented at discussion meetings. A case in point is the village of Fujimi, which was number seven in terms of village-division plan fulfilment according to the September 1939 survey of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry cited
above (cf. Table 15). In this typical case of a Nagano Prefecture village with little farmland living of sericulture and labour migration, it was two students from Katō Kanji’s agricultural training centre in Tomobe, Kobayashi Tomomitsu and Hosokawa Mitsusada, whose enthusiasm led to the community’s participation in the Village-Division Campaign (Naganoken kaitaku – kakudanhen 1984: 169).

While the members of the Katō-Kanji network at the central level mobilized the state to support the mass migration movement, the members of the Katō-Kanji network at the village level mobilized their respective communities to implement the mass migration by drafting out-migration schemes for their villages to contribute their share to the final goal of the “Millions to Manchuria Plan”.

It was undisputedly necessary to have the administrative framework for implementing the mass migration plans, but the institutional structure alone cannot explain the evolution and the making of the Village-Division Campaign. This campaign evolved in a network of personal connections and was turned from a movement carried mainly by local enthusiasts and their supporters at the central level into a government-sponsored and orchestrated campaign which forced local administrators previously unconnected to Katō Kanji and his ideas to contribute participants to settler groups for the sake of quota fulfilment. When the natural reservoir of volunteers for migration to Manchuria dried up in the 1940s, the ministerial bureaucracy as well as the prefectoral offices took over the recruitment of communities for emigration schemes. Katō Kanji concentrated on the recruitment of members for his Young Pioneers which were filling the quotas of the “Millions to Manchuria Plan” in the 1940s. The Village-Division Campaign had many elements of a grassroots movement when it first evolved in 1937 and turned into well-organized campaign with government support until 1939, because during these few years it was propelled by the personal enthusiasm and the connections among the activists involved. When it turned into a mere government campaign with the main goal of quota fulfilment, the enthusiasm of local activists was turned into a subject for media propaganda which was used as moral suasion to persuade communities and villagers to emigrate to Manchuria.

7.3. Local Activists portrayed as Local Heroes

The prime example of local activists portrayed as local heroes can be found in the promotion of the village of Ōhinata as the national model for village-division. The writer Wada Tsutō was a member of the rural literature movement (nōmin bungaku
undō), which just like the proponents of agrarianism followed anti-urban concepts in favour of a rural utopia. Together with Arima Yoriyasu, who was Minister of Agriculture and Forestry in 1938/39, he founded an organization for the promotion of rural literature, the Discussion Forum for Rural Literature (Nōmin bungaku konwakai) in 1938. Arima was a fellow student of Katō Kanji and a main supporter of the mass migration plans in the Ministry. Through his Discussion Forum for Rural Literature, Arima spurred Wada to study the village of Ōhinata, where Wada spent some time collecting information about the village-division in this community. The organization even paid him a one-month visit in the settlement of Ōhinata in Manchuria, although the settlement was not featured in Wada’s novel about the emigration process in the village.

The documentary novel about the decision progress leading to the sending off of the first advance group from Ōhinata was first published in June 1939 by the Asahi newspaper company and again in 1941 in the company’s “Colonial Literature Series” (Young 1998a: 389). The story of Ōhinata was turned into a play as well in 1939, and at the end of that year a crew led by Toyota Shirō from the Tōhō film studios came to the village to make a film about the village-division of Ōhinata. This film, Ōhinatamura (The village of Ōhinata), was released in 1940 and was subsequently shown in villages all over the country (Asada 1978: 37-38; Shimizu 1994: 64). Since the novel by Wada served as the starting point of the media exploitation of Ōhinata and its activists for the promotion of mass migration, the text of the novel has been translated (see the Appendix) and will be analysed for its contribution to the making of the Village-Division Campaign and the image of the local activist promoted.

The novel begins with the description of the severe economic crisis in Ōhinata before the village started its migration scheme. The reader accompanies the old mayor Yui Keinosuke on his round in the village trying to collect outstanding taxes. He encounters Horikawa Kiyomi, and the two discuss the problem of the exploitation of the village forest by the rising numbers of charcoal makers in the village. The situation is presented as a deadlock. There seems to be no way out of the desperate financial and economic situation of the village. Thus mayor Yui decides to step down from his post and bring back Asakawa Takemaro from Tokyo to become the new village mayor. The relationship between Horikawa and Asakawa is described as a very personal one – the older Horikawa looked after Asakawa as a teenager when Asakawa
was a child – the actual meeting between the old and the soon to be new mayor in Tokyo is not discussed in detail.

The take-over of the responsibility for the village politics in the novel is described as a voluntary internal affair which took place without interference from the prefectural level and as a transfer of power in mutual accordance. In fact, the idea to ask Asakawa to take over as mayor is presented as originating with the old mayor Yui (Wada 1964: 115-130). Thus Wada leaves out all the aspects that made the transfer of the village headship of Ōhinata to Asakawa Takemaro special and were the prerequisite of the preferential treatment of the village in the course of the Village-Division Campaign. The embezzlement scandal which led to the demise of the old mayor as well as the heavy interference by the prefectural office in the aftermath are not even mentioned in the novel. There the old mayor resigns because he cannot cope with the economic crisis any more and entrusts the solution of the village problems to a young visionary. It is harmony instead of conflict, no outside interference is necessary for the solution of the village problems.

The text of the novel alternates between dialogues that the writer invented as a literary element, and passages that explain the economic problems of the village and the migration policy of Nagano Prefecture in a non-fiction style. The data is taken from the material about the village-division of Ōhinata that was going on at the time of writing. It contains the rationale for out-migration given in the explanation of the Village-Division Campaign, i.e., the scarcity of farmland and rural overpopulation. The problem of the unequal distribution of farmland, however, and the class structure in the village, are not mentioned. Although the old mayor Yui is shortly introduced as a landlord, and the family of the new mayor Asakawa is described as one of the land-holding families that lost their wealth through the establishment of too many branch families, the real culprits for the poverty in the village are the merciless natural conditions and the rise in population.

The only person portrayed in negative terms is the local capitalist, the owner of a large part of forest selling the right to cut wood in his forest to the poor charcoal makers through questionable transactions. This is clearly a reference to the company Yoshihon Ltd. in Ōhinata and its dominance in charcoal production in the village (describe in chapter 3.2. of this study). The novel mentions the activities of the local capitalist only in passing. The owner of the large private forest and the local sawmill
does not even show up when the whole village sends off its first pioneers going to Manchuria (Wada 1964: 158).

This portrayal of rural society with no conflict within the farming population and capitalism as the real enemy corresponds to the basic convictions of agrarianism, which regarded farming as the basis for a self-sufficient life and developments connected to urbanization and industrialization as dangerous distractions on the way to the ideal society.

The novel’s solution to the problems is also found in accordance with agrarianist concepts. In his quest for measures to improve the economic situation of Ōhinata, the new mayor goes back to old documents describing the situation in the village in the late nineteenth century. His answer to the current problems of his community is to reduce the village population to the level of the past when resources were sufficient for all residents (Wada 1964: 136). Thus just like the advocates of agrarianism he finds the solution to the current problems in restoring a past, presumably “ideal”, situation. To lower the population, the mayor then contemplates out-migration from the village. He has already heard about out-migration from the village of Nangō and the county of Shōnai.

Here again, the text of the novel changes reality slightly to make its point. The migration plans of Nangō and Shōnai are not explained in the text, but just introduced as two earlier attempts at a larger migration endeavour. The text does not mention that both forms of migration (as they were later categorized) actually resulted from the failure of the activists in these communities to muster enough support and volunteers to realize their original ideas. Whereas the developments in Nangō happened early enough for the real Asakawa to have been aware of them when he started the discussions for out-migration in Ōhinata in spring 1937, the events in the Shōnai region was more or less parallel to those in Ōhinata. What was later regarded as a specific organizational form for recruiting migrants was the outcome of events in spring and summer 1937, and just like in Nangō actually the result of the failure of one village to mobilize enough migration volunteers by itself. For the sake of propaganda, however, Wada portrays the two other forms of migration to Manchuria as the forerunners, the stepping-stones for the new and ideal form of out-migration by village-division as in the case of Ōhinata. This form, the novel claims, was invented by Asakawa and then carried through with the support of the whole village and some help from the prefec-
tical office (Wada 1964: 134-136). In an ideally autarchic fashion corresponding to the agrarianist idea of self-reliant communities, the local activist found the solution for the problems of his village by himself. The (in reality heavy) interference from the prefectural office and the financial incentives provided by Ōhinata’s status as a Special Assistance Village in the Rural Revitalization Campaign, as well as the fact that the prefectural office of Nagano was looking for a community to test village-division before Ōhinata even contemplated out-migration, are not mentioned in the novel.

The decisive moment for the village-division of Ōhinata in the novel is a meeting of the so-called four pillar institutions – village office, school, industrial cooperative and agricultural association – which also in reality took also place on 1 February 1937. In the novel this meeting is dominated by young people who came to the meeting not as representatives of the above-mentioned institutions, but because they were looking for solutions to their economic problems. At the beginning of the novel the passivity and ignorance of the rural populace about the possibility to migrate to Manchuria is named as one of the obstacles for the improvement of the situation (Wada 1964: 133). The two activists, Asakawa and Horikawa, are portrayed as the ideal team for this promotion activity: Asakawa acts as the eloquent mastermind of the plan and mediator between the village and the prefectural office supporting the plan, and Horikawa plays the part of the practical activist respected by all the villagers. At the meeting, these two succeed in spreading their enthusiasm for an out-migration plan from Ōhinata especially among the young people. Only a few members of the village assembly, presumably older functionaries, silently disappear from the scene at the end of the meeting. The meeting answers all the questions about the effects of a migration plan the villagers had at this early stage. No open opposition is mentioned in the novel. Those who somehow disagreed or were not really enthusiastic about the new plan vanish in the background without spoiling the generally positive and harmonious atmosphere (Wada 1964: 136-140).

The next chapter of the novel depicts the meeting on 21 March 1937 which produced the pledge of 33 members of the local Council for Economic Revitalization to actively promote the village migration plans and to resettle themselves if necessary. The novel reprints the pledge as well as the list of signatures, but the interesting part is the lively discussion Wada describes. Although his novel is based on interviews and fact-finding missions, its authenticity cannot be verified in all points as has been shown above. Thus the description of the decision making and implementation proc-
ness as depicted in the novel is not so much a record of the actual events, but rather a stylized portrayal of the ideal that other villages should strive for when they tried to imitate the success of the Village-Division Campaign of Ōhinata. In this ideal description all the problems and obstacles for the village-division are mentioned, e.g., the regulation of debts, the duty to look after family members, and the problem of people urging others to emigrate without considering emigration themselves. However, contrary to reality, in the novel these problems can all be solved by the common effort of all villagers. The novel does not offer a detailed description of the mechanism for debt regulation or an in-depth discussion of the problem of which part of the village population should go and which part should stay. Whereas the novel includes these problems and encourages the reader to think about all aspects that must be clarified in the process of a village-division, the solution offered is less than satisfactory, since it all comes down to the communal effort and the unwavering conviction of the young enthusiastic activist to overcome all obstacles (Wada 1964:146-154).

The departure of the advance group and the further preparation for resettlement are treated less like a technical occurrence but rather like an emotional human-interest story. The whole village, and especially the school children representing the future, enthusiastically praise the first settlers from the village; their families are treated like the families with sons in the army. The migration movement is thus compared to other activities carried out for the sake of the empire (Wada 1964: 160). Although Wada visited the settlement of Ōhinata village in Manchuria, his novel is written from the perspective of someone watching the events in Japan, i.e., the perspective of his readers. Thus the founding of the settlement is reported at a ceremony on 11 February 1938 in Ōhinata’s elementary school. The progress in the settlement is described through the reprint of the settlers’ reports sent back to Ōhinata in Japan. Through these reports that (according to the novel) were distributed as copies in the village, the people in Ōhinata learned about the rapid progress in the settlement on the continent. Again, only minor problems seem to exist for the brave settlers to overcome.

In their reports, the settlers also refer to the 3,000 Manchurian and 1,000 Korean peasants that live in the settlement area. Technically these people fell under the jurisdiction of the settlement headquarters that was built in the centre of all the hamlets in the settlement area (Wada 1993: 9). The text of the novel freely admits that the 4,000 original inhabitants of the settlement area are employed as tenants in accordance with the Manchurian Development Company, and that they come in handy in
the construction of the new settlement and all the work that was necessary in the agricultural sector (Wada 1964: 164-165). This proves that whoever wanted to know it even before 1945 could have been clearly aware of the settlers’ reality in Manchuria taking away farmland from the original population, using them as tenants landlord-style.

Another reality is not mentioned in the novel, which gives the impression that the settlers constructed their new village from scratch: Although it is true that most of the construction work of private houses as well as public facilities like an elementary school, a headquarters building, a small hospital as well as agricultural facilities for the production of *miso*\(^{23}\) or the milling of grain was carried out by the settlers and their indigenous labour force, the first settlers occupied houses that were forcefully bought from the Chinese peasants that live in the area before (Naganoken 1984 – kakudanhen: 162).

Wada’s novel ends with the send-off of the first family members in the summer of 1938. The willingness of these people to resettle permanently is symbolized by their effort to take all their household belongings and every item connected to the ancestors with them (Wada 1964: 167-171). Again the emphasis is on the emotional side and the bright hopes for the future. Whereas all descriptions of the past are connected to shadow and despair, events connected with the emigration to Manchuria take place in the sunlight with music and laughing children symbolizing the bright future.

The young activists, and especially the two protagonists of the Village-Division Campaign Asakawa and Horikawa, are portrayed as local heroes throughout. They qualify for their leading roles in the community through their personal qualities. In the text they are the real makers of the village-division of Ōhinata. No outside interference is needed. The role of the prefectural governor and prefectural office is some discrete support when the community itself had sorted out its problems and decided to follow its local activists. Government plans or the problem of quota fulfilment are not mentioned. The new mayor arrives at the necessary number of out-migrating households by looking into the history of the village, not by following standards set by the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry.

\(^{23}\) Soybean paste
Although the problem of recruiting volunteers for resettlement from all layers of village society, and the necessity to not only administer the out-migration but also the reconstruction of the village economy in Japan are mentioned, the novel does not follow up on the effects of the out-migration. The novel ends where in real life the problems for most villages that participated in the Village-Division Campaign merely started. When the enthusiastic part of the village population left the community in the advance groups and brought their family members to the new settlements, most villages ran out of volunteers needed to fulfil the ambitious migration quotas. Though it was meant to inspire the rural populace to look for role models like Asakawa and Horikawa and to develop their own migration schemes, the novel did not really answer the questions of communities asked by their prefectural offices to produce volunteers for migration but which had no local activists or role models to begin with.

The real village of Ōhinata was also used for the education of other Japanese communities contemplating village-division. After a representative of the village at the National Assembly of Agricultural Technicians gave a speech about the village-division process in Ōhinata in June 1938, he received requests for more information material from all over Japan (Yamada 1978: 341). The most prominent villager of Ōhinata, Horikawa Kiyomi, even turned into the national role model for local activists. The man himself was called back to Japan at the beginning of 1940 for a promotion tour for Manchuria migration from 21 January until 19 February 1940 throughout Nagano Prefecture. The actor portraying Horikawa in the movie met with the real person to study the character he was playing (Murakami 1940). However, when the movie was released, enthusiasm for migration to Manchuria had cooled, and most villages that had decided to participate in the Village-Division Campaign at the height of the campaign in 1938 or early 1939 had difficulties to push their original plans through. The general mood had changed with the progress of the war and the shortage of labour in the countryside resulting from the draft. The presentation of local heroes on the screen, on stage or even live could not persuade enough people to emigrate to Manchuria to keep the mass migration scheme running (Asada 1978: 38).
8. Conclusion

One of the main arguments of promoters of mass migration to Manchuria from the impoverished Japanese countryside in the 1930s and early 1940s was the inevitability of such a move. It is noteworthy that until a few years before the founding of Manshūkoku the resettlement of Japanese peasants on the continent was regarded as a hopeless endeavour, because the living standard of Chinese peasants and prices for agricultural products in the region were so low that Japanese peasants were not seen fit to compete in that market. As late as 1928, Yamamoto Jōtarō, president of the South Manchurian Railway Company, advised against bringing larger numbers of Japanese farmers to Manchuria. Up to 1931, the most influential magazine for the rural region, *Ie no hikari*, recommended emigration to Brazil. Even Nasu Hiroshi, who later became the most active proponent for Japanese emigration to Manchuria in academic circles, doubted in 1927 that mass migration to Manchuria could remedy the problem of the presumed overpopulation in Japan (Wilson 1995: 256, 259).

With the expansion of Japanese dominance in Manchuria, the mood changed. Different interest groups came together at the beginning of the 1930s and started advocating the creation of Japanese settlement in Manshūkoku. The Kantō Army, the military power in the region, saw these settlements as a way to spread Japanese influence over wider areas of the vast Manchurian countryside, as a reservoir for future soldiers, and as a source of food for the army. The influence of these local military advocates of Japanese immigration into the region can be seen especially in the test phase from 1932 to 1936, when the majority of settlers were reservists sent to Manchuria with the proverbial hoe in one hand and a rifle in the other. Emigration was often seen as a service for the empire, just like service in the army. In the beginning of the migration movement, settlers were therefore immune from military conscription. However, this promise was null and void in the last phase of World War II when nearly all male settlers between 18 and 45 years of age were drafted into the army (Young 1998a: 354, 408).

The counterparts of those in Manchuria wanting to pull settlers to the continent were forces in Japan that were looking for a solution to the economic problems of the countryside. The general conviction among scholars of agriculture was that in Japan’s rural areas too many people were competing for too few resources. In many
villages this led to a high percentage of labour migrants, i.e., mostly young people moving temporarily to other localities to work in the industry. Besides this seasonal migration, emigration to another country in search of a job was a classical solution to the problem and had been practised in Japan since the country opened up to the outside world after the Meiji Restoration of 1868. This population movement was an important factor for the economic development of Japan and was often aided by government support in form of contracts between the Japanese government and the government that received the immigrants, as well as by a number of associations and agencies helping and counselling the individuals aspiring to resettle abroad.

Thus the idea to advise those wanting to leave their home areas in Japan to emigrate to Manchuria was nothing spectacularly new. Different public figures had proposed such a move, but the idea to send over large amounts of settlers organized in groups was mostly the brainchild of Katō Kanji. His motivation for the occupation with Manchuria was the search for room to realize an ideal agrarian society. First Katō had tried to realize his vision in agricultural training centres where young people from the countryside should learn to lead a self-sufficient life as peasants not afflicted by the ills of modern urban society. However, the realization of such a life “rooted in agriculture” – the literal translation of the Japanese name nōhonshugi for this ideology – within Japan, with its rapid industrialization and all the capitalist structures that had already reached the countryside, was nearly impossible. Thus the untouched land of Manchuria – also seen by many others as a field for experiment – became the centre of Katō’s vision of a new agrarian utopia. After he came into contact with proponents of Japanese agricultural settlements in Manchuria, he began to lobby for financial support of the Japanese government for an emigration programme for those willing to build settlements based on his idea of self-sufficient peasant communities.

After the Manchurian Incident of 1931 and the ensuing war in the region, public interest in Manchuria was high in Japan. In the general enthusiasm that followed the formalization of Japanese influence in the region with the founding of the puppet state of Manzhouguo, the plan to send emigrants to the new state seemed plausible to many. Katō Kanji, who could rely on a network of former fellow-students and friends from university who had built academic careers or become influential in the bureaucracy, along with his students and followers from his agricultural training centres, used the public interest in Manchuria to submit his first emigration plans to the Japanese government. However, for the first four years of the lobbying for government spon-
sorship for emigration Katō’s efforts were stymied by Takahashi Korekiyō’s staunch opposition as Minister of Finance to allow larger sums of the government budget to be spent for an emigration programme.

Nevertheless through the constant lobbying by migration advocates in Japan as well as in the Kantō Army, and the highly publicized resettlement of some groups of paramilitary settlers, the perception of the possibility of Japanese settlement changed from highly unlikely to absolutely necessary. When the argument of Japanese emigration to Manchuria as a necessary move took over, the feasibility of the endeavour became increasingly irrelevant.

The change of the concept of large-scale emigration to Manchuria from a utopian vision of some agrarianists into the major goal of the Japanese government occurred in the increasingly nationalistic climate after the February 26 Incident and the ensuing shift to the right in politics. It was enabled by the combination of the migration idea with the ongoing nationwide effort to revitalize the rural economy. The Japanese government had financially supported a programme administered by the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry which tried to revitalize the rural economy by rationalization in agriculture, control of resources and promotion of self-help in the villages. This Rural Revitalization Campaign, however, reached only those households that were already better off and had resources that could be rationalized or used to diversify the family business. The rural poor did not profit from the Rural Revitalization Campaign.

Agricultural scientists and intellectuals claiming to represent the interest of Japan’s rural population saw the scarcity of farmland as the main reason for the persistent poverty in many villages. The general opinion in the first half of the twentieth century in Japan was that a rural household should have a certain minimum of farmland to be able to survive economically. The minimal size of this area was even computed based on surveys conducted by the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry and adjusted to the climatic conditions of the prefectures in question. The concentration on the size of fields available to rural households supported a conviction that had been discussed in academic circles for several decades, i.e., the existence of a large “surplus population” in Japan. The idea that a minimal amount of farmland was necessary for the economic survival of a rural household resulted in the conclusion that only a drastic reduction of households in the villages could save the rural economy. This assessment of the problem of rural poverty clearly neglected the importance of sideline
businesses and the influence of market mechanisms on agricultural products. It furthermore tackled the situation in Japanese villages from a merely statistical point of view. Farmland was measured by the community and statistically distributed among the registered households. If the amount of farmland per household resulting from this mathematical exercise fell below the benchmark given by ministerial bureaucrats, the village was deemed overpopulated.

This view from above totally ignored the traditional structures in the villages, where farmland was not evenly distributed among cultivators living in a more or less egalitarian society. In most villages, large amounts of land were in the hands of a few landlords, who rented out plots to the many village poor. Hardly anybody owned plots with the recommended standard size that according to the opinion of agricultural functionaries ensured household self-sufficiency. Thus the idea to relocate “surplus population” from the villages and thereby somehow bring about the increase of the remaining households’ plot sizes was far removed from reality.

On the other side, the declaration of standards for farmland sizes per household and the discussion of the ideal population in villages reflected a general trend in Japanese social politics not only in the first half of the twentieth century, i.e., the idea that it was the task of the government to actively manage society and therefore to interfere heavily in all kinds of economic and social development. The concept of the management of society by the government involves a heavy responsibility for the managing agents for the results achieved by the measures they prescribed. In the case of the Rural Revitalization Campaign, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, as the managing agent, could not just walk away from the unsolved problems left over by the shortcomings of the campaign felt especially by the rural poor.

For those dedicated to improving the economic situation in the countryside, the new government policy of 1936 asking for the resettlement of one million Japanese households to agrarian settlements in Manchuria over the course of 20 years offered an ideal solution to the predicament of the presumed number-one problem of Japan’s rural areas – overpopulation. The idea of a large-scale government-sponsored and orchestrated migration scheme as a measure of social welfare politics met the demands of those advocating a large-scale colonization project of Manchuria for political reasons. Whereas the administration of the resettlement in the trial phase was mostly managed by the comparatively small and weak Ministry of Colonial Affairs, the
large and powerful Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry took over the recruitment effort within Japan after the merger of the Rural Revitalization Campaign and the mass migration programme for Manchuria.

However, despite the heavy involvement of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry in social management in the countryside, the recruitment of the high numbers requested by the mass migration planners was a real challenge. Deciding for political reasons that a permanent population of a million peasant households was desirable for the Japanese expansion on the Asian continent and the stabilization of its influence in Manchuria was the easy part of the Manchuria migration scheme. Administrators in the central Japanese bureaucracy based their plans for the implementation of the “Millions to Manchuria” policy on this desirability. They drafted five-year plans for resettlement that seem to have never been tested for feasibility or even for plausibility in the light of experiences of earlier planners with ideas for the resettlement of Japanese farmers to the Korean peninsula (Duus 1995: 289-323).

The hard part of the mass migration scheme was the recruitment of volunteers for migration and the implementation of the resettlement plans at the grassroots level. Contrary to a simple order-obedience mechanism, the rural “surplus population” could not just be ordered to emigrate to the continent. Social management mainly works through the instrument of moral suasion, i.e., the persuasion that certain government measures are in the own interest of the people the measures are targeted at. To successfully manage desirable social developments – in this case the out-migration of large parts of Japan’s rural population – it is necessary to include the managed subjects in the process and entice their cooperation with the government programme by giving them the impression that most of the measures they are participating in are actually their own idea and that the government is just helping them in their realization.

In implementing the mass migration plans for Manchuria, the planning bureaucrats encountered a grassroots-level activism that was carried by mostly young people who were looking for practical measures to improve the economic situation in their communities. Most of these people had already been active in the Rural Revitalization Campaign and were frustrated by the outcome of the campaign for the lower income groups in village society. These locally active young people belonged to a newly emerging rural elite that was trying to break the grip of the traditional elite of
landlords and rich peasants on village politics. Some of these young people had come into contact with the ideas of agrarianism and underwent a sort of vocational training in agriculture in Katō Kanji’s school, where he not only taught practical subjects connected to agriculture but also the ideology of nōhonshugi. Thus Katō Kanji not only brought his vision of the creation of self-sufficient peasant communities in Manchuria into government and academic circles through his personal networks of friends from his days as a student of agriculture at Tokyo Imperial University. Through his work as an agricultural educator he also dispersed his ideas among rural activists looking for concepts that could be employed to change the desperate situation in the rural economy and society.

Since emigration to Manchuria was made available as one such solution to the problems in the countryside, some of these local activists started promoting out-migration from their communities to Manchuria on their own. Young classifies the Manchurian colonization as a social movement, but without specifying which part of the complex mass migration endeavour resembled a social movement and which characteristics of the Japanese emigration movement substantiate this claim (Young 1998a: 307, 318). A look at the history and range of social movements shows that, despite the differences among them, a common characteristic of social movements is that they have the form of a campaign with collective claims and an agenda of meeting, rallies and statements (Tilly 2004). In this general perspective, the promotion of out-migration in organized groups from the Japanese countryside to agrarian settlements in Manchuria was a campaign with a collective goal propagated in meetings, statements and rallies. More important, however, is the question of the target of a social movement. Many such movements targeted authorities that did not grant certain rights (e.g., the labour movement, the peasant movement, the socialist movement). Often social movements lobbied for legal changes or some kind of reform to be brought about by government institutions. For the mass migration movement to Manchuria, however, the question of the movement’s target as well as the question of a charismatic leader, often a requirement for the start of a social movement, needs to be examined a little further.

The first local activists in Nangō certainly had a clear target when they founded their local committee to promote mass migration. Their enemies were the local landlords dominating the village economy. But the idea to split the village of Nangō in half and open a new village for the disadvantaged with sufficient farmland in Manchuria, out of
the reach of the landlords, was not exactly a reform that would enforce a redistribution of wealth in the village. It was more in line with the general idea underlying the whole concept of sending the village poor to Manchuria, i.e. the eradication of poverty by exporting the poorest part of society. The start of the village-centred migration campaign in Nangō had most characteristics of a social movement: a group of people with a common goal as well as a common adversary, organizing themselves in order to attain their goal around some local leaders. The movement did not succeed in its original goal, since the traditional economic structures in the village of Nangō did not change, and the disadvantaged who resettled to Manchuria did not build their own community. They nevertheless brought a concept into the discussion about the implementation of the abstract mass migration plans that, although it was not totally new, revolutionized the Manchuria emigration policy.

Since the local activists of Nangō belonged to a network of followers of Katō Kanji’s agrarianist ideas, news about Nangō’s plan to manage the emigration of people from the village by village-division spread in the circles of those interested in solving the economic and social problems of their villages by out-migration. The idea to take the decision to emigrate away from the individual (the unit initially targeted by government propaganda) to the village level was born in the discussion among activists at the local and prefectural levels who were trying to put the abstract government plans with its horrendous quotas into something manageable at the grassroots level.

At this intermediate level, however, the propagation of emigration was no longer a real social movement. Since mass migration was an official government policy, local activists did not have to fight against institutions and authorities to change legislation or institutional practice to realize their goals. They did not have to petition the government or organize protest rallies, since they were the new favourites of government agencies, who without the local connections and local knowledge of the village activists had surely been much harder pressed to recruit enough volunteers to fulfil the ambitious migration quotas.

The interesting phase of the whole emigration movement is the short period when the campaign was taken out of the hands of local enthusiasts by a government apparatus. Detached from reality and caught by the imperative to fulfil quotas, the bureaucracy turned the campaign into an oppressive, top-down command mechanism. This mechanism was perpetuated to save face politically. It had nothing to do with the
original idea of offering a better life to the needy. It took approximately two years from 1937 to 1939 to conclude this process. In the end, the Village-Division Campaign was no longer a grassroots movement but had to be forcefully implemented by the prefectural and central bureaucracies. From 1940 on, the early phase when activists had shaped the campaign was conserved in a propaganda campaign which used the image of the activists as local heroes to entice peasants against their better wisdom to fill the dwindling ranks of Manchuria volunteers.

The local activism which propelled the migration campaign in the beginning was heavily influenced by the mainstream opinion that the Japanese countryside had a “land problem”. The local activists all focused on the scarcity of farmland in their communities. As recommended, they arithmetically computed the “overpopulation rate” when drafting plans for the out-migration of up to one-third of the village population. In all the early cases where local activists, imbued with genuine enthusiasm for Katō Kanji’s agrarianist visions, planned the village-division, the plans mechanically “redistributed” a statistical amount of farmland left behind by a statistically computed number of surplus households. For today’s reader it is hard to understand why those with local knowledge about the local land ownership and traditional power structures seemed not to have realized that the “land problem” was not so much a general scarcity of farmland but a problem of distribution its ownership. Most local activists had to admit at some point that the real problem in their villages was not that many peasants wanted to farm larger plots, but the economic recession which affected the sideline businesses like sericulture, charcoal making, or seasonal labour migration. Since the official rationale for the mass migration movement was an unfavourable ratio of farmland to households, local advocates had to play along: they were competing for additional government funding for revitalization measures in their communities when they conformed to the official policy.

In the decision-making process for village-division at the grassroots level, local activists played a decisive role. If the economic situation and its assessment by the village office had been the main criteria for the government help and subsidies that came with a community’s commitment to participate in the migration scheme, bureaucrats would have chosen the participating communities according to the communities’ neediness. In reality, Ministry planners accepted village-division plans from villages where local activists had drafted them, and must have scrapped villages from their list of candidates that did not follow up after the first draft. Although the initial enthu-
siasm in some villages was strong enough to produce a village-division plan, plans were more or less completed only in a few exceptional cases. One was the village of Ōhinata, which propaganda for the Village-Division Campaign of the 1940 turned into a model for the nation.

Before this village rose to national prominence it was a typical case of a community in northeast Japan with a few local landlords, a high tenancy rate, mounting private debts as well as an unbalanced village budget and a high reliance on sericulture and charcoal production. It was brought to the attention of promoters of Manchuria migration in its home prefecture Nagano, which was among the most active emigration advocates, through an embezzlement scandal that led to the purge of large parts of the old village elite from local politics. Under the auspices of the prefectural office, a young academic with roots in the village and contacts to Katō Kanji and his agrarianist network was made village mayor. Having such a prototypical local activist at the apex of the village administration made the otherwise average community an ideal test case for a mass migration scheme administered at the village level with the help of the prefectural office and the Ministry of Agricultural and Forestry. Because of the special attention of the prefectural office as well as prominent advocates of Manchuria migration coming personally to the village, decision-making and implementation for village-division was especially fast in Ōhinata. The mayor, Asakawa Takemaro, found an ideal partner in another local activist, the organizer of the local charcoal makers’ cooperative, Horikawa Kiyomi. The swift implementation and relatively high quota fulfilment of Ōhinata’s Village-Division Campaign was to a large part due to Horikawa’s popularity and reputation in the village community.

A rare coincidence of various factors favoured a quick decision-making process – one that led to the departure of the first settlers from Ōhinata before the Sino-Japanese War on the continent erupted on a large scale and changed public perception of the resettlement in Manchuria, plus exceptionally weak opposition to migration plans within the village, where the old elite had been purged – resulted in a nearly ideal development of Ōhinata’s village-division. This lucky course of events, along with the special attention the village received because of its rather accidental role of being Japan’s first divided village, made out-migration from Ōhinata the ideal object of an academic study about the impact of village-division on the mother village and the conditions in the branch village in Manchuria. This study, conducted by a team of students around Katō Kanji’s collaborator, the professor for agriculture Nasu Hiroshi,
revealed that despite the efforts of the activists and organizers and the emigration of a quarter of the original village population, the economic situation and amount of farmland available for the average household had improved little. Because mostly poor families with little or no land resettled, the amount of farmland left behind for redistribution under the aegis of the village’s industrial cooperative was far too small to change the economic situation of the households which stayed behind. This was the general experience in all communities which sent off large parts of their population. But it should have come as no surprise to those planners and local activists who had sufficient knowledge about the rural power distribution.

The real problem behind the existence of rural poverty was hardly ever discussed. The propaganda of the emigration movement and especially that for village-division using the case of Ōhinata was based on the model of a harmonious rural community where no class tensions or conflict of interest existed between local landlords and rural have-nots. Contrary to socialist ideas, which saw the landlords as the natural enemy of the tenant, agrarianism saw urbanization and industrialization as the biggest enemy for the inhabitant of rural areas. Instead of tenant unrest instigated by advocates of socialism, the adherents of agrarianism propagated a frugal self-reliant lifestyle as a shield against the commercialization of agriculture. Consequently those looking for solutions to the economic problems of rural households could not discuss a better reaction to capitalist market forces by rural producers of sideline products like silk or charcoal. Instead of making young peasants fit for the market economy or recommending they move into full-time jobs in the growing industries, advocates of the agrarianist-inspired simple life had to focus on the provision of enough farmland for agricultural self-sufficiency. This vision presented a dilemma to its advocates. Since a revolutionary redistribution of farmland, feasible in the socialist universe of thought, was out of the question for the proponents of a harmonious community, land for the poor had to be sought outside Japan. Even those who understood that the simple arithmetic of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry used in the village-division plan would not change the reality in the Japanese village were able to propagate large areas of farmland as the main incentive for volunteers to go to Manchuria. For the activists themselves, the creation of new communities overseas provided well-paid leadership jobs in administering the settlement.

An important conclusion, already employed in the Rural Revitalization Campaign, from earlier attempts to improve the economic situation of poorer rural people was
that any effort at rural reform should not challenge the power and influence of the old elite (Young 1998a: 336). Some local activists had to learn this lesson when their efforts to mobilize not only a part of the village population (and so its labour force) but also funds from village coffers were blocked by the traditional elite, who saw no sense in spending money they paid into the village budget to send away their cheap day-labourers. Although the official chronicles of the Village-Division Campaign tried to convey the impression that three different forms of implementation of village-division were designed to provide a choice for all possible situations in communities applying for village-division, the distinction into a Nangō emigration style (out-migration from one community into several settlements), a Shōnai style (out-migration from a larger area in Japan as one group into a settlement), and an Ōhinata style (out-migration of a substantial part from one village into a branch settlement in Manchuria) was no more than an after-the-fact rationalization of the evolution of community-based out-migration concepts – concepts that in most cases did not work out because of the opposition of the old village elite, as in Nangō and Shōnai. Only in the rare ideal case of Ōhinata could such concepts be implemented as desired.

Opposition, or at least passive non-cooperation, of the traditional rural elite was an important obstacle for the Village-Division Campaign. But because the campaign’s guiding ideology negated class conflict as a root problem in the countryside, this aspect could not be openly discussed. When opposition against the local activists’ plans was discussed in the circle of promoters of village-division, it was usually only to recount how initial opposition turned into support for the migration movement (Asahi shinbunsha 1939: 64-65, 102-107).

In the implementation process, social differences within the village were discussed only in terms of the necessity to help poorer families. The wealth of other families was not mentioned. The possibility to send a considerable part of the population to a country where they could become landowning peasants or often even landlords renting out plots themselves offered a solution to the “land problem” – one that allowed the wealthy to keep their land and status. This did not automatically lead to all the better-off villagers accepting the village-division plans: the plans would still cost their tax money and deprive them of labour. In post-war interviews, villagers from Ōhinata admitted that even in the national model village for a harmonious village-division there was opposition from wealthier villagers to the migration scheme, and that the
general perception of the time was that the better-offs were telling the village poor to go ahead to Manchuria as they would follow later – something that in most cases did not happen (Yamada 1978: 339). One of the prominent members of the Economic Revitalization Committee in charge of implementing Ōhinata’s village-division was Hatakeyama Shigesama, one of the richest people in the village. He was not only president of the industrial cooperative of the village; he was also vice-mayor and the chairman of the farm practice association of the hamlet of Hongō, the richest part of Ōhinata (Yamada 1978: 338). He is an example for those wealthy villagers who actively supported village-division without resettling themselves – probably thinking that the offer of farmland in Manchuria for the village poor would justify his own landholding and wealth and would help to keep the social peace in the village.

The implementation of out-migration without major disturbances in the village society was a challenge for local organizers. They not only had to find volunteers for the emigration group; they also had to find ways to justly administer the redistribution of emigrants’ belongings. Since most of the volunteers were heavily in debt, the organizers had to devise methods to regulate the debts of prospective settlers that would not further antagonize the wealthy villagers who usually were the creditors. At the same time they had to offer a prospective to indebted individuals that made emigration an attractive way to get rid of the family’s debt. Important agents in handling the practical side of out-migration were the village industrial cooperatives, a traditional field of activity for local activists and reformers. So another contribution of local activists to the Village-Division Campaign was administering the resettlement in a non-confrontational way, i.e., settling financial and other practical matters without antagonizing the traditional village elite. The degree to which this strategy to preserve harmony was successful determined how much cooperation the activists received from the elite. Where the migration plans interfered with agendas of local entrepreneurs who relied on low-income villagers for cheap labour (as in Yomikaki), parts of the elite withdrew their support for the campaign.

An important characteristic of a social movement is that it mobilizes participants on a voluntary basis. Participants usually join the movement because they believe in its goals and hope to profit from its achievements. In the Village-Division Campaign, this was certainly true for the first enthusiasts who propagated out-migration and often resettled with the first groups from their villages. But setting migrant quotas often led to drafting people who were not really volunteers in the latter parts of the campaign.
Even in Ōhinata some of the emigrants were more or less pressured to resettle (Yamada 1978: 342). The enthusiastic voluntary participants often followed a charismatic leader, but the topic of “leadership” within the Village-Division Campaign poses another problem in the assessment of the campaign as a social movement.

Some social movements are closely associated with their charismatic leaders – people who represent the movements’ concerns in public appearances. These leaders often symbolize the cause of the movement by fighting against discrimination or other problems that they themselves face. The agrarianists in Japan surely had a charismatic leader in Kato Kanji, who in a biography written as recently as 1984 is depicted in a sage-like way (Nakamura 1984). Katō must have been a very convincing advocate of his cause, mobilizing intellectuals and politicians, as well as infecting pupils with the emigration virus in his lectures on agrarianism. These followers then carried this virus back to their home communities.

For the Village-Division Campaign, however, the charisma of local leaders was much more important than the general influence of Katō Kanji. Although Katō, as well as other emigration proponents such as Sugino Tadao, travelled the countryside giving lectures about the endeavour, the real mobilization effort had to be made by local proponents. They were the ones who talked their fellow villagers into joining the campaign, and sometimes led them to the continent by volunteering for resettlement themselves. The emotional attachment of emigrants to the migration movement happened at the local level, not at the national level or through a direct connection to Katō Kanji.

The Village-Division Campaign that unfolded on a national scale did not have a charismatic national leader, but was administered by a bureaucracy implementing social management measures. To successfully implement those measures, respected local leaders and activists were co-opted. They became the local agents of moral suasion, convincing their communities that participation in the government policy of migration was in everybody’s best interests. The incentive for the activists themselves often was the possibility to further their careers in the new settlements. Activists who decided to join the emigration groups were treated with special consideration during the recruitment and training process. Potential local promoters of the migration idea were treated to inspection tours on the continent; local leaders and specialists of the Village-Division Campaign were given a special training apart from ordinary settlers;
they were awarded generous payments in their jobs in administering the new settlements. Although some of the new leaders in the Village-Division Campaign, like Hori-kawa Kiyomi, came from a humble background and fought for the rights of the lower level of village society, most of these leaders were not the type of social movement leaders who fought against their own poverty or discrimination. Rather, they were acting a paternalistic caretakers claiming to represent the interests of the village poor who could not organize themselves of their own accord.

When the campaign ran out of genuine local enthusiasts, the implementation process changed. After the first nationwide hype depicting Manchuria as paradise on earth, reality set in. People became increasingly aware that Japan was actually fighting a war on the continent, and that resettlement was no guarantee for a carefree life. In most cases not enough volunteers could be recruited to complete the local village-division plans.

This was not only due to passiveness or disinterest among the rural population. The home communities implementing village-division plans also closely followed the progress of the resettlement of their fellow villagers. Some of the results were less than satisfying, so deterred the undecided from registering to emigrate. A commission from Yomikaki village which spent 23 days on an inspection tour in Manchuria in March 1939 encountered a settlement for their branch village that had many problems. They assessed the implementation of Yomikaki’s village-division plan very critically. Some even felt cheated (Takahashi 1997: 212-213, 262-264).

To counteract this, the propaganda effort explaining the necessity of emigration and the benefits of the Village-Division Campaign for rural areas was stepped up. *le no hikari* featured Manchuria emigration in nearly every issue in 1940. This was a propaganda effort that had started with a few features a year in the early and mid-1930s, accelerated with more features accompanying the evolution of the Village-Division Campaign, peaked in 1940 and 1941, and petered out with occasional features until 1943. Thus the stepping up of the media campaign followed the ebbing of the grassroots enthusiasm, as did the usage of the story of Ōhinata’s village-division in a novel, play and movie. This propaganda campaign substituted the local activists – who were now lacking in many villages – with the idealized role models of the depictions of Ōhinata. In the process, the story of these locally active people was changed slightly to turn them into local heroes. These heroes on their own came to
the conclusion that village-division was the only solution to their community’s problems, and they put their ideas into practice without much social conflict within the community. The major agency for implementing village-division in the 1940s – the government, through the prefectural office and the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry – appeared in the propaganda only as a helping hand in the background: one that supported the local activists but did not interfere in their local affairs. This is a classical case of moral suasion that aimed at suggesting to the targeted part of the population that the measures prescribed by the government were actually the natural solutions to people’s problems and in their own best interests.

The rural population reacted with passivity to these government efforts. The recruitment of setters in the 1940s often used considerable pressure and was not accompanied by the same enthusiasm as in the early phases. A logical consequence would have been the discontinuation of the whole programme. Instead, the settlers became “victims of the empire”, as Young calls them (Young 1998a: 399-411). Wilson puts the continuation of the emigration movement down to the takeover of military priorities within the political bureaucracy. She argues that emigration had become a symbol of Japan’s advance into the ranks of the powerful nations and saw itself as the civilizing force necessary in Manchuria (Wilson 1995: 284-286). In this perspective settlers were actually regarded as objects to be moved around for the sake of the empire.

The provocative question is, why did some rural people let themselves be treated like this? The committee from Yomikaki that went on the inspection tour to Manchuria and the Yomikaki settlement there in March 1939 first made an effort to voice its dissatisfaction with the development of their village-division scheme. They compiled a proposal of five points aiming at a better implementation of Yomikaki’s village-division, but in the end they did not dare to stop the whole project, and against their better judgement published a positive report of their tour to Manchuria in the village gazette (Takahashi 1997: 262-264). Most emigration plans, especially when the Village-Division Campaign was officially changed into a District-Division Campaign providing considerable leeway in the scope of settlers’ recruitment, were implemented despite the difficulties in recruitment. It was implemented by bureaucrats who tried to do their job by fulfilling abstract migration plans with unrealistic quotas, without thinking about the consequences for the people affected. Although settlers were not recruited at gunpoint or forcefully sent to Manchuria, the campaign of the 1940s often employed
considerable pressure to fill the ranks of the emigrant groups. Moral suasion, or the reasonable suggestion that a certain behaviour or action was beneficial to the individual or household, often turned into group pressure in village communities exercised upon the most vulnerable members of the rural society to persuade them to leave.

This was surely not what the early activists wanted. They had shaped the mass migration movement into a community-based campaign aiming at resolving the economic problems of rural areas, and they contributed to the implementation of the biggest government-sponsored mass migration movement in Japanese history by administering the out-migration from their communities. Some of these activists became the new elite in their Japanese home village after they were co-opted by the planners of the Village-Division Campaign. Those who decided to take up a leading position within the migration movement and resettled to Manchuria, however, shared the fate of all the ordinary settlers at the end of World War II.
9. Epilogue

This study analyses the making of the Village-Division Campaign and the role local activists played in the process. But the story of Ōhinata would not be complete without a summary of the events that ended its village-division endeavour. This epilogue is based on a few secondary sources that give the most important information about the fate of the Ōhinata settlement in Manchuria and its inhabitants.

Like many Japanese publications about the migration, the history of emigration from Nagano prefecture emphasizes the events at the end of World War II and the tragic fate of the settlers. It devotes three of the ten pages about the Village-Division Campaign of Ōhinata to these events (Naganoken – kakudanhen 1984: 159-169). The account of the events at the end of the war starts with the deteriorating relationship between the settlers and their Chinese-Manchurian neighbours. More and more Japanese men from the settlement were drafted into the Japanese Army, until by July 1945 there were only elderly people, women and children left. However, the settlers were at no point in time told to leave the settlement, and even after the Japanese capitulation on 15 August 1945 the people in the Ōhinata settlement, like in most other Japanese agrarian settlements in Manchuria, were told to stay. The situation in Ōhinata just after the announcement of the end of the war by the Japanese emperor was relatively calm. However, refugees from other settlements came to Ōhinata. The local police chief collected all weapons in the settlement since the war had been declared over, thus making the possessing of a weapon no longer necessary.

The settlement of Ōhinata was first attacked on 3 September 1945; then smaller attacks by groups of Chinese followed daily. On 9 September, a Chinese armed unit of 9,000 men attacked the settlement and plundered it. The villagers had fled into the fields, so relatively few lost their lives. After this event the second hamlet of the settlement was turned into a defence structure and the remaining population was assembled there. Four days after this was completed the settlement was surrounded by Chinese and the Soviet Army. After negotiations, the police chief of the settlement struck a deal allowing the remaining settlers to flee to the nearest railway station and leave the area. The settlers’ train journey was tedious and often interrupted by attackers who robbed the refugees and abducted young women. Nevertheless the settlers of Ōhinata were comparatively lucky, since they could use some other mode of
transport than their feet. Settlements further away from railway lines were often evacuated by foot, and many of the fleeing settlers did not survive the marches because of attacks, illness, starvation, etc.

Settlers who reached bigger cities in Manchuria were usually put in some kind of refugee camp. The people from Ōhinata went to former Xinjing, now again called Changchun, where the local Committee of Japanese (Nihonjinkai) used some former barracks of the Japanese army to accommodate them. The living conditions in camps like this were horrible; many settlers who survived the flight from settlements died there in the winter due to cold, hunger or illnesses that spread rapidly in the camps. On 16 February 1946, the leader of the emigration group and integrating figure of the village migration movement, Horikawa Kiyomi, died of illness. His death seriously affected the mood of the remaining people from the settlement, especially since two more leading members of the group were fatally ill. Nevertheless a new group leader called Horikawa Motoo was decided upon, preserving the village migration structure even in the dire circumstances of the refugee camp. In March 1946, the civil war between the nationalists and communists reached the streets of Changchun, confining the refugees to their barracks. After the communist victory in this battle, the city was taken over by their Eight Field Army of the communist People’s Liberation Army and the situation in Changchun returned to normal. In June 1946 the Committee of Japanese told the remaining people from Ōhinata that they were to be repatriated. The repatriation started on 17 July 1946 with settlers in Changchun grouped together as a battalion of 1,250 people travelling together by train to Wenzhou. Then 2,500 Japanese refugees were put on a ship that was to have brought them to Maizuru, a port on the Sea of Japan in northern Kyoto Prefecture. Since, however, cholera broke out on the ship, the vessel was rerouted to Sasebo in northern Kyūshū, where it was put under quarantine for 43 days. Fifty-three people on board of the ship died of the disease until the quarantine was finally lifted on 9 September 1946, and the refugees were allowed to enter Japan.

The day after the disembarking from the ship, the remaining settlers from Ōhinata started their journey back to Nagano. From Hiroshima they went to Nagoya, then to Matsumoto and finally to Ōhinata. According to the history of Manchuria emigration from Nagano, 395 people from the Ōhinata settlement of Sijiafang returned to Japan, 389 people from the settlement lost their lives before they could return.
Although the returning settlers were well received – among others by Hatakayama Shigesama, who had taken over as village mayor from Asakawa Takemaro – they had no place to go back to. They had sold their houses and fields when they had left for the continent. Some of the returnees could stay with relatives; others had to be accommodated in the village hall or the local temple. Since they had lost their livelihoods they had to rely on donations of food and clothing. Thus some of the returnees, among them the new “group leader” who took over after Horikawa’s death, turned to the prefectural government for help. The prefectural office arranged for them to found a new settlement in the vicinity of Karuizawa. On 17 January 1947 the settler group of Ōhinata had officially been dissolved. Some of the returnees stayed in the village, found new jobs and new homes. Others took up the offer to go to a new settlement, this time not too far away in the same prefecture. Just like in the resettlement campaign to the continent, the leader of the “emigrants” Horikawa Motoo built an “advance group” of 37 young men who prepared the infrastructure in the new village after they officially founded it on 11 February 1947. On 17 April 1947 another 28 “settlers”, bringing along 99 family members, moved to the new settlement, once again called Ōhinata.

Since Ōhinata had ceased to be an ordinary village due to the special attention awarded to it in the Village-Division Campaign, its post-war history is not ordinary either. In most other cases the former settlers returning from Manchuria had the same problems as the returnees to Ōhinata – finding a place to stay and a job. But very few former emigrant groups stayed together to form another community. The new settlement near Karuizawa was even visited by the Japanese emperor on 7 October 1947 and started prospering in the post-war era as an agricultural community (Naganoken – kakudanhen 1984: 164-169, Wada 1993).
10. Appendix: Ōhinata Village, by Wada Tsutō

The village of Ōhinata in Saku County, Nagano Prefecture, is situated in the valley of the prefectural road from Iwamurada to Manba along a small mountain river called Nukuigawa. The Nukuigawa has its source at the Jikkoku Pass at the prefectural frontier to neighbouring Gunma and flows into the upper reaches of the Chikumagawa. For ten kilometres alongside it, the eight hamlets of the village are lined up from east to west. Morning dawns rather late in this village and the sun disappears again early in the day. Especially Mount Morai which rises in the south covers the whole village with his dark shadow, so in winter the sun cannot be seen before 9 o’clock. At 3 o’clock in the afternoon the sun disappears again behind the summit of the Ōkami Pass. Therefore the village is traditionally called “the village of half days”. It is a place of dark shadows which only in the literal translation of its name is situated “in the direction of the big sun”. The mountains on both sides of the village fall steeply into the valley of the Nukuigawa. At the foot of those mountains there is usually just enough space for the banks of the small river. The fields which stretch along the riverbanks look like they had been stuffed into this space by force. The old folks often compare this land to the head of a cat which seems to be able to cram its head through even the smallest opening. The paddy fields lined up along the riverbanks are so small that they could easily be hidden under a straw hat. In addition there are some fields cleared on not too steep slopes, and mulberry trees have been planted along the side of the prefectural road.
The eight hamlets along the river are Shimogawara, Hongō, Hiragawara, Mizubori, Yazawa, Shukudo, Koya and Kamaeri, comprising of a total of 406 households. Especially the two hamlets of Koya and Kamaeri which are situated in the back of the valley have hardly any farmland, only some vegetable gardens on the slopes that have been cleared around the houses. For the 336 households living off agriculture in the village, there are 49.8 chō of paddy fields and 216 chō of dry fields. For the individual household this comes down to the frightening small number of 0.15 chō of paddy fields and 0.46 chō of dry fields, which taken together amounts to just 0.61 chō of farmland per household.
It is actually hardly feasible to make a living in a village at the bottom of a valley where the sun can be seen only for half-days, where a household merely has 0.61
chō of farmland that on top of it is not fertile at all and where nothing can be cultivated during the ice-cold winters. So it is even more astonishing how the people get along here despite the poor farmland, the steep mountain slopes and the roadside as the only place for the cultivation of mulberry trees. Where they can be cultivated the mulberry trees are much taller than the houses and so big that it is hardly possible to fully embrace their trunks. They tell the story how eager these people are to grow silkworms and how badly they need this kind of side business.

The vastness of the forest which stretches from the east to the west is breathtaking. But then the smoke rising from the valley from autumn till spring catches the eye. It is the smoke of charcoal burning, and it tells the story how important a resource the mountain forest is for survival in this region. Under the roofs in front of the houses and in the sheds, straw bags containing charcoal are piled up. These bags are as precious as the straw bags filled with rice for those living from farming. The total area of forest on the village territory amounts to 4,954 chō. The forest area used by the villagers starts behind the hamlets of Koya and Kamaeri and goes all the way up to the Jikkoku Pass in far away Gunma Prefecture. The major part of this area – 3,648 chō – belongs to the village. If one deducts the area belonging to the state or to the temple and the shrine, the privately owned area of forest amounts to merely 621 chō, of which 400 are the propriety of one rich family.

The quality of the farmland is so poor that the rice it produces for the villagers only lasts for four months or maybe five if one mixes wheat and barley with it. During the other eight months, or two-thirds of the year, the villagers have to go into the mountains to earn a living. There they burn charcoal either from the wood from the village forest or from the forest area owned by one rich family. Many villagers spend half of the year with agriculture and the other half of the year burning charcoal. Forty households neither own a plough nor raise any silkworms; they just live off charcoal burning.

So these people, sturdy as their mulberry trees, advance further into the forest where the thin young trees offer a frightening sight. Originally the forest was full of oak trees and other trees used for burning charcoal. Today, however, wherever one looks, the only thing one sees is the frightening sight of tender saplings. Nearly the whole mountain is covered with trees so young that it will take another ten years until they can be harvested.
It was different in the past. At that time, the mountain forest was so thick, that you could sometimes not even see the sun between the pines, the cypresses, the *keyaki* trees, the birches, and the nettle trees, some of their stems having a girth of three metres. A large part of the wood for the reconstruction of one hall of the great Zenkō Temple in Nagano in the Genroku era (1688-1704) was brought from Ōhinata. In Zenkō Temple’s main hall the big round pillar, which is preserved even today, is from Ōhinata as well. The old folks in the village lament how the mountain forest, which once was so thick, nowadays ends up being turned into pathetic charcoal. Nevertheless, trees are being cut down year after year for charcoal until only the youngest trees are left behind, looking as if their bark has been peeled off.

The banks of the Nukuigawa are lined with big, wasteful walnut trees: wasteful because the fruits of these mountain walnut trees are only very small compared to the size of the trees. Only the land owned by the temple and the shrine is still covered with evergreen trees on the mountain slopes, but these trees cannot be cut down for charcoal. These lavish green mountain crests are mirrored in the azure blue waters of the Nukuigawa. Picturesque boulders are spread throughout the landscape. This mountain scenery is actually an impressive sight. However, who can still appreciate the beauty of this place, when in the present dire circumstances a look at the scenery makes you sad instead?

II

It was December 1936. An old man shuffled over the bridge across the Nukuigawa between Koya and Kamaeri. He was muffled up in a padded cotton jacket, on top of which he wore a sleeveless two-piece coat in faded maroon. His feet were stuffed into medium-high rubber boots. This pitiful figure was the village mayor Yui Keinosuke. Although it was only 3 o’clock in the afternoon, the sun was already about to set behind the densely forested slopes, and the cold and dark shadows were coming down from the mountains. Yui Keinosuke pulled together his shoulders, making him look like a sick bird ruffling up its feathers. His shuffling figure did not look like it was moving at its one accord. It rather looked like it was being pulled forward by an invisible string.

Starting from mid-October, fog covered the ground; and from this time onwards snow started falling. In the middle of the bitterly cold winter temperatures below minus 10 degrees were nothing unusual.
The muffled-up, sick-bird-like mayor reached the hamlet of Kamaeri. Over there walnut and chestnut trees lined the bank of the Nukuigawa, but in winter they were dark and bald. Behind the trees the mountain slopes were rising sharply. A total of eight houses were scattered carelessly over an area that was half-covered with grass in summer. This was Kamaeri.

There was no farmland at all in Kamaeri, just the mulberry trees around the houses which grew taller than the rooftops. The farmers there had no paddy fields, not even vegetable gardens in the vicinity of their houses. Stones on the roofs weighed down the tiles, which was necessary to keep them in place.

While he approached the front of the first houses, Yui Keinosuke called out, “Sai, are you at home?” Then he saw the housewife sitting in front of a shed next to the main house weaving straw bags for charcoal. She looked worn out. On top of her short, thick bear-like neck sat a matching bear head with a shrewish, wild face, the colour as dark as a bowl for buckwheat noodles. “Hey, you are diligent”, said the smiling mayor Yui. Without interrupting her weaving, the woman smiled back showing her yellow teeth. Since she only got three sen$^{24}$ for the straw bag, she just could not afford to let her hands be idle. The women in this region cut thatch grass in the mountains and carried it on their backs to their homes, where they wove it into straw bags in wintertime.

“Kingo has gone into the mountains?”

“Yeah”

“Where has he gone?”

“What do you mean?”

The woman was still showing her yellow teeth and took her time answering. The women around here were used to not answer immediately, because whoever came to talk to the husband did not just come for chat. Usually he came to collect taxes or debts. Thus it had become a custom to first say that the husband was not home.

“When will he be back?”

“Late. Maybe 9 o’clock.”

“Does he come home this late every evening?”

“Yes, every day.”

“But he has gone into the mountains?”

“What do you mean?”

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$^{24}$ 100 sen = 1 yen
The wrinkles in the woman’s shrewish face suddenly contracted. “He has gone deep into the mountains to the Jikkoku Pass.”

“To the Jikkoku Pass?” Yui Keinosuke stared at her while knitting his white brows so that they wiggle like centipedes.

“Yes, he has gone into the mountains about eight kilometres past the Jikkoku Pass.” While saying this, she smiled scornfully as if to say that Yui should go there to collect the taxes.

“What, all the way past the Jikkoku Pass?” asked the still puzzled Keinosuke. “That’s already Gunma over there.”

“Well, he’s in Gunma then.”

The distance from the village to the Jikkoku Pass at the prefectural border is six kilometres. If you continue for another eight kilometres, that makes 14 kilometres one way and twenty-eight kilometres for the round trip.

“He gets up at 4 o’clock and leaves; and he comes back at 9 o’clock in the evening. He hardly sees his children and they are not seeing much of their father as well.”

Mayor Yui had lost all inclination to talk about the actual matter he had came for. What would happen if he broached that topic?

“Has your son gone with him?”

“Yea, Matsu’ichi has gone as well. I don’t see him very often either lately.”

Sorrow spread all over the woman’s wrinkled bear-like face. Matsu’ichi was her eldest son. He had just left school with his 16 years.

When Mayor Yui finally turned to leave, he added in an apologizing tone: “When Kingo comes home tonight, tell him that I was here to collect the village tax.”

While he said this, he already started walking, so he did not look into the woman’s face. He got no answer. What he heard instead was the sound of straw being woven hectically into a bag.

Do these efforts have any effect? Mayor Yui mumbled under his breath, as if to mock himself. Then he continued mumbling that there was probably no mayor in the whole of the world who was proud about having to run from house to house to collect the taxes.

The annual village tax came to 8,800 yen, but the outstanding dues which had already been amassed had long surpassed 10,000 yen. And there was no prospect for the possibility to repay the dues fully in the future. However, if it were only the outstanding dues of 10,000 yen, the mayor could still shrug his shoulders. On top of that
the whole village had private debts amounting to more than 400,000 yen. With 406 households this made for an average 1,000 yen in debt for each household. A really hopeless situation!

There was no money for the village administration, the payment for the schoolteachers who could not be paid the full sum anyway was three months behind, and the allowance for members of the village council had not been paid out for several years. The mayor did not know what to do and had no reason to smile at all.

He pulled his shoulders together and approached the next house without further contemplation. There the widowed housewife was just about to read a letter she had received from her daughter who had left home in spring to go working at a small textile mill.

Mayor Yui put his head through the entrance door and asked suddenly: “Hey, what is it? Is she sending you any money?”

The woman’s face immediately changed colour. Instinctively she hid the letter in her sleeve and turned around to the mayor. Thus she had no time to recover from the surprise: “Sending money? Not at all! She is always making excuses saying that she will send money the next month. No money at all!”

“She still hasn’t found the right guy?” Keinosuke slowly limped into the entrance area as if he had just come to kill some time.

“What do you think!” The woman calmed down. “She just works all the time like crazy in the textile mill.”

She pretended that nothing had happened, though the seven yen contained in the letter she had put up her sleeves. They had a heart-warming effect on her.

“Who knows? Your Amakko is good looking, and she is as hard working as you are and has strong hands.” Keinosuke could nearly smell what was in the envelope the woman had just inserted in her sleeve. However, although he suspected what it was, he did not mention it. She would not admit to it under any circumstances.

“And your Asayoshi is in the forest area belonging to Yuya?”

“Yes, this guy spends the whole time at Yuya. He never sends any money. And he never drops by even for a short visit.”

“But is he earning enough money?”

“Don’t mention it! If you deduct the financial support for his own family, his money barely lasts for a good month. He always has more expenses than income.”
“Well, but you always seem to get by not too bad. You always get something to eat from somewhere.”

“Come on, mayor, stop talking bullshit. I am already racking my brain about what to do at the end of the month….The remittance from Yuya for this month has not arrived yet, our debts are mounting, and on top if it I get the notice that the interest is rising.”

“Oh come on, you really turned into an old bag”, said Keinosuke still in a tone as if he had just come over for a chat. The woman had become a widow when she was still young. At that time there were rumours that the manager of Yuya had set an eye on her.

“Well, too bad that I’ve become such an old bag. But you, mayor, you will turn a blind eye on me, sure you will?”

She got up on her knees properly and put both her hands on the floor in front of her in a gesture of submissive plea to be exempt from the village tax again this year like she had been exempt for the last six years. This had been granted to her as a widow.

“Damn, I am finished”, said mayor Yui, drawing his shoulders together again and scratching his head. Then he continued: “I cannot sleep any more. When Asayoshi comes back, please tell him that. We are now in arrears with our tax payment for six years in a row. I don’t know what to do at the end of the year. The only thing left to the village administration would be to do a moonlight flit.”

“A moonlight flit. That would be nice. You know, mayor, why don’t you take me with you then?”

“I would think about it, if you were a little younger though.”

“Hey, before you say that, take a look in the mirror yourself! The shock would make you speechless! Come on, mayor, take me with you!” said the old woman to the equally old man; and to not further enrage him about the money matter she offered him her sweetest smile.

Chuckling silently to himself, Keinosuke left the dark, smoky room. On the mountain crest behind him the wind whistled through the pine trees and it seemed as if the whistles were shaking the chestnut trees lining the pathway. Biting cold was creeping into the worn fabric of his overcoat.

Mayor Yui dragged himself forward and approached the next house. When he came to collect the village taxes, everybody looked embarrassed. This had been going on for seven days now. He himself was a landlord from Shimogawara, the hamlet situated the furthest downstream in the front part of the valley. He had started collecting
taxes there seven days ago, then continued through Hongō, Hiradawara, Mizubori, Shukudo and Koya, until he finally reached Kamaeri.

It was not as if he believed that his tax collecting effort had any effect. He knew about the futility of his endeavour right from the start. Until this very day nobody had shown up at the village office to pay his taxes.

When he left the last house in Kamaeri, he exhaled deeply as if he wanted to stretch his back. Unbelievable as it may sound, it was a sigh of relief. “At last”, he thought, “this is finally done and over with” and he felt really relieved. With steps much lighter then when he came he started his way back. When he’d arrived at the village office, the first thing would be to write his letter of resignation; and tomorrow he would go to Tokyo for his “sit-in” at Asakawa Take-chan’s place. His heart was beating with joy and he felt as if his feet were hovering over the ground. Today he finally took his leave from the mayor’s chair which he had occupied for 12 years – three terms of office. How he strained his old bones and worked for the village until he nearly dropped, he thought to himself. And now, so he figured, there was only one last service for the village left for him, and that was to bring back Asakawa-chan from Tokyo.

He left Kamaeri behind and on the Miyakozawa forest path turned into the valley where the back part of the village forest lies. In this valley he wandered along a mountain creek also named Miyakozawa and came through the southern end of the village forest where the border with the neighbouring village Kita’aiki runs, until he finally reached the peak of Yomogahara. As Yui Keinosuke left the Miyakozawa valley, he spotted a big man in the twilight under the trees on the forest path. This figure staggered along like flickering smoke, his feet not making any sound.

The one who looked like a staggering drunkard not able to walk straight was the managing director of the industrial cooperative of the village, Horikawa Kiyomi. Keinosuke was simply thunderstruck. This 55-year-old, six-foot tall man with a barrel-like belly was usually as strong as a horse and here he came staggering like flickering smoke without a firm stand.

“Hey, Kiyo, old boy, what’s wrong with you”, Keinosuke asked him, standing so close in front of him that the two of them were nearly colliding.

Although Horikawa Kiyomi reacted with an “Hmm”, he was really quite absent-minded and looked somewhere in another direction.

“Hey, where are you going?”
“Hmm”, said Kiyomi once again, as if he only now really noticed the person in front of him. “Well, just into the mountains. But wherever you look, it’s the same picture. Only trees that cannot be cut yet.”
The Kiyomi standing in front of Keinosuke with a mad glittering in his eyes was a total different person from his normal self.

“Why do we rarely see the mayor lately, say. Listen, are you on your merciless hunt for money again today?”

“So what? Even if I’d gone into the mountains with you, you could not cut the young trees yet.”

“You are right, you are right. You cannot cut the young trees anyway; I know that. But there is nothing left to live of anymore.”

“But still you cannot cut the trees!”

“And there is nothing left to live off anymore!”

Both of them were grumbling to themselves; and both of them stubbornly stuck to their claims, although the latter’s words about there being nothing left to live off sounded bitterer than the other one’s words that one could not cut down the very young trees yet.

The two of them standing next to each other were indeed a strange couple. Keinosuke with his shoulders pulled together looked quite feeble, but he knew how to argue in a determined manner.

“And if I tell you, Kiyo, you cannot cut them. You cannot cut a single one of them!”

“Yea, right, you cannot cut a single one of them. I have been running around for three days, mayor, without cutting down a single tree. I have climbed the entire Haidate forest path all the way up to the Yazawa Pass without a break — and there on top of it I started to cry out loud. Then I went down the Yazawa forest path, but there was no tree that could have been cut as well. When I reached the Ōkami Pass, I was again driven to tears.”

Kiyomi’s words were literally pouring out over the mayor who only reached up to his chest.

The big Kiyomi was well known for being talkative, for getting agitated often and for crying frequently. And when he said that he was crying, it was not just a saying, he was really shedding tears.

Surely Keinosuke knew about this. Nevertheless he was on his way back to the village office where he had to write his letter of resignation. Since he was walking on
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foot he would need another hour to reach the village office. And he was well determined to hang on and stick to his guns in their quarrel.

So he grumbled “And you cannot cut the young trees” as he started moving again.

“And today I started crying at the Yomogahara Pass”, said Kiyomi, who started walking with him.

“Well, what you say is right. You cannot cut the young trees, yet, but mayor, try to put yourself in my place. I cannot return to my family today.”

“What, you cannot return to your family?”

“No, I cannot. If I do not want to get killed, I cannot go home. I know, too, that you cannot cut the young trees yet. Maybe I know that better than you do. And because you cannot cut the young trees, there is nothing left to live off anymore.”

“I know that myself.”

“I don’t care if you know that yourself. There is nothing left to live off anymore. And people say that there is no use in letting the trees in the mountains grow until they are tall and strong if people die of hunger. And now they say that another 75 chō of forest will be sold. I am dead against it!” said Kiyomi with the true ring of conviction.

If 75 chō of village forest were sold, all the charcoal burners would have to fear for their survival. The forest was about to be sold by the village to the industrial cooperative which would then sell it to the charcoal burners’ cooperative.

“If we don’t sell, we will not make the next year. To be honest, this is all my idea” Yui Keinosuke said finally, virtually spitting out the works.

“I know that, too.”

“I don’t care whether you know that, too”, replied Keinosuke so harsh and gruff that Kiyomi wondered where this little man who looked like a sick bird with ruffled up feathers took all the energy from. What struck him even more was that the two of them had the same quarrel as before but now with roles reversed. Usually Kiyomi would react to that with roaring laughter, but this time he did not feel like laughing.

“The teachers’ salaries are three months in arrears. And even if we only pay them a part of it, we have to pay them. What shall we do at the end of this year? The employees in the administration have to be paid, just like the rates for our low-interest funds and the allowances for the members of the village assembly. We have to reimburse Yuya for the expenses of the construction work... Kiyo, how shall I pay all this? Let’s give away 75 chō of forest. Even if we sold 200 chō, the money would not be enough at the end of the year!”
“But this is not the last time that we have to sell something! There are no trees left to cut down, no trees left, not a single tree left!”

“But without trees we will have no money for the next year!”

“Not a single tree left!”

Kiyomi’s mad laughter rose up to the tops of the chestnut trees standing at the roadside as if it would shake them. And while he laughed tears were rolling down his cheeks which were as weather-burned as the bark of the trees.

Keinosuke saw these tears, too. To watch this six-foot-tall man laughing while crying and crying while laughing, left with nowhere to turn, was a heartbreaking sight.

To the villagers, who knew that there were no trees left to cut down and who did not know what to live off without the trees, it was clear that under the current circumstances in the village where there was nothing to harvest and nothing to sell there would be no money for the next year without trees for the production of charcoal.

“Listen mayor, when selling off some village forest you should keep in mind our feelings, too. We have harvested trees in the mountains just like sometimes skin is peeling of the body and thus the body is losing some of its parts.”

“But now we are in trouble. We are in such deep trouble that I can hardly bear to watch it.”

“It is a shame that it has come that far.”

“Yes, it has come that far.”

Then the two of them turned into different directions and sigh deeply.

III

The profit from 3,600 chō of village forest made up a third of the yearly income of the village, so the forest was an important resource. The village tax reached roughly the same amount. Both sums together make up the core of the village finances. The year before in 1935 it was 6,861 yen in village tax versus 6,837 yen of profit from the village forest. Compared to these sums the 874 yen in subsidies, 4,700 yen from the government coffers and another grant of 232 yen were no big deal.

However, in these two main fields of income payments were heavily in arrear, surpassing 10,000 yen by far.

The cutting down of trees in the village forest had traditionally been practised as a matter of course according to a natural rotation plan. Every year around 100 to 120 chō of forest were earmarked for cutting down, so that an area was harvested only
every 25 years. This system has never been violated in the past, since there never was a necessity to do so. By using just the designated area, it was possible to burn 100,000 bundles of charcoal per year. This was enough for the villagers with their small patches of farmland when they went into the forest to make charcoal. Their world hidden in the mountains did not know frivolous pleasures. People went into the mountains with the sun which was rising late and came back early with the sun setting early as well. Far away from the problems of the outside world people lived a carefree life. It was like a dream of a paradise hidden somewhere deep in the mountains unknown to the rest of the world. But then more and more people flooded into this region hitherto hidden from the outside world just like water finding its way between two rocks. The population started rising and quickly filled the narrow valleys. The dream of paradise finally burst during the horrible crisis in agriculture in 1930/31. The recession came like a thunderstorm from the lowlands into the mountains and destroyed everything in his way. Along the rivers of the Nukuigawa, along the prefectural road, everywhere people planted mulberry trees rising higher than their houses to feed their silkworms. When the prices for raw silk plunged, their major source of income vanished suddenly. A kan (3.75kg) of silkworm cocoons, priced at 12.13 yen before, suddenly brought only 2 yen. The price of a bundle of charcoal, previously at 1.40 yen, dropped to 0.40 yen. To compensate for the decline in prices, people increased production, since it was not possible to compensate the declining prices by a reduction in food consumption. The living standard was at subsistence level anyway, and there was no further possibility for compensation. So people had to work harder to increase the amount they produced. Since the price for a bundle of charcoal had dropped from 1.40 yen to 0.40 yen, the logical conclusion was that to make the same amount of money as before one had to use 300 chō of forest for charcoal production instead of the 100 chō used before. So the villagers started to cut down the forest. They just had to harvest trees. There was no way the old plan of cutting down only 100 chō per year could be upheld in the face of people who said that they had nothing to eat. A hundred chō per year turned into 150 chō, 150 chō turned into 200 chō, and soon there were more trees cut down than was healthy for the forest. In 1930 alone 220 chō of village forest was harvested. In this way the bark was peeled off the mountains until they were standing there nearly naked. It was not because people were not concerned with the future.
But the present was the more pressing problem for them. Village taxes went deeper and deeper into arrears; the political leadership of the village could not even reap the profit they envisioned when they decided the sell-off of usage rights of the village forest. In the end there was no way out of this situation. In 1931 the demand for trees from the villagers had again increased dramatically. So the exploitation of resources continued, even though only 169 chō were officially earmarked for usage. And those were only the figures for the village forest. Another 621 chō of privately owned forest were exploited even more mercilessly. People were chasing wood like mad but as a consequence drove themselves only deeper into poverty. The reason for this was that wood from the privately owned forest was more expensive and some overly eager buyers were even duped by the vendors. The vendors “miscalculated” the forest area or the amount of wood in question, and there were cases where the vendors forced the buyers to also buy other goods besides the wood at ridiculously high prices. The rich peasant Yuya was a particularly notorious case. He owned 400 chō – more than half of the whole area of privately owned forest. The more people worked for him, the more burden he put on their shoulders, their debts were rising and their situation was worsening constantly.

In 1932 100 chō were cut down, in 1933 it was 150 chō since 50 chō were added privately from Yuya, and in 1934 the total amount came to 189 chō, so the mountain top went practically bald. The whole timber – the keyaki trees, the beeches, the nettle trees and the larches – was soon cut down and turned into charcoal without waiting for the stems to reach a certain girth. People did not even bother to reforest the area for instance with larches, they left the area barren and just cut the grass that started growing there. Villagers like Kingo and Matsu’ichi went all the way to Kamaeri beyond the far away boundary with Gunma to cut wood over there. If not at least 75 chō of village forest were cut down, the villagers and the village administration were not able to survive. Horikawa Kiyomi had climbed the Yomogahara Mountain to take a look at these 75 chō a last time with tears in his eyes.

“Oh, shit. I can’t give you an answer. Oh, Kiyomi, if it only were tomorrow. Tomorrow morning I am going to Tokyo and I am not coming back.” It was not that Kiyomi did not know that the 75 chō of forest in question were on the Yomogahara Mountain. Who could overlook that?

“What? Tomorrow? To Tokyo? You are going to Tokyo tomorrow?” Kiyomi looked frightened as he squinted and stared at the mayor.
“Yea, I will not be mayor from tomorrow.” Although he intended to sound rather casually, he did not succeed.

The word “Tokyo” had triggered a memory about something that has been going around in Kiyomi’s head and he suddenly asked with a stern voice:

“Where is Asakawa Take-chan anyway? Are you alone, mayor?”

“Hey, I won’t be mayor from tomorrow.”

That was not what Kiyomi wanted to know: “Where is Asakawa Take-chan? Do you really think you can take it that easy? In that case, you know, I will just come with you.”

Kiyomi’s face was calm and not betraying any sentiments. Although he heard Keinosuke say twice that he would not be mayor from tomorrow, there was no way he could reproach him for that. And somehow the major as well seemed to be quite fond of this Asakawa Take-chan.

“I have to go tomorrow”, he said, while Kiyomi was grumbling to himself “Mayor, do you really have to go?”

“I will go anyway. And I will bring him back with me” said Keinosuke, his voice suddenly changed.

“Ha, I might as well come with you then!”

“Can you sneak off tomorrow?”

“Hmm, if I have not sorted out what to do about the mountain forest by tomorrow, I’ll get killed.”

“Okay, then I’ll go on my own. That’s fine. I’ve made up my mind. I’ll bring him back to the village.”

“It’s settled then. If there’s some problem, send me a telegram and I’ll come over. The two of us together will bring him back even if we have to pull him by a ring through his nose.”

Keinosuke had first come up with this idea in summer. At that time he had already thought about the hardship of winter, just like the cooperative’s managing director Kiyomi, and together with Sugawa Sahei, the vice-mayor, the three of them had talked it through. Sugawa Sahei was of the same age as the mayor, but he was not such a strong personality. To say that he was not such a strong personality was not meant as a reproach. It was just that as a matter of fact nobody came forward in this different situation in village politics.
Everywhere the honorary offices of mayor and vice-mayor were desperately fought over, so if the mayor could not attend office due to illness no special care was taken for him. However, things were different in Ōhinata, because there nobody volunteered for mayor. Even people thought to possess the qualification did not volunteer, so there was no choice but to rely on anybody who showed the slightest interest. The fact that Yui Keinosuke served three terms, or twelve years, as mayor was not due to some special ability, the same as with the two terms, or eight years, of Sugawa Sahei.

Takemaro of Asakawa was from a wealthy family from the hamlet of Yazawa. He was the eldest son of an old family which was traditionally called by the former place name Asakawa as their family name. Their house was currently only inhabited by the old mother and her second son. Takemaro had left to study in the Political Science Department of Waseda University and then had set up his household in Tokyo instead of returning to the village. The old, rich family, however, was a thing of the past. In those days its wealth was gradually declining and the family was barely holding out at the bottom level of the first rank families of the village. They were of the kind that could be called the “branch family poverty”, because the subsequent building of a second and a third house for branch families had hollowed out the main house. The Asakawas had seven branch houses in the same hamlet. Three of them surpassed the main house in wealth and were among the mainstream of the first rank families. When Takemaro left to go to university the family business was about to collapse, so he had no desire to return to his real home in the countryside. When he graduated in 1923 he immediately joined the company Nissei Seimei and married a woman who was not from the countryside but from Tokyo and he visited his hometown only once a year. He was not even at his family home when it was rumoured that he was about to come back to the village for good.

In summer, when the three people had already voiced their concern about the hardship of winter, Keinosuke had talked about bringing Takemaro back to the village from Tokyo, because there was nobody else.

“Hey, come on, let’s get Take-chan for the job! If it were for Take-chan, he would work until the barrel hoop around this 4-shaku\(^{25}\)-barrel rubs off”, he said drumming with his flat hands on the barrel-like upper body of Kiyomi who in summer was wearing just his undershirt.

\(^{25}\) 1 shaku = 30.3 centimetres
“Kiyo-san would become Take-chan’s horse without further ado. Take-chan did not even need a whip or spurs”, said the jocular Sahei, although he was dead serious about the matter.

“Oh, yes, with Take-chan on my back I would fly through the dry riverbed of the Nukuigawa, then I would fly through the village and through the mountains”, said Kiyomi with his thick resonant voice which sounded like he was crying.

Keinosuke as well as Sahei had seen the figure of the fifteen-year-old Kiyomi jumping over the large stones along the riverbank carrying the young Takemaro on his back like a horse.

Kiyomi was born the second son of a poor family. He did not finish school properly, but went to work along the Nukuigawa. There he looked after the young Takemaro, became his horse, and if he became tired of it, he just strapped him to his back. In summer he would put him in a washtub and let him play in the Nukuigawa, or he would catch trout to delight him. He did this job for about five years.

However, in the end no one of the three went to ask Takemaro what he had to say. The business of his family was declining; the family was being looked down upon by the uncles of the branch families and their offspring, and everybody thought by himself that it did not make sense to return to the village.

Since then they had not raised this touchy topic again. So while they were strolling along the banks of the Nukuigawa, both Keinosuke and Kiyomi did not think about what they would finally hear from Asakawa Takemaro about whether he would return to the village or not. They just did not think about it. What they would hear from him just did not make a difference. The only thing that Keinosuke was thinking about was that he would bring him back even if he had to pull him by a ring through his nose.

Kiyomi, too, was thinking about nothing else, so did not reproach Keinosuke for the topic he had mentioned of his not being mayor or anything else from tomorrow.

Kiyomi did not talk about this issue until he finally parted with Keinosuke in front of the village office in Hiragawara. It helped to think that from now on things would steadily take a new direction. That's why as soon as he had parted from Kiyomi, Yui Keinosuke entered the village office, which lay quiet and deserted since the young clerks had already gone home. There he spread out his letter of resignation, written with a worn-off brush chewed up at the tip, in front of vice-mayor Sugawa who was sitting there all alone.
The jocular Sugawa Sahei stared at the letter of resignation with the blood pulsing in his temples. The old guy usually had a joke on his lips, and his blood was circulating very fast.

“I will leave for Tokyo tomorrow.”

Sugawa understood the very instant Keinosuke uttered this phrase.

“Okay then.”

While he said this, he opened the lid of his inkstone case and started rubbing the inkstone very hard to make ink.

Then he turned around to the bus scheduled pasted on the wall behind him and asked: “What time are you leaving?”

With this gesture he cornered the mayor, the letter of resignation he had just received from him laying in front of him on his desk. He spread half a sheet of paper and taking the mayor’s letter as a model he started writing himself like this were a calligraphy exercise. He, too, was writing with an old, chewed up brush.

When he finished writing, he stacked the two sheets together, folded them four times and inserted them in an envelope, which he stuffed in the drawer of his desk. Looking not the slightest bit concerned he asked: “I dug up some mountain potatoes. Do you want to take some of them as a gift?” He said this as if nothing had happened, that was his way of handling things.

“I don’t want to burden myself with them and look like a country bumpkin from the mountains of Saku at first sight”, said Keinosuke, sounding somehow relieved.

“So what. You are dressed like someone from the top of the mountains of central Japan anyway. Don’t you think that a sack of potatoes would go well with that appearance? Think about it, Kei-san!”

Sahei did not relent and backed off from his conviction that no matter what Keinosuke had to take a sack of mountain potatoes with him.

IV

It is well known that Nagano Prefecture is a mountainous area. In those days, the total amount of arable land in the prefecture only amounted to 172,737 chō, while at the same time 211,132 farm households could be counted. So the average size of the farmland per household was not more than 0.82 chō. However, as could be seen easily when looking out of the window of a train on the Chūō Line or the Shin’etsu Line, steep mountain slopes were opened up and the mountain sides were cultivated
into fields. Not only were the steep slopes turned into fields, but the cultivation went also up all the way to the mountaintops, and in the end those 0.82 ちō were literally carved out of the mountains up to their very tops. There were no rivers carrying a lot of water to speak of, so it had to be brought up arduously little by little from far away by irrigation measures like dams and pipes. Those narrow 0.82 ちō of fields which “could easily been hidden under a straw hat” were being cultivated with utmost sincerity.

People clung to their scarce fields, but not being blessed by nature and the climatic conditions, one had to have an unrelenting will to carve out a living there, and possess untiring physical strength. On top of strength and willpower one also needed a sharp wit to hold one’s own against the harsh and merciless natural conditions.

To raise the average 0.82 ちō of farmland per household to the national average of 1.07 ちō per household the number of farm households had to be lowered to at least 161,437 households. Thus 49,695 or nearly 50,000 farm households were surplus population. To counter the current crisis on a national scale, however, the land for cultivation per household had to be extended to at least 2 ちō according to the suggestions of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, which had concluded that otherwise a self-sustained and stable agriculture was not possible. Thus we were actually looking at 100,000 surplus households in Nagano. It had then become possible to clear out those more than 100,000 farm households and for the first time provide farm households in Nagano with nearly 2 ちō of land for cultivation, enabling them to run a business that could really be called agriculture.

Nagano Prefecture had adopted the scheme for emigration of agricultural settlers to Manchuria in connection with the economic revitalization of villages throughout the prefecture. When as early as 1932, at a time when the smoke of the Manchurian Incident had not yet dispersed, the first paramilitary settlers founded the village of Iyasaka in Yongfengzhen near Jiamusi in Northern Manchuria, 32 people from Nagano Prefecture were among them; a further 29 people from Nagano were among the paramilitary settlers of the second group which founded their settlement of Chiburi in Hunanying in the following year of 1933. Since then the sending of agricultural settlers to Manchuria had become a basic policy for the prefecture.

In 1934, 26 persons from Nagano went with the third group of settlers to the settlement of Mizuho in Suifen. In 1935, 42 persons joined the fourth group bound for Chengzihe and Hetahe; and in the following year of 1936, 294 people went with the
fifth group of emigrants to settle in Heitai, where they established the Shinano Village of Heitai, a village which for the first time took the form of a migrant group consisting only of people from the Shinshū region.

Ōmura Seiichi, the governor of Nagano Prefecture, was especially enthusiastic about the basic idea of sending out migrants from the prefecture. Shinano was the roof of Honshū, but now the roof was in a way being torn down. The governor showed uninhibited enthusiasm for the restoration of the thick forests on the mountains of Shinano, which were being cultivated all the way up to the top. The number of migrants from Shinshū was the highest nationwide; and due to their strong willpower, their great physical strength and their sharp wit people would soon realize that people from Nagano were destined to take over a central and leading role among all the migrants from different places.

However, to the eyes of the people from Minamisaku county living in the shadow of the mountains, the new horizons of the continent were still closed. They had no hope for the future, no remedy for their present situation; they were mercilessly driven to their last resort. The people from the mountain shadows of Minamisaku were focusing on whether to give up or endure with strength and willpower, but they had no ambition or willingness to volunteer for overseas resettlement on the continent.

Early in the morning of New Year 1937, when mayor Asakawa Takemaro went alone to pray at the Chinchū Shrine and the Suwa Shrine, deep in his heart a new resolution took shape that he should point out the new horizons of the continent lying before these people living in the shadow of the mountains. At this time Takemaro had just learned that a movement for district-division, with the village of Nangō in Miyagi Prefecture at its centre, was in the process of implementation, and was becoming more and more successful. He also learned that the movement for the division of the Shōnai District of Yamato Village in Yamagata Prefecture was in full swing. These were district-division schemes like the Shinano Village situated in Heitai, where migrants from the same prefecture or region formed an emigration group, went to the continent and build a settlement there. However, the resolution which formed in the heart of Asakawa Takemaro was not envisioning the same form of emigration. Although it was vague and partly like a dream because the villagers were not exactly overflowing with self-confidence, it was nevertheless a vision about a totally new form of emigration where the village of Ōhinata was split into half and one half would emigrate to the continent where it would build another new Ōhinata Village on the foreign
soil. He spent the first month of 1937 secretly mulling over this idea on his own. When it was no longer possible to keep his hands idle, when he was just disgusted with the predicament of nowhere to go to revitalize village politics, when he was in a daze and did absolutely not know what to do, this vision he had been secretly mulling over felt like a faint light to him. He did not know whether it was not just a vision. When he thought about this a light shudder came over him. All of January he had been searching old texts that he had at home and he had been searching old books that he dug up at the village office. He also met with the prefectural governor Ōmura and the head of the economic revitalization department Miyoshi at the prefectural office in a single-handed one-person action. He told nobody about it.

The fact that the Shinano Village was built in Heitai and that before long for the sixth-year settler group for the Shinano Village of Minamigodōkan an advance group would be sent for which the application was progressing successfully finally changed its secret vision from being just a vision. The youth from the villages in the shadow of the mountains in the Kiso valley, in Ina and in Suwa, and even those from the plains and basins were eagerly joining the sixth-year settler group in rising numbers.

The first meeting of the four pillar institutions for the reconstruction of Ōhinata Village was on 1 February. When Takemaro came to the conviction that he would present his lonely visions to the village assembly, his visits to the prefectural office became more frequent. Although he still did not speak to anybody about them, at the end of January he made preparations to break the news of his decision to Hirokawa Kiyomi. This former farm hand and babysitter who carried him on his back jumping over the rocks along the Nukuigawa and his young master were a strange team, coming together again after 35 years to support each other in the reconstruction of their village; and also this time it was not only just a figure of speech that Asakawa was carried on the shoulders of Horikawa who once played his horse. It was not just a superficial feeling but Asakawa’s heartfelt conviction that he should rely on Horikawa because there was nobody else to rely upon. Although it was the nature of their offices as village mayor and managing director of the industrial cooperative to support each other, it was not their respective offices which brought the two of them together. Whereas one of them graduated from university, the other one was a charcoal burner who had not even properly finished elementary school. One of them had a proper education, the other one had practical experience; one had the theory, the other one the practice; one had the thoughts, the other one the strength for action; one of them was
taciturn, the other one was eloquent; everywhere one of them could make up for the things the other one of them lacked, so it was indispensable that they supported each other. It was an irony of fate that once again one of them should be the horse carrying the other one on his shoulders to carry him through the thunderstorm that was roaring through the entire village.

Then came 1 February, when the first meeting of the four pillar institutions was about to be opened. All the functionaries of the village office, the industrial cooperative, the local schools and the Imperial Agricultural Association were assembled on the second floor of the village office. Many more interested persons also participated. There were even more interested persons than had attended the reception for the former mayor after his resignation.

It was afternoon. The meeting was scheduled to last from the afternoon well into the night. People sat cross-legged on the second floor, which was so densely packed with people, as it has never been before.

Asakawa Takemaro got up first and gave a frank and thorough report about the situation of the village government without leaving out any details. He spoke about the impasse and the predicament the village government was in with its effort to revitalize the village and at the same time about the meaning of the improvement of the financial situation of every single household. It could be definitely said that this had already reached an absolutely desperate state. All the villagers were shocked by his assessment that even the gods would not know what to do in this situation, but as shocked as they were, they had to agree nevertheless. Nobody had any suggestions what to do. Pressed together in one corner of the room were a lot of younger men who had come as interest persons, but although they looked like they were not the people who could keep silent under those circumstances, they did not raise their voices.

That was the time when the topic of emigration was taken up. Standing in front of those villagers living in the shadows of the mountain without sunlight and only half-long days, mayor Asakawa’s speech about the outline of the emigration form Nagasaki Prefecture which had begun in 1932 pierced the peoples’ hearts like a six-inch dagger.

“I want to make an announcement about what I have been doing lately and something I found out from old records about outlines of Ōhinata Village in 1879. I want you to listen carefully while I compare them to our present situation.”
When Takemaro said this, the room suddenly became silent as a grave. Those who had been smoking stabbed out their cigarette, the young men perched together in the corner all turned their heads.

“According to the old records from 1879 the village at that time had a total population of slightly more than 240 households. So if you will, that is slightly more than 240 households versus the current 406 households. And they even had 4 tan more of paddy fields in those days than we have nowadays, 4 tan more!! That means they had 502 tan versus the 498 tan we have presently. For the dry fields I cannot say because unfortunately I do not understand the figures, but I can tell the figures for those fields where barley and wheat was grown. We have currently 80 tan where we grow barley and wheat, but in those days they had 600 tan, nearly eight times as much.”

“They had 600 tan in those days?” said a voice from where the young men were perched together. It was not clear who of them said this, but that was not important anyway since it could have been anybody’s shocked voice.

“Yes, they had 600 tan. But they only had a population of some 240 households and on top of it trees were covering the mountains so thickly that it was dark even around noon. When the main hall of Zenkō Temple was refurbished in the Genroku era the wood for the construction was transported there from this very village – that much I understood from the old records. The big round pillar which is in the centre of the main hall even today was made from a cypress that was transported there from this very village. If you think about it, then you must admit that a number of 400 households in this village is utterly unreasonable. This is where the problems come from.”

“Mayor, do you think that the village can be revitalized if we only had a population of 240 households like in those time, if let’s say we could reduce our population by 50 households?” asked Kosuda Sanjirō, the secretary in charge of the industrial cooperative and vice-president of the local branch of the reservist association.

“I can see a chance for revitalization then” answered Takemaro with a smile at the same time as Mizuhara Tōzaburō from the hamlet of Yazawa got up an raised his voice from the cramped corner: “Sure it will revitalize.”

“If we do that, then the village can revitalize on its own. Today we have 336 agricultural households instead of 240 in the village. Let’s assume a case with a reduction of 50 households. Today every household has on average 6.1 tan of arable land. If
we do some mental arithmetic it is easy to conclude that then every household would have 11 tan. That would be fabulous!”, said Tōzaburō with his quick computing.

“Wow, you did this all in your head!” Yui Keinosuke was so amazed that he blurted this out loud and those sitting around him started to laugh.

“Yes, that’s right. It will be exactly 11.3 tan. Today a household has 1.5 tan of paddy fields and 4.6 tan of dry fields. That makes a total of 6.1 tan. If this were 2.1 tan of paddy fields and 9.2 tan of dry fields, than this would sum up to a total of 11.3 tan. But I did not work it out in my head.” said Takemaro while he started laughing himself.

Everybody started laughing then. Tōzaburō was scratching his head while he was laughing and this time he did not get up when he said:

“In that case we could be mostly autonomous in the production of our food, couldn’t we?”

“We can never be sure, but I think it could work.” said Kosuda Sanjirō in the direction of Tōzaburō without getting up.

“Last year’s harvest was 1,100 koku26 of rice, barley and wheat together came to 130 koku, azuki beans and soya beans together came to 120 koku. This was a pretty average harvest, but it was no more than a third of the whole village consumption. Last year the cooperative bought 1,700 koku of rice for redistribution.”

“By the way, if this calculation contains no mistakes, then there will be fields up for grab for the households staying behind. How can they be redistributed fairly within the village, has anybody already thought about that?” said the village assembly member Amakawa Harunosuke with his deep, resonant voice.

“What we first have to talk about is the general plan. If we do not discuss this plan, we will get nowhere. We should talk about whether to reduce our population, whether to emigrate to Manchuria, this is the question we have to decide first.”

Takemaro could well imagine Amakawa Harunosuke’s intentions. Thereafter nobody took up on Harunosuke’s words.

Getting up on one knee Kosuda Hikoichirō from the hamlet of Shukudo said: “The food is one thing, but if those using the village forest were reduced by half, the amount of wood for charcoal burning that each household could get would also increase.”

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26 1 koku = 180 litres
“Hiko-chan, you are working really hard in the mountains, that is why you suddenly noticed.” Kiyomi laughed while shaking his barrel-like upper body.

“That’s it, Hiko-chan”, said Kosuke Hyōgo. “That’s it. The amount of wood you can get your hands on will surely rise. You will grind your teeth and you will not stop making charcoal. In the future one part of today forest used for charcoal production will once again just like in the old days be used as timber. The forest will again be so thick that it gets dark around noon.”

“Wow, going back to timber production.” Hikoichirō nodded in agreement.

“We will no longer have to go all the way up into the part belonging to Gunma Prefecture.”

Suddenly a young voice coming out of the crowded corner shouted: “Did you fall into the river and crack you skull?”

Regardless of the manner of speaking, these words started everybody and in an instant they all sank back to their seats.

Then from the middle of those who sank back into their seats the voice of Takemaro sounded: “My friend, you are not one of those wanting to go to Manchuria? If only one or two went, that would be useless. But you know that only 250 households can survive here. Do you think that it is only a dream that 150 households can emigrate to Manchuria and build a new Ōhinata Village over there?”

Contrary to the expectation that the room would fall dead silent again, Kosuda Sanjirō jumped up with his small frame like driven by a spring the very moment that Takemaro had finished speaking: “I don’t think it’s a dream. I think we can do it and I will go to Manchuria.”

“Hey, Kosuda, don’t speak in such a hurry.” said a smiling Kiyomi in the middle of faces full of tension. “You don’t know what is coming out later of what you say now at this moment. So don’t say anything now, better you decide later without haste. It is better if we don’t talk about individual decisions at the moment. Now we should only think about what the mayor said, whether this is just a dream or whether we could put it into practice. What do you all think?”

This said, he looked around at the other participants and smiled.

“I think we can make it”, came out of the dark face of the assembly member Hyōgo.

“It’s not a dream. I think, too, that we can make it”, shouted Mizuhara Tōzaburō out of the middle of the crowd.
“Well, no matter what I feel, will it not be difficult to put that into practice? Listen, I am just talking about my feeling and my determination”, said Akiyama Ginjirō, a representative of the agricultural association of the hamlet of Kamaeri with a clear and piercing voice out of the middle of the crowd as well.

“Difficult, indeed. I think in all those years I never encountered a problem as difficult as this,” said Kiyomi who stopped smiling and made a serious face.

“I admit it’s difficult. But do you think it’s absolutely impossible? Don’t you think it can be done by just going one step at a time?”

“If we talk about the problem of implementation, then my very first feeling is that it really can’t be done.” This time Kiyomi nodded with a serious look. He understood the feelings of Ginjirō quite well.

“How can we solve the problem of implementation?”

“Let’s start at the very beginning. If we go than we will have to take our fathers and mothers, our wives and children with us as well. That could be the problem of implementation and I don’t think that we could go then.”

While Ginjirō said this he watched the face of his neighbour very closely. His face seemed to say that everybody was thinking the same.

However, Ginjirō did not say anything else. The majority of the people assembled would not say more because he was not from the same social level as they were.

Kiyomi watched Takemaro from the corner of his eye, a look that did not escape Takemaro.

“Gin-san, we intend to solve that problem, too”, said Kiyomi smiling while his eyes were glittering for a moment.

Nevertheless, nobody knew how to solve this problem – that went without saying.

“We intend to solve all the problems connected to the implementation. Do you think that we can realize the proposal pf sending 150 households to Manchuria to build a new Ōhinata Village? Do you agree or do you oppose this proposal?”

When Takemaro said this looking around among the assembled, Mizuhara Tōzaburō had already risen to his feet.

“Sure we can do it! Sure we agree with the mayor! Come on, everybody, let’s go!”

“I agree with Mizuhara-kun!”

When Kosuda Sanjirō shouted that, others started shouting the same until everybody agreed.

“Mayor! There is nobody having a different opinion!”
Horikawa Kiyomi said this in his rarely used standard Japanese, blinking hectically with his thick eyelashes like his eyes were overflowing.

When night fell none of the meeting’s participant was getting up. Usually one or two people were getting up and slowly the number of people would decrease, but this did not happen that night. This can also be called something that did not happen before. Those who got up and went downstairs just went to the toilet and they all came back up again. There was nobody who did not return. Only the assembly member Amakawa Harunosuke went downstairs and did not come back. And then the assembly member Sasaya went downstairs without coming back.

V

A few days later when Takemaro had just finished dinner after returning home from the village office, he heard some unexpected voices coming in from outside. When he went out to look he saw Mizuhara Tōzaburō, Akiyama Ginjirō and Ōsawa Yoshikichi standing in the dark storeroom.

At the far end of the long veranda was the room for the Buddhist altar where some stairs leading to the second floor of an annex stood in a right angle. Below the stairs leading to this annex was a storeroom where firewood and junk were piled up. The second floor had been closed and unused for a long time, but when Takemaro returned, it was put back into use for all the people coming frequently. Starting with Kiyomi, the employees of the village office came over, and it can be said that the room became something like the night office of the mayor. People sometimes unexpectedly walked along the long corridor and went up to this room.

The three people who had come over this evening had not gone up, so Takemaro went up to the second floor with them and said: “This is my office. The family does not come up here. Just sit comfortably.”

In front of a gigantic iron brazier, Takemaro sat down with his legs widely crossed, deliberately showing he was relaxed.

“Looks like this turned into the office for planning the migration to Manchuria”, said Tōzaburō who had sat down cross-legged first, since he was closest to the mayor and came from the same hamlet.

So they had opened up the topic that they came over to talk about this evening.

“Yes, I’d like to use it that way. So, tell me, what’s the general mood? Are you still trying to work things out? What’s your feeling?”
“I think we can realize it. The mood among the people around me is that they all want to come along. Mayor, this is not just a wild dream”, said Ōsawa Yoshikichi using formal language. He did not sit cross-legged since he thought this to be not appropriate.

“I don’t care whether it’s dream or not. I think deep in their hearts they all want to go. I would go as the first of us. I would take my whole family with me. Mayor, I think I should take all of Kamaeri with me, leaving not a single one of the eight houses over there behind. I should just try it”, said Akiyama Ginzirō offering to go first just like he did at that evening in the village office.

“Eight houses?” Takemaro asked in return, and Tōzaburō said at the same time: “Not leaving a single house behind?”

“Yes, Not a single house would be left in Kamaeri. I am pretty confident. I would try to relocate Kamaeri just the way it is now. The hamlet of Kamaeri would just disappear. It’s a big mistake to live over there anyway.”

Although he wanted to say this to Takemaro, Ginzaburō had turned to Tōzaburō.

“All of Kamaeri? Hmm, well...Well, it’s probably not a place for people to live over there.” Takemaro looked at Ginzaburō very hard without showing the surprise he felt in his heart.

“I am fiercely decided to go. And among those around me are more people who are fiercely decided, too. I think that from now on more and more people will decide to go, but, Mayor, it won’t be an easy thing to do. And if you think about that, our hearts get gloomy and depressed”, said Yoshikichi falling out of the formal language again.

“We think that’s the problem, Mayor. And it’s not just us. Everybody is depressed.”

“I have to look into this. Me and Horikawa, we really have to do some in-depth research into this matter, especially into the matter of debts, where some are tied up in debt ten or twenty times their income.”

“When you are tied up in debts then there is really no way to work your way out of them. Going to Manchuria would be foolish, you cannot even move to a neighbouring village then.”

That was the first time debts had been a topic in the discussion. Up to then they had not been mentioned at all. However, even if you did not mention them, everybody knew that they were there. It was at that time that this topic came out in the open.

“The total sum of debts is 480,000 yen, that is an average of 1,200 yen for each household, and this is not exactly helpful. However, we should not only look at the
average amount of debts per household, since they do not apply to the really poor people in the village. If you look at debts and property, then you see that to have large debts you also have to have property as a security, otherwise you cannot take out a loan. The poor people in the village would not be surprised by these figures; it is just that we are. If you just look at the poor people, then the sum of debts they have to carry on their shoulders amounts to 70,000 yen”, said Tōzaburō, who was fond of numbers.

“Those who really want to go to Manchuria, those who think that they have to go to Manchuria, those who think that they must go because they have to rebuild the village, those people are really people like us, but actually none of us would be able to go. We just do not have the ability to go, just like Mizuhara said, we could not even move to the neighbouring village”, said Ginzaburō with an expression showing that this was actually what they came to talk about tonight.

“That’s the way it is. Particularly those who could go without a complaint are those who have no need to go”, said Takemaro smiling. Talking like a man of great experience Yoshikichi added: “If only those people would completely disappear from the village, the village thereafter would fall into ruins”

Still smiling but with a serious expression Takemaro went on: “See, that’s why I think that we will have to select those 150 people from all classes. If we only send the poor people, then the situation here would probably not improve and the village over there could not be properly built. And as you said, if only those who leave without a complaint would go, the village over there would probably turn out good, but the village over here would fall into ruins. This is why I think, that people from all classes, the landlords, the free peasants, the tenants as well as the charcoal burners having nothing to do with farming at all, they all have to be prepared to go. Here as well as over there, we have to do good on both sides....And I intend to go myself.”

“You want to go, too, Mayor?” asked Tōzaburō in reply his face suddenly changing colour.

“I intend to go.”

“Mayor? You?” said Ginzaburō putting his head slightly to one side. “What do you guys think?” he then said peeking at the faces of Tōzaburō and Yoshikichi.

“It’s not easy to say what we think. Horikawa also said, that he would go, so...” When Tōzaburō stalled, Yoshikichi continued:
"It’s because Horikawa also said that he was going. If on top of that the mayor went, too, what would become of the village thereafter? It is like we just said; to get things right on both sides we have to select people from all classes: I think that everything, not just the property we talked about before, but also the different classes should be taken into consideration. Property is important, but at the same time it’s the heads. It’s the people. I think we need the heads and the people to successfully divide the village”, said Yoshikichi now peeking at Tōzaburō’s and Ginzaburō’s faces as well.

“That’s it. I think so, too”, said Ginzaburō and Tōzaburō one after the other.

“I think the mayor cannot go.”

“And besides that there is another problem. This is actually not so much my problem. I’m not saying ‘You should go, you should go’, I’m saying ‘I go’, isn’t that so? The problem is those people sitting at the sidelines shouting ‘You should go, you should go’. I am sick and tired of that.”

The young men were nodding their heads, not repeating what had just been said.

“It is just this thing with the debts. It’s not only that you get depressed once you start thinking it over, we also have a very troublesome request in this regard”, said Ginzaburō returning to the earlier topic.

“What do you guys want to do? For the moment there is nothing we could do about this problem. What would you guys do? Our most pressing problem....” When Take-marō had said that much, he stopped and made a face as if he was thinking about something. In that instant Ginzaburō reacted:

“Shouldn’t we first try to identify this debt problem? How much is it? Who has how much debt?”

“That’s what I am thinking. But, you guys, this is a backbreaking job. If you don’t do that job properly, then your plan will come to nothing. Only if you do your job properly, we can solve that debt clearance problem. I would give it a try.”

“Okay. Who has how much debt? Then, where do they have those debts? Who do they owe money to, and when did they borrow the money? How much is the interest rate, and under which conditions was the money lent? We have to find this out in every detail. The person responsible for the debts should know this exactly”, said Yoshikichi, and Tōzaburō, who had just lost his father, nodded with a stern expression.

“There are cases where even the person responsible does not know. In my present situation I by and large know about our debts, but I don’t know the details. I don’t
know when and from where the big thing will come flying in our face with a bang. And that will come without fail.”

“What about you guys then? Would you help me then in my research? That would be a start.”

“I will try to help as much as I can. I would take responsibility for Kamaeri”, said Ginzaburō, although he was not entirely satisfied with what Takemaro had said a little while ago, because he had just said that something had to be done without specifying concretely what that was supposed to be. He thought that the financial situation of the village was just the same as the situation in their straw-thatched houses where they also kept saying that something had to be done without being able to change something. That was the only thing he just could not understand.

“We will organize a committee and split up the responsibility for all the different aspects of the work, I think we are looking forward to a good cooperation. There is nothing that cannot be done if you are determined to risk your life for it. I will go and wail at the Ministry for Colonial Affairs, I will wail at the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. I will wail at the prefectural office. I will sacrifice my life. Horikawa as well will risk his life. I will even wail with my hands clasped in front of Yuya’s Kihyōe”, said Takemaro, again saying only that much.

Ginzaburō, Tōzaburō and Yoshikichi had all folded their arms and were holding their breath. Inside the house one could clearly hear the sound of a small mountain stream flowing by and they all looked as if they were leaning towards that sound. Takemaro had folded his arm to look like their companion. Among them Takemaro’s face had undisputedly the severest expression. This face was an unbearable proof of the heavy burden that all those problems here and there were causing.

“It’s the people. There is probably nothing that we cannot do if we are risking our lives for it. What do you think?”

“I think so, too. If we go on like this, there is no life to speak of anyway. So we will risk our lives, too. Wherever this will lead us, we are prepared to give our lives. Honestly speaking, we don’t know whether we can deal with our own situation on our own, but we will try to be as much help as possible.”

Although Yoshikichi was still young, he was very sensible for his age since he became head of the household very early.

Takemaro looked around this room which had been locked for so long. There were not even pictures hanging on the bare walls. He mused: “This room, well, this room, I
don’t know whether this is an office or a club, but I think that you men can use it any
time you like. No matter whether I am here or not, please feel free to use it.”

The three of them nodded and started looking around in the room as well. Takemaro
looked at the alcove where piles of scattered old papers, files with something that
looked like scrap paper and a mountain of worm-eaten drawings could be seen.

“When you have some free time, try to study that. I understand that there is an out-
line of the old Ōhinata Village in there. In those days they had a Gofuku Theatre and
a Buryō Park. The old Ōhinata was a good place to live.”

VI

The village-division plan which was set up as a basic target at the first meeting of the
assembly of the four pillar institutions on February 1 was different from the county-
division plans of Miyagi and Yamagata. It called for the division of one single village
and the relocation of one half of the village to a new settlement somewhere else –
that is to say, simply a village-division where a branch village was created out of a
mother village. The fact that this was an unprecedented example and an epoch-
making new form of village-division astonished the offices in charge in the prefecture,
and due to the widespread interest that followed it received unlimited support. There-
after Asakawa Takemaro’s trips to the prefectural office became rather frequent; the
prefectural governor Ōmura Seiichi and the head of the economics division Miyoshi,
who up to then had not even known the name of that tiny village hidden in the
shadow of the mountains, were nervously on the look-out for the new horizons open-
ing up in front of this village.

The assembly of the four pillar institutions that been the conference for the revitaliza-
tion of the village was simply turned into the committee for village-division with a
meeting every week, always on Saturday. As a result of the research it decided the
adoption of a concrete proposal which was based on the figures that Takemaro had
first published in his personal suggestions: 150 currently existing households as well
as 50 second and third sons who would set up their own independent households in
the new village, making a new village with altogether 200 households. Even if you did
not take the 50 second and third sons into consideration, sending out 150 of the cur-
rently existing households would bring the size of farmland which at the moment did
not surpass 1.5 tan of paddy fields and 4.6 tan of dry fields, up to 2.1 tan of paddy
fields and 9.2 tan of dry fields, amounting to 11.3 tan per household. Furthermore,
the number of those depending on the 3,600 chō of village forest would also be decreased by half. It is clear that this would increase the amount of charcoal wood to be obtained by every single household. The most important thing was that after the modification in the use of wood it would be possible to return to the old way of using the wood for timber. On the mountain ridges, pine trees, cedars, keyaki trees and beeches would again grow thick and lush; the long forgotten dream of the Buryō Park could come back to the people. Ōhinata Village set up the target to have again 250 households with a population of 1,250 villagers, like it had in 1879 in order to be able to rebuilt and revitalize the village.

On March 20 a four-pillar-institution meeting took place in the elementary school with especially members of the Committee for Economic Revitalization of Ōhinata Village on the roster. Many young activists also assembled there that day, so that the meeting somehow looked like a village activists’ rally.

It was at that meeting that the general manager of the charcoal burners’ cooperative, Horikawa Kiyomi, publicly announced his decision to volunteer for emigration despite his age of 56 years.

In the night after Takemaro had presented the plan for migration to Manchuria for the first time, Kiyomi had not been able to sleep a wink. He had been tossing and turning in his bed, and when the morning was nearly dawning he had come to a decision: “I will go, too.”

That was the decision he had reached. In this sleepless night the image of 3,600 chō of village forest being destroyed was floating in his mind, then he saw the mountains disappearing one by one, it was like he was in a delirium, sweat broke out and his heart started beating faster. It was the mountains with nothing left to cut down. Kiyomi was the person who knew this best. And it was also Kiyomi who was the first one to raise his voice saying that it was necessary to cut wood in the coming years on those mountains without anything left for cutting. Kiyomi was painfully aware of the situation where not cutting trees would bring the villagers in danger of starvation, and cutting trees would gravely endanger their livelihood as well. Was there any way out of this? Kiyomi was frantically racking his brains during the sleepless night, but he could not think of any way out. This was not because Kiyomi could not think of something, it was the spirit of the time; nobody else in his place would have been able to find a way out of this dilemma either. Confronted with the problem that to protect the mountains for tomorrow one had to drastically cut back on the necessities of today,
there was nothing he could think of. The only thing that he could think of was to be clubbed to death like a pig and be thrown into the Nukuigawa.

So he thought that it would be best to be clubbed to death like a pig, in that night this seemed to him to be a rather appealing possibility. While he really thought that this would be best, the inevitable sight of the naked mountains drifting through his mind was distressing. He was driven in a corner with no way to escape, when he came to a sudden conclusion and burst out in a roaring monologue. Everybody! This is my fault! It’s me who tore off the skin of the naked mountains! He said this loud and clear. And then his mood began to lighten up slowly.

I will go to Manchuria, too! Having been really down, Kiyomi felt refreshed after making that decision. And if nobody went, I would go! I will be the first one to go. He had no children. Normally he was woken up in the morning, but that day it was just the opposite, he woke up his wife to tell her of his decision.

From that day onwards he stopped working as general manager. There was nothing to worry about since he left the work to his protégé chief secretary Kosuda Sanjirō whom he trusted like a son. He devoted himself entirely to “be the horse” for Take-maro and did not turn his eyes anywhere else.

So at the start of the meeting Kiyomi got up from the chairman’s seat and publicly announced his decision:

“I am 56 years old. When people are in their fifties, then they might have another five good years. I think you should make the best out of these good years. I think in the good years left to me I will go to Manchuria to work there. I discussed this with my wife, who is 52 years of age. We decided to make the most out of the good years left to us. Since the founding of the industrial cooperative in 1922 I have been running around working in a haori or in old Western clothes, as you all know I was basically a charcoal burner working from dawn to dusk. And that was not all the work I have been doing, I also worked as a rice bag carrier, I think am stronger than a young city slicker. When I go to Manchuria I will open up the land and work the fields together with you young people, and I am happily looking forward to doing this. Even if no one of you went, I would go together with my wife. We would go first, open up the land and prepare everything for when you all came over. There are probably people who would argue that this is really bullshit and that the only way to go is to go together. I think the number of these people will rise, and I think I will pester all of you to come

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27 A traditional Japanese short coat
along with me because we can only rebuild the village of Ōhinata if the number of these people comes up to 150. At first there are a lot of difficult problems coming up, especially since we have to get together many people. There are people who are sure that they want to go, but there are also situations where people cannot go, so I think that it will be a tough job to gather the number of people we need.

Although he mixed dialect and standard language, Kiyomi who usually never used correct standard language got the message across clearly. This opening address contained conveyed strong emotions, and there was not even one person coughing in the room.

“Chairman, there is something I’d like to say”, said Takemaro with a voice that was not his usual voice but a bit trembling and hoarse.

“I would like to make one proposition. I personally had made the firm decision to emigrate and bring along my whole family, but I set this idea aside. There is a lot of work that needs to be done for the reconstruction of Ōhinata village with this plan to build a new village with 200 households where 150 of our existing household would go. To gain full administrative support, we must communicate our plan to the Ministry of Colonial Affairs and the Ministry for Agriculture and Forestry. This is a work where we must achieve the total destruction of the old to rebuild the new. What my proposal says is that if we stop our work somewhere halfway, then the rebuilding of the village might no longer be possible. Put in another way, in case we cannot muster 150 households, then I would propose that all of you assembled here, especially all the activists among you, the 33 members of the Committee for Economic Revitalization take the initiative and go to Manchuria. I would propose that we now make a pledge about this. What do you think about this?”

Just like he had been waiting for Takemaro to finish speaking, Kosuda Sanjirō got up and said: “I agree. I think, too, that it is not okay to persuade other people to go without going oneself.”

“I agree”, said a gloomy voice belonging to the village assembly member Kosuda Hyōgo.

“I agree to a pledge”, said Hiramatsu Taihei, the president of the Agricultural Association, getting up.

Then everyone was getting up one by one shouting his agreement.
“Chairman, I have something to say”; said the young representative of the Agricultural Association Ōsawa Yoshikichi getting up from his seat at the far end of the room.

“Just like the mayor just said, I think that the village-division and resettlement to Manchuria is a great step towards the revitalization of Ōhinata Village. I think that this must improve the situation in the mother village as well as it must work out for the branch village. Although there are a lot of problems we have to think about when dividing the mother village and the branch village in terms of the property situation, I will not touch on this topic at the moment. What I want to talk about are the people. These people have to be skilfully distributed on both sides, in the mother village and in the branch village. What is that supposed to mean? Well, when according to the pledge that we are about to make the 33 members of the Committee for Economic Revitalization would all resettle in Manchuria, the branch village would prosper. However, what would become of the mother village? I think that would mean the human resource bankruptcy for the mother village.”

From the seats of the young activists voices were rising saying “That’s it, that’s it.” In that instant Yoshikichi took a peek at Takemaro’s face. Takemaro was smiling a bit at the edges of his mouth.

“I first had decided to go to Manchuria myself taking the whole family with me, but now I think I’d better stay”, continued Yoshikichi.

“Chairman, I have something to say.” The head of the elementary school Nakazawa Yūzō got up.

“I agree with Ōsawa’s opinion. However, if we cannot muster 150 households, we cannot revive the mother village. Even if the 33 committee members stayed behind in the mother village, we could not achieve an improvement. It is absolutely vital that we muster the 150 households. In the unlikely case that we cannot find 150 households, then the 33 committee members should go altogether, because in that case we either have to suffer the economic bankruptcy when they don’t go or the human resource bankruptcy that Ōsawa is worried about when they go, and therefore I would argue that there is no other possibility for them but going. If those 33 people would back out, what should we all think? I am an outspoken person, so shouldn’t we try “human resource bankruptcy” in our village? Since the usually serious Yūzō was not the one using funny expressions normally, people started laughing.
“I don’t think we have to do this”, said Takemaro who was also laughing and some other people sitting at the front of the room said the same.

Among the laughter a voice sounded from seats of the young activists. “Chairman: Mizuhara Tōzaburō” said Tōzaburō from the hamlet of Yazawa from the back of the activists seat, jumping up and announcing his name.

You could tell outright that he was really poor, and everybody felt sorry for the bad luck that had befallen him recently, so it became quieter in the room when he got up then when anybody had got up before.

“As a petty activist, I would like to discuss with all the many activists present. I agree that we should demand a pledge from the committee members now. The reason is that I feel the same about what Kosuda Sanjirō had said before. At the same time, however, I also agree with Ōsawa’s opinion. We have come so far now that we have to go. I myself belong to the group of people who want to go to Manchuria, but we should remember that both parts, the mother village as well as the branch village, are Ōhinata Village. So this is what I want to discuss about with the village activists.”

“What do you want to discuss about?” The one asking this question in a conversational tone was the young Kawashima Junhei sitting right next to him. Smiling Tōzaburō replied:

“I agree with the pledge of the committee members. And I’d propose that all the activists should also make a pledge. What kind of pledge do I mean? Well, it’s a pledge that if in order to gain enough households for resettlement more than half of the 33 committee members go to Manchuria, we pledge that we will be the first ones to actually go. Although there are only a number of people present here at this meeting, I would like to form a volunteer association with the people present as its core members and then enlarge the membership.”

“I agree!” shouted his neighbour Kawashima Junhei.

“I agree!” shouted the young Okumura Sanemitsu getting up and said: “Would those who agree please all get up?”

All the activists got up, not a single one remained seated and they all shouted: “I agree!”

“Let’s form an activists association outside the Committee for Economic Revitalization”, said the hoarse voice of Tsunekawa Yoshitarō while he was still standing.

“No objections!” shouted the young people.
Crouching at the front of the room in the chairman’s set Horikawa Kiyomi was jotting down with his brush what was being said, mostly leaning his ear toward what the young people were saying. Thus, when they all shouted “No objections!” he started winking hectically. He was still crouching over the piece of paper as if seeking shelter. His brush was moving and he kept on writing as if he had forgotten about everything around him.

“Okay, I tried to write a draft for a written pledge that I would like to read to you. Since I am not good at that stuff, please correct me where necessary.”

He seemed to be not very convinced and read his draft stuttering:

Pledge

The Committee for Economic Revitalization of Ōhinata Village seriously plans to implement the resettlement of a large group of migrants in Manchuria. In case the expected number of 150 households cannot be reached, we, the members of the Committee for Economic Revitalization, will join the initial migration group and resettle to Manchuria. We sign this pledge to further the cause of the revitalization of our village through the erection of a new branch village.

March 21, 1937

The members of the Committee for Economic Revitalization of Ōhinata Village

“I approve, I approve, let’s all sign this. Everybody write your name under it,” said Kosuda Hyōgo with a voice as dark as his face into the short silence that had followed, and soon everybody agreed.

Horikawa Kiyomi was the first one to sign and then he passed the list to his neighbour Takemaro. After having covered the whole paper with straight lines, Takemaro signed and handed it to vice-mayor Hatakeyama Shigesama. When Hatakeyama with his magnificent appearance, with his thick beard, his fat belly and his white complexion of someone who without fail had been born in the mountains had finished signing the list, applause started somewhere in the room and amidst this applause he handed the pledge to Hiramatsu Taihei, the president of the Agricultural Association, sitting next to him. Thus every time someone finished signing the list, people applauded. Amidst the applause the list was completed with all 33 names on it:

General manager of the industrial cooperative: Horikawa Kiyomi
Mayor: Asakawa Takemaro
Vice-mayor, president of the industrial cooperative: Hatakeyama Shigesama
President of the Agricultural Association: Hiramatsu Tahei
Vice-president of the Agricultural Association: Kosuda Toraichi
President of the Youth League: Ichikawa Masayuki
President of the Local Reservist Association: Hiraoka Shigeru
Vice-president of the Local Reservist Association: Kosuda Sanjirō
Village office secretary: Horikawa Shōzaburō
Youth league official: Yamaguchi Tōichi
Village assembly member: Yui Moriyuki
Head of a farm practice association: Yui Kichirō
Member of the board of education: Kosuda Kyūgo
Head of a farm practice association: Kosuda Shingo
Head of a farm practice association: Hatakeyama Kokusa
Head of a farm practice association: Ichikawa Hitoshi
Head of a farm practice association: Yui Keinosuke
Village assembly member: Ichikawa Seizaburō
Councillor of the Agricultural Association: Tsuboi Ryōzō
Village assembly and board of education member: Kosuda Hyōgo
Hamlet head: Sugawa Sahei
Director of the industrial cooperative: Hatakeyama Dajo
Village assembly member: Asakawa Tsunemaro
Head of a farm practice association: Kikuchi Keiichi
Representative of the Agricultural Association: Kosuda Hikoichirō
Representative of the Agricultural Association: Ōsawa Yoshikichi
Representative of the Agricultural Association: Akiyama Ginzō
Elementary school teacher: Nakazawa Yūzō
Vocational school teacher: Takekura Eita
Councillor of the Agricultural Association: Kudō Saichi
Head of a farm practice association: Kosuda Jisaburō
Head of a farm practice association: Hatakeyama Gisuke
Head of a farm practice association: Kosuda Uichirō

When the pledge had returned into the hands of Kiyomi, he got up and read it out loud. His piercing voice was flowing out his barrel-like figure in the local Saku dialect drowning from time to time in applause.
VII

At the end of June it was announced by the Ministry of Colonial Affairs it was expected to send the first advance group with 22 members over to Manchuria at the beginning of July.

Members of the advance group would later receive their first basic training at the immigrant training centre in Harbin, after which they were sent out on internships in different settlements, to the first settlement of Iyasaka, the second settlement of Chiburi, the third settlement of Mizuho, or the fourth settlement of Hetahe and Chengzihe, where they would receive real-life training. Since the places for the settlements of the seventh-year migrant groups had not been decided yet, by the time the training would be over, the first thing on the agenda would be to find a place for the settlement.

Twenty members of the advance group had spent a whole month of training at Kikyōgahara. On July 1, when their first month of training had ended, they first returned to the village to prepare everything for their resettlement in Manchuria.

The twenty people who returned had sunburnt skin from one month of hard training; their faces were pitch black, their eyes pinched together front looking into the sun but their bodies seemed to have grown by an inch. They crammed their belongings into enormous wicker trunks that had been provided and paid for by the committee members; then they went around to say goodbye to all their relatives. Those emotional days were quickly over, and on July 8 the first chapter of the story of the construction of Ōhinata Village in Manchuria opened with their departure in high spirits.

They were bound to line up in Niigata on the 10th to board the ship Nihonmaru. Horikawa Kiyomi accompanied them on their way to Niigata.

On the day of their departure all villagers came with them to the border of the village to see them off, and since the day was a Sunday, the pupils of the elementary school from the fourth grade onwards had also lined up in formation to give them a send-off. Led by Nakazawa Yūzō the school orchestra was assembled for a practice session. Kosuda Hyōgo had developed the idea for a song about the endeavour, but since unfortunately the place for the new settlement had not been decided yet and could therefore not be included in the song, he made a song in which the settlement name was not included. He would happily remedy this and make a new song as soon as the settlement place was decided.
There was a rumour that Takei Asakichi from the hamlet of Kamaeri would take the remains of Sue with him, and that was not just a rumour. Asakichi insisted on it, but as was not unknown to anybody, Sue’s lover Nishikawa Yoshiharu was also hoping to do this. Only her mother Fuku, who would be left behind all alone, had not heard of it. So Fuku said that when the time had come for Sue to go to Manchuria she wanted to carry what was left of her over in her own arms. Among the villagers were those supporting Yoshiharu’s cause as well as those supporting Fuku, and the topic was discussed very seriously.

On the July 8 all the villagers assembled at Suwa Shrine. They were more enthusiastic than they had been at the time of departure for Kikyōgahara. All people were crying and the women were all clutching their handkerchiefs. For them Manchuria was still another country far away across the ocean.

The orchestra of the elementary school was standing in front, followed by the group members. Behind them all elementary school children stood in a long queue. When the file loudly sang the song about the construction of Ōhinata in Manchuria and started to move together with the excellent musicians from the school orchestra, the villagers let go of their handkerchiefs and shouted banzai\(^28\) throwing both hands up in the air. While they were shouting banzai, banzai, tears which nobody was wiping off were streaming down their cheeks.

When the dawn breaks in the distance
Our hope is burning and we see the green
Of the new plains on the continent
The light shines on us who open up the land
   Oh, Ōhinata in Manchuria
Pioneers on the wild plains
We work with our axes and hoes
The avant-garde of Japan’s great achievements
We have the strength and energy
   Oh, Ōhinata in Manchuria
Just plant one grain of wheat
And the life in the our home will prosper
Work together until everything is beautiful

\(^28\) Cheers meaning "110,000 years", i.e., long live
In the paradise that we will build
Oh, Ōhinata in Manchuria

The open country is painted with the blood of our ancestors
Now we plough it bravely
And in the sunset glow
We proudly sing the ‘kimi ga yo’
Oh, Ōhinata in Manchuria

They sang loud and in high spirits without stopping. The women’s voices grew more and more harmonious, the men’s voices joined in hoarsely and not always harmoniously.

They stopped at the village boarder and people started to return home, but the older schoolchildren had been told to accompany the group to Haneguroshita station and the school orchestra went along with them. Of course the village functionaries were also expected to come along to the station. There were also many among the villagers that did not turn around to go home at the village border. So the file was actually only reduced by half.

The music and the singing had stopped and the file of people moved on freely right into the direction of the sun which was bathing them in bright light.

From time to time a little voice could be heard from among the crowd of women singing the village construction song. Whenever you wondered whether the singing had stopped, somebody remembered to start again. It was like nobody had the heart to walk the road in silence. Most often the song came out of the group of Nishikawa Katsuyo. In her group were also Mizuhara Tamiko, Ōsawa Masaki and Akiyama Yoshino. They all were now sending off their husbands.

When the group arrived at Haneguroshita station, again there was a huge crowd of people waiting for them. The Youth League, the Reservist Association and the fire brigade of the neighbouring village of Umise had all assembled in their uniforms and the small premises of the station indoors as well as outdoors was tightly filled with the functionaries and the activists from that village.

As if it came back to life, the school orchestra started again singing and playing the village construction song. It was like the send-off usually given to conscripts, however, it was actually even more enthusiastic then such a send-off.

29 The Japanese national anthem

The uniformed welcome groups from Umise Village shouted this over and over again. When Takemaro expressed his gratitude to the uniformed group his eyes were overflowing with tears, which he wiped away as if they had been sweat that had broken out. He saw many other people doing the same.

The platform was filled with people to the point of overflowing when the advance group climbed aboard the train amidst music, song and shout of banzai.

“Let’s go” – “Have a save journey”

Inside and outside the window Kiyomi and Takemaro faced each other and both of them were overflowing with tears.

Finally the train started moving in a storm of cheers after the conductor had blown the departure whistle many times.

The road construction workers on the premises who had waved with their pick axes put the axes down, raised both hands and shouted banzai.

Some people standing at a nearby railway crossing also formed groups and together they shouted Ōhinata banzai.

See the new plains on the continent
The light shines on us who open up the land

Oh, Ōhinata in Manchuria

At that time the conductor finally got himself to blow the whistle for the departure of the train with his cheeks fully blown up.

Hidden in a new breakout of banzai cheers the women started crying. However, not knowing whether their crying would be fully drowned in the banzai cheers, they were crying into their handkerchiefs.

The train started disappearing and slowly the crowd of those who had not wanted to go home before started to disperse until only Takemaro was left standing alone as if he was nailed to the platform. He gazed at the area just opposite the platform where he could see a huge pile of timber at the place where raw material was stored. Thick logs of pine trees, cedars and cypresses were piled up like mountains; timber piles of all sizes were lined up on this storage site. Keyaki, mountain keyaki and larches, the majestic trees turned into fat tree trunks were rolling around. There were also all kinds of piles of chestnut trees for railroad ties and well curbs. The place was flooded
with timber wood. Around the corner was a big sawmill. The sound of the saws was ripping the air into pieces.
The storage area and the sawmill belonged to Yuya. Takemaro’s stern look at it seemed to say: “Show your face, Murano Kichibee! Why don’t you show your face when you hear everybody shout banzai?”
So the first chapter of the construction of Ōhinata in Manchuria was written on July 8, but on that very evening the news of the start of the war on the continent following the Marco Polo Bridge Incident reached this village hidden in the mountains.

VIII

On February 11 the hall of the elementary school was packed with people because of the ceremony for Founding of the Nation Day. People filled the corridors and the place was so congested that people were climbing in through the windows.
When the ceremony for the Founding of the Nation Day was over, another ceremony was conducted for the foundation of the new Ōhinata Village in Manchuria. The school principal came up on stage again and declared in front of the pupils and villager standing together in front of him:
“Today on this auspicious day of the founding of our nation we in Ōhinata celebrate another happy event: We have finally founded our Ōhinata Village in Sijiafang (“four house hamlet”) in Shulan County, Jilin Province. Probably right now the group leader Horikawa heading the 37 members of the advance group is bravely making the first steps in the construction of the village all our hopes rest on. Isn’t this a truly auspicious day for all of us? We are all happy and moved to tears.”
The school principal did not just say so; he really took out his handkerchief and wiped his eyes. At the same time the sound of sobbing arose from the crowd of pupils and many girls wiped their eyes with their hands. In that instant all the present village functionaries were fighting back their tears.
“Everybody, let’s all sing the village song of Ōhinata in Manchuria at the top of our voices. Let’s try to send this song all the way to Manchuria. Even if they cannot hear us over there in Manchuria, let us sing all together as if they could hear us.”
While he said this, the principal looked over to Ōsawa Yūzō. Yūzō took a step forward from the organ and picked up the baton.
Everybody got up and when the organ started to play, some sobbing voices could be heard. Then everybody sang the village song:
With burning hopes to the continent
The pioneers of our great Japan
We divided the village of Ōhinata
And went to Sijiafang in Manchuria

We will be more than thousand settlers
Old and young together joyfully
In winter with its freezing cold of minus 30°
And in the scorching heat of summer

With arms of iron we wield the hoe
From the foot of Mount Nanling
To the border of Suiquliu
We will open up 10 square ri\(^3\) of land

Golden waves of more than a thousand hectares
Where we harvest 20,000 koku of rice
We have 3,000 hectares of dry field for grain
There is no corner left bare on the plains

To raise the flag of his imperial majesty
To take the harmony of the five races in your hand
To build the paradise of the imperial way
We will all march together

The boundless Eastern harmony
The calm water of the Suiliang River
The ever-lasting prosperity
Shines upon our village

Ōsawa Yūzō could not raise his face hidden in the shadow of the organ.

\(^{30}\text{1 ri} = 3.93\text{ kilometres}\)
From VIP seats and the corridor as well as from the crowded windows hoarse voices could be heard. Some of these voices were low and off-pitch, some other voices – especially the high voices of the female pupils – sounded astonishingly harmonious. While everybody was singing, tears were rolling down their cheeks.

At last all the villagers led by the voice of mayor Asakawa cheered banzai for Ōhinata Village in Manchuria. After three shouts of banzai, the people in the corridors and at the windows continued to shout and would not stop doing so for a while.

In the afternoon all pupils from the school assembled again in the school garden, all lined up carrying small flags in their hands. They were split in two groups, one group marching upstream along the Nukuigawa to the hamlets of Hiragawara, Mizubori, Yazawa, Shukudo, Koya and Kamaeri, the other one marched downstream to the hamlets of Shimogawara and Hongō.

After the fall of Nanjing there had been also been such a flag march. At that time the groups had stopped especially in front of the houses with family members in the army and had shouted three banzai. This time it was different. The groups stopped in front of the houses of the 38 members of the advance group and shouted three banzai there.

IX

The advance group sent letters about the situation in the new village where they were busily doing the construction work without any free time. There was no doubt about it, that under the control of group leader Horikawa everybody in turn took the responsibility to pick up the pen in the evening after the tiring work of the day in the dim light of the lamp and wrote a report.

The first report sent was written by Horikawa Shōzaburō:

"Mayor Asakawa,

The settlement area of our Ōhinata village in Sijiafang, Shulan County, Jilin Province is the area between Sijiafang Station and Suiquiliu Station on the La-Bin-Line connecting Lafa and Harbin in the north-eastern part of Jilin Province. Since it is not more than 20 ri to Jilin City, the group’s truck can sometimes make a return journey there in one day. The train journey to Harbin in the heart of Northern Manchuria takes four and a half hours, a journey to the capital Xinjing takes only seven hours, so our transport infrastructure is better than expected."
The layout of the village is nearly rectangular with 4 ri from north to south and 3 ri from east to west; it spreads out over the large area of 20 square ri. Apart from the mountain ranges at the east and the west of the village the most part of it is plain countryside. In contrast to our home village which is in “the direction of the big sun” in name only but which in reality lies in the dark shadows of the ranges of Mount Morai, this new village is in the wide open country and I think that Öhinata (in the direction of the big sun) is finally an appropriate name for it. In the mountains of the east and west many walnut trees, white birches, and pines trees are growing; the water of the river Suiliang that is running through the village from south to north is so clear that you can count the beautiful pebbles at its bottom, which is very rare for a Manchurian river; with several kinds of carp it really resembles the mountain rivers of Shinshū. I think that we are more than blessed with this settlement place in comparison to other places. That’s all for today. From now on we will all take turns to write detailed reports.

Horikawa Shōzaburō”

From then on the settlers took turns to write detailed reports to send them to Öhinata:

“Mayor Asakawa,

The area of the new village comprises of approximately 1,400 chō of paddy fields and 2,600 chō of dry fields, in addition there are 4,800 chō of mountainous forest. Although we have heard that in many other settlements the cultivation had started right away, too, we have excellent farmland here. Moreover, we have opened two canals in the paddy field area with an extension of 6 ri and 4 ri respectively. The areas which had been cultivated before had only been used for three or four years. We can at least use them for another ten years without fertilizer and expect to harvest between 1 and 1.5 koku per tan.

The paddy fields of our village in Japan are terraces carved in the mountainsides. They are small enough to hide them under an umbrella. They only provide us with a third of the village consumption in grain so that we even cannot feed ourselves. For us it is not easy to describe to you back home how big the difference in comparison is, to first and foremost make you understand and believe how large the scale is. Different from the grain you eat over there, we only have first class rice to eat here. Kōsuda Hyōgo says that it’s like in the old stories of Asama Saemon, we now eat only
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rice here in our new village in Manchuria. Because we are concerned that we might get beriberi when we only eat white rice, we started making wheat dumplings filled with red beans and eat them as snacks.

We have made very good progress in the area of our settlement. I could tell you about many of them, however, I am very tired now so the pen is not moving. The other members of our group are still outside, but I would like to thank you all in their names for your help. You know that we would like to welcome the members of the main group and our family members as soon as possible, so we shortened the time for our meals to work instead.

Takei Asakichi

“Mayor Asakawa,

Sijiafang is developing really fantastic. Last year there were only 20 households of settlers from Fukushima who came as defence groups for the railroad. Until then Sijiafang – just like its name says – had literally been a “four house hamlet” with four old Manchurian dwellings in front of the station. However, in just one year we have built many houses for a few hundred households and you would be really surprised to see one shop lined up next to the other.

At the moment the headquarters of our new village is in the hamlet of Shifenfang, just one ri from Sijiafang, however, we are now constructing a headquarters with a police station, a village office, a school, an agriculture cooperative, a hospital, etc. directly in Sijiafang. Since the government office of Shulan County which is now situated 20 ri to the north-west will move to the same place, our Ōhinata Village Headquarters will be in the building next door to the county headquarters, which corresponds to a prefectural office in Japan. Furthermore, since last year buildings for the experimental farm of our county and the county police station had been constructed here and the post office started its operation here in July of this year, we are looking forward to a brilliant future as a medium to large sized administrative centre.

In terms of the agricultural production in the most important central area, we can for instance look at the products piled up at Sijiafang station last year: measured in wagonloads of 24 tons each, there were 100 wagonloads of unpolished rice, 600 wagonloads of soya beans and more than 1,000 wagonloads of various local products such as other types of grain, coal and charcoal. This comprises only the collection and transport of large amounts of products. From the middle of next year a coal processing plant will be constructed 2 ri east of Sijiafang which will also generate a consider-
able amount of products. So we have invited 200 additional families of coal miners from Japan and are expecting that the town of Sijiafang will make an outstanding development. I think that the direct contact with this fast developing industrial and administrative centre in our vicinity will have a great influence on our village of Ōhinata. Now, concerning our security, there is the settlement of the railroad defence groups from Fukushima in the south, in the east and in the north there are a total of five other settlements from seventh-year settlers, thus the settlement area of Ōhinata is perfectly safe. Moreover, we have not heard of any incidents with bandits from the settlements in this region in the past. In this regard there is no need to worry.

At the moment we have 3,000 Manchurians and 1,000 Koreans, i.e., a total of 4,000 local people living in 22 hamlets in the area of the Ōhinata settlement. They work some of the land of the settlers as tenants and are a source of labour for all kinds of agricultural operations. Especially for the construction of the new village they come in very handy, however, for the future I think we have to do some in-depth research about the problem of our leadership of the Manchurian people and our harmonious coexistence.

Nishikawa Yoshiharu"

"Mayor Asakawa,

In lieu of the group leader I would like to give a report about this year’s construction measures. In the agricultural sector we will cultivate up to 20 chō of land with vegetables and we plan to erect 100 buildings for individual families, a school and a hospital. More than 70% of the construction material for the family houses has already been cut and is piled up in huge heaps on the square in front of the railway station. The space where we will construct our village headquarters next to the new county office is situated on a rather small hill from which we can see the open country in all four directions. There we will erect our village office, school, hospital and the agricultural cooperative. We are planning roads running from east to west and from north to south through the whole area. The roads will be 10 ken\(^{31}\) wide with 4 ken as a throughway for cars in the middle, 3 shaku for road trees as well as 2 ken on the outside of the tree lines for pedestrians on each side.

\(^{31}\) 1 ken = 1.82 metres
Concerning the construction of the school, we are planning to plant a 36m wide windbreaker forest and construct a skating rink covering 300 tsubo. You can imagine that these alone are grand-scale projects. On top of that the construction of the agricultural cooperative will start next year, first for hulling and polishing rice and milling flour, but than also for the communal production and distribution of soya sauce and miso.

Concerning the construction of the hamlets, we are planning 50 housing units for each hamlet. This year we intend to focus on the construction of the headquarters and the hamlet of Shifenfang. In the centre of the hamlets we will have a road 8 ken wide, of which 4 ken in the middle will be the road for the cars and 1 ken on each side for the pedestrians. Between the space for the cars and for the pedestrians we will plant road trees. On both sides of this wide road we will erect 25 houses each. Each household unit will receive an area of 120 tsubo. In the centre of this area 15 tsubo will be used for individual family houses with white walls. Since public bathing houses are being constructed there is no need for individual baths in each house. Since we are hurrying this year’s construction projects, we cannot cultivate more than the 20 chō of vegetable fields as described above. However, as we want to cultivate 20 chō of paddy fields and 50 chō of vegetable fields in the next year, we are striving to complete the construction as soon as possible. Thus we will finish the erection of our Ōhinata Village after only two years. Hence, besides the already mentioned cultivated land, the majority of the arable land will be given to Manchurian and Korean tenants. Everything concerning the rent paid by those tenants has been agreed upon with the Manchurian Development Company. Besides the land already under the plough, there are slightly more than 500 chō of land that still has to be developed. So from now on we will put our efforts into the survey and distribution of all this arable land as well as into the construction of canals and new roads for agriculture.

In the area there is a mountain range running from the east to the west, so the direction of the wind is restricted to the north to the south. We are planning to plant 20m wide windbreak forest every 400m. In the future the trees of these windbreak forests will enjoy a long and abundant growth. They will serve as a place for rest for men and horses with a cool breeze in the shade in summer; and in winter they will block the cold winds. Moreover, we will build agricultural roads through them and than we can start to allocate the arable land. Thus we can accomplish a really ideal farm area,

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32 1 tsubo = 3.31 square metres
where from early spring when first grass sprouts until the harvest of golden waves of grain in autumn the villagers of our Ōhinata village are busy working. We cannot help but feel sorry for the people in our home village squirming around in the narrow space in the shadow of Mount Morai. We are very grateful that we came to Manchuria where this splendid fertile soil had been waiting for us. Thus in the name of us all I would like to thank all of you and especially our mayor for your continued support.

Akiyama Ginjirō"

Then came a letter by the group leader Horikawa himself.

“Mayor Asakawa, 
You have been informed about the situation of the construction of the new village in turn by group members writing reports. Now I will hastily give you an overview of our budget since it is already past sleeping time. Although I have researched this point until late at night, I am embarrassed about my unskillfulness regarding the regulations for the allowances for the construction of individual settlers’ homes. Please let me know your consultations and corrections after you reviewed what I have considered. 
I would like to ask for the formation and send-off of the main group very quickly. In contrast to the other groups, we should resettle our family members in one single move. I will try to obtain the permission for the invitation of our family members as soon as possible from the offices in charge, and I would like to ask you for your continued cooperation in that matter.

Horikawa Kiyomi”

These letters were copied and distributed to all houses as soon as one of them had arrived. It goes without saying that these reports from the location of the settlement became an extraordinarily strong spur for the formation of the first main group. Suddenly thereafter the first main group with 34 members could be formed. Now Takemaro was the only person left behind in the village to strengthen the conviction, since all those people who had planned the endeavour from the beginning were now being sent away as well. However, he believed in the effects of on-site reports. Those who went over to Manchuria were ready to come back to Japan and offer their sup-
port whenever necessary, and thinking about the effect that would have gave him a firm resolution.

Kosuda Hyōgo said that he had to be at Kiyomi’s side as early as possible, and Kiyomi said the same. Nakazawa Yūzō would soon hand in his letter of resignation, Mizuhara Tozaburō was waiting for the day of his departure to Manchuria nearly paralysed. Of the five houses in the hamlet of Kamaeri only one household would stay behind, the other four – from the stingy Kudō Sannosuke to Kikuchi Masami – joined the migration. The equally stingy Ōya Gohei from Shimogawara went as well. Especially the fact that the fathers of Yokoi Hachirō and Yui Minosuke, who were due to depart for the front, also joined the migration with military khaki hats covering the nearly white hair of the two in their fifties caught people’s attention.

Although on April 11 the Imperial Army had started its southern advance on the continent versus Xuzhou, the first main group with its 34 members and Kosuda Hyōgo as its leader nevertheless departed in high spirits. With the school band taking the lead and everybody singing the song of the new village in Manchuria, the file of the farewell party was as long as always.

On Mai 16 the 14 people who were originally scheduled to leave with the first main group but had been delayed for certain reasons left as the second main group. Among these 14 people were the brothers of Ōizumi Seiji and Kikuchi Haruo who had died in the war. Haruo had been a young household head without a father; he had left his younger brother behind to look after their mother and elder sister. Seiji had been the second son, and now his older brother left for Manchuria, temporarily leaving behind a younger sister and both his parents longing to see the continent of their children and resettle there themselves.

The story of Ikawa Kume moved many people to tears. They thought that despite all their sorrow the two parents were really brave at the great farewell for their two sons.

X

July 8 was scheduled as the day for the first send-off for family members to Manchuria to commemorate the day one year earlier when the first 20 members of the advance group were sent off.

The time for the resettlement of the family members had not yet come according to the regulations for agricultural settler groups, however, taking into consideration the
specific situation of a single-village division, special permission was granted for the early resettlement of the family members.

So it was decided to send off the first 27 complete households consisting of a total of 117 members. Of the 27 members of the advance group waiting for their family, 17 returned to the village to help with the resettlement.

For those 27 households leaving behind the housed where had their roots and had lived for several hundred years to pack up and cross the ocean was a big event that had no precedent in the history of the village. There was no example of such a grand and heroic deed where people left with all their belongings not leaving a grain of dust behind.

The luggage of the peasant families contained also a lot of junk. There were cooking utensils like pots and kettles; small, medium and large kettles, small and large pots; one after the other they all came out of the darkest corners covered with spider webs. They all were soiled from handling by the ancestors, other people would ignore them or regard them as useless trash, but the members of the family would never think of neglecting them. They carried the spirit of their ancestors and were something like mortuary tablet on the Buddhist altar. Similar items were to be found among the farm tools.

Nobody could throw away even the stick of a hoe. The women were even washing the spider webs off the blade of a kitchen knife that had broken from its shaft when cutting vegetables and put it in their luggage. There were barrels with soya sauce and miso; and there were many big barrels with pickles. They even took the heavy stones on top of these many barrels with them, because these were not just any stones. Those were nothing less than important household appliances with the lustre of the oil rubbed on them by the hands of the ancestors. In Manchuria they would not make their soya sauce and miso individually, it would be produced in larger quantities in a local procession plant, so their individual tools were no longer necessary. But no matter how often people were told about this, nobody would even leave an empty barrel behind. It was not a question of whether one needed the barrel or not, those things were simply important family treasures.

Mortars as well as pounders, boards to flatten buckwheat noodles as well as rolling pins, kettles for roasting potatoes as well as flour buckets, were coming out everywhere and put into the luggage. Where the luggage became too much, the neighbours were called upon to help carry the largest pieces of luggage. Although only
four of the eight households of Kamaeri left, there were not enough people to carry the luggage and the Youth League had to be called to help.

The 27 families had all together 352 pieces of big luggage. To transport them to the train station in Haneguroshita on the day before their departure ten trucks were needed. The houses they left behind were standing there like skeletons. Wooden tags saying: “Building number so and so administered by the industrial cooperative” were nailed to all of them so that the people leaving did not worry.

On July 8, the day of the departure, all households of the whole village were displaying the national flag to express their congratulations; literally every single household in the whole village had posted a flag at the entrance as if it were looking for the house in the absence of its owners. The people had all assembled at the Suwa Shrine to see off those 107 people whom they might never see again in their lifetime. The elderly, the small children and women with babies strapped on their back had been transported to Haneguroshita station with trucks, those able to walk had come on foot. Many even walked to the station although they overstretched themselves, because they felt that they had to walk to touch the earth of their home step by step for memories.

Like before there was a long file with the school band at its head and elementary school pupils singing the new village song stretching all the way to the village boundary without a visible end, but this time the whole file continued all the way to Haneguroshita station. Nobody turned around and left half way, everybody had come to walk all the way.

Again the people of Umise Village had all come to Haneguroshita, the square in front of the station was soon covered with people. These people from the neighbouring village were all carrying little flags in their hand which they waved amidst cheers of welcome. The station was filled with people, the platform overflowing with those leaving and those staying behind, people were pushed on the tracks and there was no way through the crowd on the square. As could be expected there were not only women wiping their eyes with their handkerchiefs. Although they said that they were going all the way to Manchuria, they were like the oak used for dykes, having lived in the same place even for many generations when cut to the stump. There were people who thought that leaving this place might be something like the end of their life. Many of them had never gone beyond the Saku Plain.
Many wiped away their tears when in the distance they saw the figure of 89-year-old Kosuda Haru, clutching her small luggage with both hands. She was one of those who had literally packed up the ancestors’ tablet to take them with her when crossing the ocean.

People wholeheartedly were shouting: “Take care, grandmother!” and “Stay healthy!” when they saw Haru and all were wiping their eyes.

“Hey, I cannot work any more, so for me walking without being ill is already like working,” answered Haru, her eyes blinking behind her wrinkles.

Takei Fuku carried no other luggage but a small cotton bundle in public display. Again many people shed tears when seeing this figure clutching her bundle with both hands. Everybody knew that those were the remains of poor Sue. Like she stated in her last will, Sue would be buried in Manchurian soil. Fuku was accompanied by Asakichi who had come to get her after one year in Manchuria, looking rather different, well nourished and masculine in his settlers uniform. Next to them were Nishikawa Ume and Katsuyo.

“Old mother, stay healthy! And don’t think bad about me when you remember my face.” The one who said that with a sultry voice was Yui Keinosuke who came along despite his arched back.

“Goodness, mayor!”

Fuku cried while laughing. The old woman was one of those old ladies who would call him mayor even now after they had called him mayor for 12 years.

“Although you really put me under pressure, I carry no bad memories of you.”

Now Keinosuke started crying too.

“Goodness, I cannot repay your kindness after all those problems I have caused you, thus my Hiroo will have to look after you over there.”

“Listen, mayor, even if we go over there, we would not even dream of setting a foot in the direction of the mayor”, said Hatakejima Sai who was at her side. Today her bear-like body seemed small and crouched forward, her moist eyes were laughing.

“Come on, Sai, you would even put a bear to flight.”

“Goodness...”

In the middle of the commotion of the pupils singing the new village song and waving their little flags stood one man in a white uniform, smiling and upright like a teacher. Next to him stood former vice-mayor Sugawa Sahei who today even forgot his usual jokes and stood there with a controlled expression. When this man in the white uni-
form had arrived, the pupils had even forgotten to make funny faces and kick each other. It was Ishida who as the official in charge had especially come from the prefectural office for the occasion.

Although he was smiling brightly, Ishida's eyelashes were moist.

“Long live Ōhinata Village!”

“Long live Ōhinata Village in Manchuria!”

Sent off by a wave of cheers and flags the train started to move slowly.

The Saku Plain was in the middle of the rice transplanting season, so all the people in the paddy field shouted “Long live Ōhinata Village!” – “Long live Ōhinata Village in Manchuria!” when the saw the train.

The train passed the Chikuma River in the Saku Plain until it slid to the north on the Shin-Etsu Line in Komoro. It travelled through shower of banzai shouts from the fields, the villages and the cities.
## 11. Glossary of Japanese Terms and Institutions

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<td>nōhonshugi</td>
<td>農本主義</td>
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<td>Nōkaihō</td>
<td>農会法</td>
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<td>Agricultural migrant</td>
<td>nōgyō imin</td>
<td>農業移民</td>
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<td>Asahi newspaper company</td>
<td>Asahi shinbunsha</td>
<td>朝日新聞社</td>
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<td>Manshū jū kyōkai</td>
<td>満州移住協会</td>
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<td>Association for Rural Revitalization</td>
<td>Nōson kōsei kyōkai</td>
<td>農村更生協会</td>
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<td>Association for the Publication of Recollections from Manchuria</td>
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<td>Hoku-Shin fukyō baisakai</td>
<td>北信不況対策会</td>
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<td>Branch village</td>
<td>bunson</td>
<td>分村</td>
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<tr>
<td>Brigade of Patriotic Youths for the Development of Manchuria and Mongolia</td>
<td>Man-Mō kaitaku seishōnen giyūgun</td>
<td>満蒙開拓青少年義勇軍</td>
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<td>Bungei Shunjū</td>
<td>Bungei shunjū</td>
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<td>Business migrants</td>
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<td>Nōson keizai kōsei chūō iinkai</td>
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<td>Central Committee of the Industrial Cooperatives</td>
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<td>Takumu kyōkai</td>
<td>拓務協会</td>
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<td>Takumushō takumukyoku</td>
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<tr>
<td>Colonialization, cultivation</td>
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<td>Hamlet</td>
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Leader

Left-behind orphan

Legal person, corporation

‘Light of the Home’-Association

Mantaku = Public Corporation for Land Reclamation in Manchuria

Mantetsu = South Manchurian Railway Company

Migrant group

Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry

Ministry of Colonial Affairs

*Miyako Shinbun*

Mother village

Nagano Association for Rural Rehabilitation

Nangō Village Committee for the Sponsorship of Emigration to Manchuria and Mongolia

Nangō Village Emigration Scheme

Nangō National Higher Level School

Number of aboriginal households

Öhinata Village News

Opening of the forest

Outline of the Basic Policy of the Development of Manchuria

Overpopulation rate

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<td>Legal person, corporation</td>
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Patriotic Women’s Association | *Aikoku fujinkai*<br> 愛国婦人会
Plan for the Resettlement of 1 Million Households over 20 Years | *Nijūkanen hyakumankō sōshutsu keikaku*<br> 二十カ年百万戸送出計画
Poverty in Farming, Forestry, and Fishing Communities | *Nōsangyoson ni okeru seikatsu konkyū jōkyō*<br> 農山漁村に於ける生活困窮状況
Privy Council of the Manchurian Government | *Canyifu* (Chinese)<br> *Sangifu* (Japanese)<br> 参議府
Pseudo-Manshūkoku | *Gi Manshūkoku*<br> 偽満州国
Public Corporation for Land Reclamation in Manchurian | *Manshū takushoku kōsha*<br> 満州拓殖公社
Puppet state | *kairai kokka*<br> 傀儡国家
Regulation for Special Assistance to Economic Revitalization Plans | *Keizai kōsei keikaku to-kubetsu josei kisoku*<br> 経済更生計画特別助成規則
Society for the Research into the History of Migration to Manchuria | *Manshū iminshi kenkyū-kai*<br> 満州移民史研究会
Reservist Association | *Zaigō gunjinkai*<br> 在郷軍人会
Round-table discussion | *zadankai*<br> 座談会
Rural literature movement | *nōmin bungaku undō*<br> 農民文学運動
Rural Revitalization Campaign | *Nōson keizai kōsei undō*<br> 農村経済更生運動
Second-year settlers | *Dai ni ji imin dan*<br> 第二次移民団
Sekai | *Sekai*<br> 世界
Senior | *senpai*<br> 先輩
Settler, colonist | *kaitakumin*<br> 開拓民
Settlers’ paradise | *imin no rakudo*<br> 移民の楽土
Seven Big Policies | *shichi daikokusaku*<br> 七大国策
Shinano Overseas Association | *Shinano kaigai kyōkai*<br> 信濃海外協会
Social Policy Association | *Shakai seisaku gakkai*<br> 社会政策学会
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<tr>
<td>Society for (research into) the History of Manchuria</td>
<td>Manshikai</td>
<td>満史会</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Manchurian Railway Company</td>
<td>Minami Manshū tetsudō kabushikigaisha</td>
<td>南満州鉄道株式会社</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Assistance Village</td>
<td>Keizai kōsei tokubetsu joseison</td>
<td>経済更生特別助成村</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spiritual revitalization</td>
<td>seishin kōsei</td>
<td>精神更生</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Squad</td>
<td>han</td>
<td>班</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenrikyō</td>
<td>Tenrikyō</td>
<td>天理教</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tokyo Asahi Shinbun</td>
<td>Tōkyō asahi shinbun</td>
<td>東京朝日新聞</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tomobe National Higher Level School</td>
<td>Tomobe kokumin kōtō gakkō</td>
<td>友部国民高等学校</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tsukurukai = Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform</td>
<td>Atarashii rekishi kyōkasho wo tsurukai</td>
<td>新しい歴史教科書をつくる会</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union of Mainstays</td>
<td>chūken renmei</td>
<td>中堅連盟</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village</td>
<td>mura</td>
<td>村</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village mainstays</td>
<td>chūshin jinbutsu</td>
<td>中心人物</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village mainstays</td>
<td>chūken jinbutsu</td>
<td>中堅人物</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village-division</td>
<td>bunson</td>
<td>分村</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village-Division Campaign</td>
<td>bunson undō</td>
<td>分村運動</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ward</td>
<td>ku</td>
<td>区</td>
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<tr>
<td>Way of the farmer</td>
<td>nōmindō</td>
<td>農民道</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Way of the warrior</td>
<td>bushidō</td>
<td>武士道</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yoshihon Limited</td>
<td>Yoshihon gōshigaisha</td>
<td>与志本合資会社</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young Men’s Group</td>
<td>sōnendan</td>
<td>壯年団</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth League</td>
<td>Rengo seinendan</td>
<td>連合青年団</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yūaikai</td>
<td>Yūaikai</td>
<td>友愛会</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
12. Glossary of Chinese Terms and Institutions

Committee for the Compilation of the Fourteen Year History of Foreign Rule [in Manchuria]  
Lunxian shisi nian shi bianzuan weiyuanhui  
滫陷十四年編纂委員會

Institute for the Research about the History of the Chinese Communist Party  
Zhongguo gongchandang zhongyang dangshi yanjiushi  
中国共產党中央黨史研究室

Pseudo-Manzhouguo  
Wei Manzhouguo  
偽滿州國

13. Glossary of Place Names in Manchuria

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Japanese pronunciation</th>
<th>Chinese pronunciation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aikawa</td>
<td>Aichuan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chōshun</td>
<td>Changshun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chiburi</td>
<td>Qianzhen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harubin</td>
<td>Haerbin</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iyasaka</td>
<td>Mirong</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kakiji</td>
<td>Jiamusi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kantō</td>
<td>Guandong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kokutai</td>
<td>Heitai</td>
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<td>Manshū</td>
<td>Manzhou</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mizuho</td>
<td>Ruisui</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shikabō</td>
<td>Sijiafang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shinkyō</td>
<td>Xinjing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
14. Glossary of Place Names in Japan

Fujimi (Nagano Prefecture) 富士見村
Hirane (Nagano Prefecture) 平根村
Kurikuma (Kagawa Prefecture) 栗熊村
Najimi (Ishikawa Prefecture) 南志見村
Nakagawa (Saitama Prefecture) 中川村
Nangō (Miyagi Prefecture) 南郷村
Ōhinata (Nagano Prefecture) 大日向村
Yamato (Yamagata Prefecture) 大和村
Yomikaki (Nagano Prefecture) 読書村

15. Glossary of Japanese Names

Arima Yoriyasu 有馬顕寧 (1884-1957)
Asakawa Takemaro 浅川武麿 (1899-?)
Gotō Fumio 後藤文夫 (1888-1980)
Gotō Shinpei 後藤新平 (1857-1929)
Hashimoto Denzaemon 橋本傳左衛門 (1877-1977)
Hatakeyama Shigesama 畠山重正
Hirota Kōki 広田弘毅 (1878-1948)
Horiguchi Tatsusaburō 堀口辰三郎
Horikawa Kiyomi 堀川清躬 (1888-1946)
Horikawa Motoo 堀川源雄 (1907-?)
Hosokawa Mitsusada 細川光貞
Ishiguro Tada’atsu 石黒忠篤 (1884-1960)
Ishiwara Kanji 石原莞爾 (1889-1949)
Kanai Noburo 金井延 (1865-1933)
Katō Kanji 加藤完治 (1884-1967)
Kobayashi Tomomitsu 小林友光
Kodaira Gon’ichi 小平權一 (1884-1976)
Kokubu Kameo 国分龟雄
Kozawa Tokutarō 梶沢德太郎
Kumatani Sada'ichi 熊谷貞一
Kurita Masa'ichi 栗田匡一
Maeda Katsumi 前田勝実
Matsubara Senju 松原専重
Matsukawa Gorō 松川五郎
Matsuse Shigeri 松瀬茂里
Minakawa Nananosuke 皆川七之助
Miyamoto Masatake 宮本正武
Miyoshi Takeo 三好武男
Nagai Ryūtarō 永井柳太郎 (1881-1944)
Nasu Hiroshi 那須皓 (1888-1984)
Nishigaki Kiyoji 西垣喜代次
Nishimura Tomisaburō 西村富三郎
Sato Hyōemon 里兵衛門
Sō Mitsuhiko 宗光彦
Sugino Tadao 杉野忠夫
Suzuki Bunji 鈴木文治 (1885-1946)
Takahashi Korekiyō 高橋是清 (1854-1936)
Takaoka Kumao 高岡熊雄 (1871-1961)
Togashi Hatsue 富樫はつえ
Togashi Naotarō 富樫直太郎
Tōmiya Kaneo 東宮鉄男 (1892-1937)
Uchida Yoshikazu 内田祥三 (1885-1972)
Wada Tsutō 和田伝 (1900-?)
Yamamoto Jōtarō 山本条太郎
Yamazaki Yoshio 山崎芳雄
Yanaihara Tadao 矢内原忠雄 (1893-1961)
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no Chōsenjin kaitaku imin” '満洲' そこに打ち捨てられ者: 20 数万人の朝鮮人開
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